Stefano F. Verde

Overreaction to Excise Taxes: The Case of Gasoline

In this paper we contribute new results on the different consumers’ reaction to tax or price changes. We separately compute the compensated gasoline retail price elasticity and the gasoline tax elasticity and show that consumers overreact to taxes as compared to price variations. A novel element in our analysis is that we compare reactions to tax-inclusive retail prices to reactions to information on excise taxes that is made available to consumers. We estimate a complete system of demand for the U.S. population of households using quarterly data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey from 2007 to 2009. Relying on a complete system of demands rather than on single equations avoids imposing an implausible separability restriction, thus allowing estimation of accurate elasticities that take behavioral responses into account, i.e. that account for the way in which consumers reallocate their expenditure on a bundle of goods after a price/tax change in one of the goods. Our analysis shows that the reaction to a gasoline tax change is, on average, about 20% stronger than the reaction to a corresponding price change. We discuss the implications of our findings for the design of energy policies.

The signaling effect of gasoline taxes and its distributional implications

This paper proposes and tests a better defined interpretation of the different responses of gasoline demand to tax changes and to market-related price changes. Namely, the signaling effect of gasoline taxes is one that impacts on long-run consumer decisions in addition to the incentives provided by tax-inclusive gasoline prices. Our hypothesis is tested using a complete demand system augmented with information on gasoline taxes and fitted to household-level data from the 2006 to 2013 rounds of the US Consumer Expenditure survey. Information on gasoline taxes is found to be a significant determinant of household demand additional to tax-inclusive gasoline prices. The equity implications are examined by contrasting the incidence across income distribution of a simulated

Differential demand response to gasoline taxes and gasoline prices in the U.S.

0.22/gallon tax increase to that of a market-related price increase equal in size. The tax increase is clearly regressive, slightly more than the market-related price increase. However, regressivity is by no means a reason to give up gasoline taxes as an instrument for reducing gasoline consumption externalities. Their high effectiveness in reducing gasoline demand implies that small tax increases can substantially improve the environment while minimizing the related distributional effects. Also, gasoline taxes generate revenue that can be used to offset their regressivity.