Stephen Coulthart

Why do analysts use structured analytic techniques? An in-depth study of an American intelligence agency

Abstract This article presents findings from the first publicly available survey generalizable to an intelligence agency to explore why analysts use structured analytic techniques (SATs). Mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), SATs are simple methodologies supposed to make analysis more transparent and, hopefully, valid. Despite the US government’s investment in training thousands of analysts, there is no solid evidence on how often or why analysts actually use SATs. A survey of 80 analysts and nine follow-up interviews at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reveals a simple, but important, truth: implementing the techniques requires training and compelling evidence they will improve analysis. Other factors, most notably the amount of time pressure an analyst experiences, were not significantly related with the use of the techniques despite anecdotal accounts and conjecture from the literature. Future research should examine other intelligence agencies to cross-validate these findings. If these findings hold in other cases, intelligence agencies should focus on reforming and incorporating evidence into the training process.

Terra Incognita: Mapping American Intelligence Education Curriculum

For more than two decades, degree-granting intelligence programs have popped up around the U.S., representing the largest and perhaps most enduring investment in American intelligence education. Scholars have addressed issues in American intelligence education, but to date, there has been no focused study that has mapped and analyzed these programs. This article addresses this gap by answering the questions: What are the American intelligence programs and what content is being taught? We answered this question by systematically identifying all 17 American intelligence education programs (1992-2012). The picture that emerges is one of delayed, but rapid growth: most programs were founded after 2005. After collecting and analyzing hundreds of course descriptions using a widely-accepted qualitative data analysis method called constant comparison, we mapped the curricular structure of the intelligence programs in aggregate. The contribution of this research is to increase understanding of the structure of American intelligence curriculum for current and future intelligence educators as well as employers. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss3/3

Structure and Performance in a Violent Extremist Network The Small-world Solution

This study combines network science and ethnography to explore how al-Muhajiroun, a banned Islamist network, continued its high-risk activism despite being targeted for disruption by British authorities. We analyze news reports, interviews, and field notes using social network analysis and qualitative content analysis to test hypotheses pertaining to network structure and performance. Our analysis suggests that the activist network’s structural properties had important implications for its performance during three separate time periods. What began as a centralized, scale-free-like, small-world network centered on a charismatic leader evolved into a more decentralized “small-world-like” network featuring clusters of local activists connected through multiple bridges. This structure allowed the activist network to engage in contentious politics even as its environment became increasingly hostile. We conclude by discussing the implications of al-Muhajiroun’s small-world solution for scholars and policy makers.

What’s the problem? Frameworks and methods from policy analysis for analyzing complex problems

Abstract The importance of problem structuring – the activity of making sense of problems – has been grasped by many scholars of policy analysis, a profession that shares much in common in form and function with intelligence analysis. This article imports some of the lessons, frameworks and methodologies of problem structuring to intelligence analysis from policy analysis. The concept of a Type III error is introduced, the analytical mistake of misunderstanding a problem, along with several methodologies designed to help analysts structure problems. One such methodology from policy analysis, called boundary analysis, is demonstrated on a national security case, the 2014 Syrian chemical weapons destruction process.

Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction?

Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction? Charles Husband (Professor of Social Analysis, University of Bradford, UK, and fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: c.h.husband@bradford. ac.uk) and Yunis Alam (Lecturer and researcher, University of Bradford, UK. E-mail: m.y.alam1@bradford. ac.uk) Bristol: Policy Press, 2011, 272 pp. £21.99. ISBN: 978-1847428011