Stefano Turchetta

Query complexity of approximate equilibria in anonymous games

Abstract We study the computation of Nash equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that use adaptive queries to a games payoff function. We show that exact equilibria cannot be found via query-efficient algorithms, and exhibit a two-strategy, 3-player anonymous game whose exact equilibria require irrational numbers. We obtain positive results for known sub-classes of anonymous games. Our main result is a new randomized query-efficient algorithm for approximate equilibria of two-strategy anonymous games that improves on the running time of previous algorithms. It is the first to obtain an inverse polynomial approximation in poly-time, and yields an efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme.

Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games

We study the computation of equilibria of two-strategy anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the games payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is query complexity, that is, how many queries are necessary or sufficient to compute an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium. We show that exact equilibria cannot be found via query-efficient algorithms. We also give an example of a 2-strategy, 3-player anonymous game that does not have any exact Nash equilibrium in rational numbers. Our main result is a new randomized query-efficient algorithm that finds a

Modified release formulations of a bupropion salt

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Polymorphs of 1-cyclopropyl-7-([s,s])-2,8-diazadicyclo[4.3.0]non-8-yl)-6-fluoro-1,4-dihydro -8-methoxy-4-oxo-3-quinoline carboxylic acid hydrochloride and methods for the preparation thereof

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Process for the preparation of sulphinyl derivatives by oxidation of the corresponding sulfides

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Process for the preparation of the amorphous form of atorvastatin calcium salt

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