Michael Kenney

The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of Organisation in the Colombian Cocaine Trade

For much of the past twenty-five years, the US-led war on drugs has been premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of Colombian drug trade. Instead of being run by a handful of massive, price-fixing ‘cartels’, the Colombian drug trade, then and now, was characterized by a fluid social system where flexible exchange networks expanded and retracted according to market opportunities and regulatory constraints. To support this interpretation, I draw on primary and secondary source data I collected in Colombia and the US, including interviews with several dozen hard-to-reach informants. I analyze these data to analyze the organisational form and functioning of ‘Colombian’ trafficking networks, focusing on how these illicit enterprises communicate, coordinate their activities, and make decisions, with an eye towards deflating some of the more persistent myths that have grown up around these transnational enterprises.

“Dumb” Yet Deadly: Local Knowledge and Poor Tradecraft Among Islamist Militants in Britain and Spain

Islamist militants frequently lack a talent for tradecraft. In recent attacks in Britain and Spain, terrorists made numerous mistakes: receiving traffic citations while traveling in “enemy” territory, acting suspiciously when questioned by the police, and traveling together during missions. Militants’ preference toward suicide operations restricts their ability to acquire practical experience, particularly when they lose their lives during attacks. And their unyielding devotion to their cause blinds them to opportunities to improve their operations. This is good news for counterterrorism officials. Terrorists’ poor tradecraft provides alert law enforcers with critical leads they can use to identify their attackers, unravel their plots, and—sometimes—disrupt their operations before they cause additional harm.

Beyond the Internet: Metis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for Islamist Terrorists

This study challenges the conventional wisdom that the Internet is a reliable source of operational knowledge for terrorists, allowing them to train for terrorist attacks without access to real-world training camps and practical experience. The article distinguishes between abstract technical knowledge (what the Greeks called techne) and practical, experiential knowledge (mētis), investigating how each helps terrorists prepare for attacks. This distinction offers insight into how terrorists acquire the practical know-how they need to perform their activities as opposed to abstract know-what contained in bomb-making manuals. It also underscores the Internets limitations as a source of operational knowledge for terrorists. While the Internet allows militants to share substantial techne, along with religious and ideological information, it is not particularly useful for disseminating the experiential and situational knowledge terrorists use to engage in acts of political violence. One likely reason why Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists have not made better use of the Internets training potential to date is that its value as a source of operational knowledge of terrorism is limited.

Organisational adaptation in an activist network: social networks, leadership, and change in al-Muhajiroun.

Social networks are said to facilitate learning and adaptation by providing the connections through which network nodes (or agents) share information and experience. Yet, our understanding of how this process unfolds in real-world networks remains underdeveloped. This paper explores this gap through a case study of al-Muhajiroun, an activist network that continues to call for the establishment of an Islamic state in Britain despite being formally outlawed by British authorities. Drawing on organisation theory and social network analysis, we formulate three hypotheses regarding the learning capacity and social network properties of al-Muhajiroun (AM) and its successor groups. We then test these hypotheses using mixed methods. Our methods combine quantitative analysis of three agent-based networks in AM measured for structural properties that facilitate learning, including connectedness, betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality, with qualitative analysis of interviews with AM activists focusing organisational adaptation and learning. The results of these analyses confirm that al-Muhajiroun activists respond to government pressure by changing their operations, including creating new platforms under different names and adjusting leadership roles among movement veterans to accommodate their spiritual leaders unwelcome exodus to Lebanon. Simple as they are effective, these adaptations have allowed al-Muhajiroun and its successor groups to continue their activism in an increasingly hostile environment.

A Community of True Believers: Learning as Process among “The Emigrants”

ABSTRACT This paper applies the concept of “communities of practice” to al-Muhajiroun (“the Emigrants”), an outlawed activist network that seeks to create an Islamic caliphate in Britain and the West through activism and proselytizing. Responding to recent studies on terrorism learning and adaptation, the author argues that focusing exclusively on the outputs of learning is unsatisfactory. Instead scholars should analyze learning as a process and unpack the causal mechanisms behind it. To support his within-case analysis, the author draws on extensive field work, including interviews and ethnographic observation. Newcomers to al-Muhajiroun learn the community’s norms and practices through repeated interactions with more experienced activists. These interactions take place in study circles and through companionship. Activists also learn by doing, preaching the Emigrants’ Salafi-Islamist ideology at da’wah stalls and protesting against the West’s “war on Islam” at demonstrations. The more they do, the better they become at performing the network’s high-risk activism, and the more deeply committed they become to its community of practice. However, far from allowing activists to adapt seamlessly to all challenges, the Emigrants’ insular and dogmatic community of practice creates its own problems, hindering its ability to innovate, expand, and thrive in an increasingly hostile environment.

Structure and Performance in a Violent Extremist Network The Small-world Solution

This study combines network science and ethnography to explore how al-Muhajiroun, a banned Islamist network, continued its high-risk activism despite being targeted for disruption by British authorities. We analyze news reports, interviews, and field notes using social network analysis and qualitative content analysis to test hypotheses pertaining to network structure and performance. Our analysis suggests that the activist network’s structural properties had important implications for its performance during three separate time periods. What began as a centralized, scale-free-like, small-world network centered on a charismatic leader evolved into a more decentralized “small-world-like” network featuring clusters of local activists connected through multiple bridges. This structure allowed the activist network to engage in contentious politics even as its environment became increasingly hostile. We conclude by discussing the implications of al-Muhajiroun’s small-world solution for scholars and policy makers.