Stephen Blank

Geostrategic aims of the Russian arms trade in East Asia and the Middle East

Russia views its military exports as a major tool for achieving its national security interests, particularly, in the East Asia and the Middle East. The arms trade is an integral part of its image as a world power, a critical part of its relationship with other states in Asia, a central element in its defense and security agreements, and an essential component of its ability to obtain and maintain access to influence and resources in regions of interest. So, while it is true that Russia does sell arms and military equipment to generate revenue and extend production runs for its defense industry, it is erroneous to claim that this in the central driver behind Russia’s arms trade. Russia seeks to maintain and expand its status as a world power, and views the focused, purposeful export of its military technologies to key countries as a fundamental tool in achieving this.

The New Great Game of Caspian energy in 2013–14: ‘Turk Stream’, Russia and Turkey

Abstract Rerouting South Stream through Turkey, Russia is striking at Azerbaijan and at potential Central Asian gas exporters to Europe. Over the last couple of years, under Baku’s lead, Azerbaijan and Turkey have been working on bringing to fruition the so-called Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which aims to bring Caspian-sourced gas through the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) to the Turco-Greek border and, from there, to South-eastern Europe via the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and regional interconnectors. The goal of this paper is to examine Russia’s recent high-stakes game to threaten vital Azerbaijani interests, including the SGC, particularly developments since the cancellation of South Stream—or ‘Turk Stream’. ‘Turk Stream’ is likely to propel the Balkans and Ukraine into front-line states in a serious struggle between the European Union and Russia. Yet, the obstacles to ‘Turk Stream’ are considerable. It is by no means certain that Russia and Turkey can pursue antagonistic policies geopolitically and simultaneously maximize the benefits of their deepened energy relation and increased economic cooperation. And in its eagerness to become a gas hub, Turkey has severely limited the possibilities for Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Central Asian gas producers to break free of Moscow’s energy grip.

Russia and Latin America The New Frontier for Geopolitics, Arms Sales and Energy

Russia attempts to leverage itself onto the global stage and be portrayed as a global power that must be consulted on major global issues. It does so in order to claim a status of equality with the United States and force it to consider Russian interests before the United States acts in those regions where Russia claims to have vital or important interests, even though its ability to play on a truly global stage is quite limited. Nevertheless, for the reasons advanced above, in Latin America Moscow endeavors to cut a global figure, even if its commercial presence there pales relative to the U.S. or Chinese presence. Although world attention now focuses on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is once again simultaneously expanding its presence in Latin America. Since this process has received little scrutiny, this paper attempts to provide an assessment of Moscow’s goals, strategies, tactics, and policy instruments.

Russian Strategy and Policy in the Middle East

Stephen J. Blank is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington. From 1989–2013 he was Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Pennsylvania and in 1998–2001, he was Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the War College. He has written or edited fifteen books on Russian foreign, energy, and military policies. Prof. Blank is currently writing a book entitled Light from the East: Russia’s Quest for Great Power Status in Asia, to be published by Ashgate.

Triangularism Old and New: China, Russia, and the United States

This chapter addresses the evolution of the so called strategic triangle since 2014. It argues that whereas the Obama Administration dismissed the whole idea of a triangle, it is impossible to discern as of yet any coherent strategy of the Trump Administration. Meanwhile Russo-Chinese relations have evolved towards a de facto alliance (although not a formal one) where China is the dominant player and Russia’s dependence upon it is steadily growing. This dependence is visible in the need for political and economic support vis-a-vis the West and the steady growth of Chinese power in Central Asia. But most of all we see it in the steady movement of Russian positions on outstanding issues of Asian security towards China’s position. This movement reflects a drift away from previous efforts to maintain an independent Russian position on outstanding security questions in East Asia and reflects the alliance dynamics at work. So while Russia and China are playing by triangular dynamics, it is more uncertain where US policy is going, and therefore also uncertain in what direction the triangular dynamic is heading.

Russo-Chinese Relations in Strategic Perspective

The Crimean crisis in March 2014 impels us to reconsider Sino-Russian relations. From Russia’s perspective, all that matters is that China—its largest trading partner and the primary hope for future investments—opposed sanctions and would not formally oppose Moscow at the Security Council. We see the limits of Russia’s ability to resist Chinese power in economic issues, e.g., energy and arms sales. China continues to pocket its gains: access to Russian oil, leverage over Rosneft, deterioration of East-West ties, and new arms sales. Moscow has signally failed to anchor the political-economic system, and Russia is increasingly anchored to China as energy and arms sales suggest. This is the conclusion despite Russian efforts to find some balance.

Making Sense of the Russo-North Korea Rapprochement

By 2013, Russia aimed to assert its independent status as a major contributor to stabilization on the Korean Peninsula and to avoid marginalization by standing apart from efforts to restrain North Korea. Many see South Korea’s harder line and US policies as primarily responsible for North Korea’s adventurism and believe Washington still seeks regime change under the guise of coerced denuclearization. They blame Washington and Seoul as much if not more than Pyongyang for the impasse since 2010, frustrating efforts at diplomacy in lieu of a North Korean commitment to denuclearize. Moscow’s anti-Americanism permits North Korea to continue its military buildup, secure in the fact that both China and Russia, despite their regional rivalries, will preserve the “northern alliance” against Washington and its allies and give it space, if not resources, to proceed.

The Soviet–Israeli War, 1967–1973: The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli Conflict

The publication of this book could not be timelier. Vladimir Putin’s current intervention in Syria and Russia’s Middle East policy bear a striking resemblance to the policies of the Brezhnev Politburo of the late 1960s and ’70s. Indeed, Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez admit as much in their conclusion. But the importance of this volume far transcends its relevance to contemporary affairs. Just as the authors did in their previous work, Foxbats Over Dimona, they again successfully compel readers and researchers to confront evidence that upends their long-established and often comforting preconceptions.

The North Caucasus: Russia’s Other War

ABSTRACT This essay examines Russia’s ongoing counterinsurgency war in the North Caucasus in the light of Russian historical strategies and some Western or comparative principles that pertain to such wars. We argue that Russia is failing to bring this war toward resolution and that it is already deforming the state structure and could engender even more negative consequences for the Russian state due to conditions under which it is being waged, including the impact of Moscow’s wars in Syria and Ukraine.