Stephanie Kurzenhäuser

Judgments of risk frequencies : Tests of possible cognitive mechanisms

How do people judge which of 2 risks claims more lives per year? The authors specified 4 candidate mechanisms and tested them against peoples judgments in 3 risk environments. Two mechanisms, availability by recall and regressed frequency, conformed best to peoples choices. The same mechanisms also accounted well for the mapping accuracy of estimates of absolute risk frequencies. Their nearly indistinguishable level of performance is remarkable given their different assumptions about the underlying cognitive processes and the fact that they give rise to different expectations regarding the accuracy of peoples inferences. The authors discuss this seeming paradox, the lack of impact of financial incentives on judgmental accuracy, and the dominant interpretation of inaccurate inferences in terms of biased information processing.

Affect-inducing risk communication: current knowledge and future directions

Affect appears to have a central role in people’s risk perception and decision-making. It is, therefore, important that researchers and communicators know how risk communication can induce affect or more specific emotions. In this paper, several studies that examined affect-inducing cues presented in and around risk communication are discussed. We thereby distinguish between integral affect induction, meaning through the risk message, and incidental affect induction, which occurs unintentional through the risk communication context. The following cues are discussed: emotion induction, fear appeals, outrage factors, risk stories, probability information, uncertainty information and graphs and images. Relatively few studies assessed the effect of their risk communication material on affect or specific emotions. Incidental affect induction appeared to occur more often than expected based on its factual content. Risk communication easily seems to induce affect incidentally and, thus, may be difficult to control. We, therefore, argue that incidental affect induction is more influential than integral affect induction. Implications for further research and risk communication in practice are given. Based on this overview, we strongly suggest considering and empirically assessing the affect-inducing potential of risk communication formats and content during their development and evaluation.

Risikokommunikation in der BSE-Krise: Illusorische Sicherheit und Transparenz

ZusammenfassungViele offene Fragen bestimmen die Diskussion über BSE-Risiken. So fehlen zum Beispiel zentrale Informationen zur Übertragung der Krankheit vom Rind auf den Menschen, Technologien zur Diagnose der Infektion sind noch nicht voll entwickelt und politische Verordnungen zum Verbraucherschutz müssen sich erst noch in der Praxis bewähren. Wie bewältigen Experten aus Politik, Wissenschaft und Biotechnologie die Aufgabe, den Verbraucher über derartige Unsicherheiten aufzuklären? Experten versuchen häufig, trotz der zugrunde liegenden Unsicherheiten einen Eindruck von Sicherheit zu vermitteln. Solche illusorische Sicherheiten können den Verbraucher irreführen, und ihre Enthüllung kann zu Vertrauensverlust und gesteigerter Risikowahrnehmung führen. Am Beispiel der BSE-Schnelltests wird gezeigt, wie selektive Informierung über die Zuverlässigkeit der Tests zum Eindruck illusorischer Sicherheit führen kann. Als Alternative dazu wird eine Methode vorgestellt die es ermöglicht, statistische Informationen auf verständliche Weise zu kommunizieren. Abschließend wird die Bedeutung einer transparenten Verbraucherinformation über Unsicherheiten im Zusammenhang mit BSE diskutiert.AbstractDiscussion of BSE risks involves many open questions. For example, we lack important information on the mechanism of transmission between cows and humans, technologies to diagnose the infection are not yet fully developed and political regulations for consumer protection have yet to prove their efficacy under applied conditions. This paper concerns the question of how experts from politics, science and biotechnology currently inform consumers about such uncertainties. Experts frequently try to give the impression of certainty, although there is none. The resulting illusion of certainty can deceive the public and leads, once revealed, to a loss in trust and an increase in risk perception. An alternative and more transparent way of communicating risk information is presented.

How to Foster Citizens’ Statistical Reasoning: Implications for Genetic Counseling

Objectives: Our aim is to provide an overview of key research findings from cognitive psychology regarding effective ways of communicating statistical information, and to point out the implications of these findings for genetic testing. Method: We review the literature on the presentation of statistical information in diagnostic test results, discuss various representations that invite misunderstandings, and propose alternative representations that foster understanding. Results: Single-event probabilities, conditional probabilities and relative risks are easily misunderstood. Specifying the class of events to which a probability refers and using natural frequency statements improve understanding. Conclusions: Cognitive psychology has identified simple and effective tools for improving statistical reasoning. They can help to improve the public’s understanding of diagnostic test results.