Stephen J. Flusberg

Time to Guide: Evidence for Delayed Attentional Guidance in Contextual Cueing

Contextual cueing experiments show that, when displays are repeated, reaction times (RTs) to find a target decrease over time even when the observers are not aware of the repetition. Recent evidence suggests that this benefit in standard contextual cueing tasks is not likely to be due to an improvement in attentional guidance (Kunar, Flusberg, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2007). Nevertheless, we ask whether guidance can help participants find the target in a repeated display, if they are given sufficient time to encode the display. In Experiment 1 we increased the display complexity so that it took participants longer to find the target. Here we found a larger effect of guidance than in a condition with shorter RTs. Experiment 2 gave participants prior exposure to the display context. The data again showed that with more time participants could implement guidance to help find the target, provided that there was something in the search stimuli locations to guide attention to. The data suggest that, although the benefit in a standard contextual cueing task is unlikely to be a result of guidance, guidance can play a role if it is given time to develop.

The Role of Memory and Restricted Context in Repeated Visual Search

Previous studies have shown that the efficiency of visual search does not improve when participants search through the same unchanging display for hundreds of trials (repeated search), even though the participants have a clear memory of the search display. In this article, we ask two important questions. First, why do participants not use memory to help search the repeated display? Second, can context be introduced so that participants are able to guide their attention to the relevant repeated items? Experiments 1–4 show that participants choose not to use a memory strategy because, under these conditions, repeated memory search is actually less efficient than repeated visual search, even though the latter task is in itself relatively inefficient. However, when the visual search task is given context, so that only a subset of the items are ever pertinent, participants can learn to restrict their attention to the relevant stimuli (Experiments 5 and 6).

A Connectionist Approach to Embodied Conceptual Metaphor

A growing body of data has been gathered in support of the view that the mind is embodied and that cognition is grounded in sensory-motor processes. Some researchers have gone so far as to claim that this paradigm poses a serious challenge to central tenets of cognitive science, including the widely held view that the mind can be analyzed in terms of abstract computational principles. On the other hand, computational approaches to the study of mind have led to the development of specific models that help researchers understand complex cognitive processes at a level of detail that theories of embodied cognition (EC) have sometimes lacked. Here we make the case that connectionist architectures in particular can illuminate many surprising results from the EC literature. These models can learn the statistical structure in their environments, providing an ideal framework for understanding how simple sensory-motor mechanisms could give rise to higher-level cognitive behavior over the course of learning. Crucially, they form overlapping, distributed representations, which have exactly the properties required by many embodied accounts of cognition. We illustrate this idea by extending an existing connectionist model of semantic cognition in order to simulate findings from the embodied conceptual metaphor literature. Specifically, we explore how the abstract domain of time may be structured by concrete experience with space (including experience with culturally specific spatial and linguistic cues). We suggest that both EC researchers and connectionist modelers can benefit from an integrated approach to understanding these models and the empirical findings they seek to explain.

Are things that are hard to physically move also hard to imagine moving

Are objects that are more difficult to physically manipulate also more difficult to mentally manipulate? In our study, participants interacted with wooden objects modeled after the figures from Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) classic mental rotation experiment. One pair of objects was easy to physically rotate while another pair was difficult. They then completed a standard mental rotation task on images of these objects. Participants were slower to mentally rotate objects that were harder to physically rotate when they engaged in motor imagery. Further, this cost accrued with increasing angles of rotation. We verified this was the result of motor imagery by showing that the costs can be eliminated by using a strictly visual imagery strategy (imagining the objects moving on their own). These results reveal a striking constraint imposed by our real-world motor experiences on mental imagery, and also demonstrate a way that we can overcome such constraints.

The metaphor police: A case study of the role of metaphor in explanation

While many scholars have pointed to the role of metaphor in explanation, relatively little experimental research has examined whether and how metaphors are used and understood in everyday explanatory discourse. Across 3 experiments, we investigated the nature and function of metaphor in explanation by drawing on a real-world example where the terms guardian and warrior were used to metaphorically explain the role of police officers. We found, first, that the associations participants brought to mind for these concepts differed depending on whether they had previously answered questions about law enforcement (e.g., associations for warrior emphasized aggression and violence rather than strength and bravery when participants had previously answered questions about policing). Second, people were almost evenly split in their judgment of which metaphor was more appropriate to explain the role of law enforcement; this preference was highly predictive of beliefs related to policing and the criminal justice system. Third, and most important, using these metaphors to explain the job of policing causally influenced attitudes toward law enforcement in a metaphor-congruent manner (i.e., exposure to the guardian metaphor led to more positive attitudes), a finding that could not be accounted for by basic lexical priming. These studies complement existing work that has identified metaphor as a mechanism for representing abstract concepts, but also highlight the communicative and explanatory, rather than representational, functions of metaphor by showing that metaphors can encapsulate and convey an array of structured attitudes and beliefs.

Metaphors for the War (or Race) against Climate Change

ABSTRACT Despite overwhelming scientific consensus, millions of Americans fail to view climate change as a pressing threat. How can we address this disconnect between science and public opinion? In the present study, we investigated the role of metaphorical framing in shaping attitudes toward climate change. Participants read a brief article that metaphorically described US efforts to reduce carbon emissions as a war or race against climate change, or non-metaphorically described it as the issue of climate change. We further manipulated whether these emission-reduction goals emphasized the relatively near or distant future. We found that, compared to the race frame, the war metaphor made people perceive more urgency and risk surrounding climate change and express a greater willingness to increase conservation behavior, irrespective of the time horizon. Those who read the non-metaphorical report tended to respond in between these two extremes. We discuss the implications of these findings for climate communications.

War metaphors in public discourse

ABSTRACT War metaphors are ubiquitous in discussions of everything from political campaigns to battles with cancer to wars against crime, drugs, poverty, and even salad. Why are warfare metaphors so common, and what are the potential benefits and costs to using them to frame important social and political issues? We address these questions in a detailed case study by reviewing the empirical literature on the subject and by advancing our own theoretical account of the structure and function of war metaphors in public discourse. We argue that war metaphors are omnipresent because (a) they draw on basic and widely shared schematic knowledge that efficiently structures our ability to reason and communicate about many different types of situations, and (b) they reliably express an urgent, negatively valenced emotional tone that captures attention and motivates action. Nevertheless, we find that the meaning (and consequences) of war metaphors is intimately tied to the context in which they are used, which may result in either positive or negative outcomes, depending on the situation. Thus, blanket statements about whether or not a war frame is useful are misguided or overly constraining. Here we situate our case study results in relation to popular theories of metaphoric representation and processing and offer some guidelines for using a war framing effectively. This work helps illuminate the complex, dynamic, and nuanced functions of metaphor in cognition in general, and in public discourse in particular.

Metaphorical Accounting: How Framing the Federal Budget Like a Household's Affects Voting Intentions.

Political discourse is saturated with metaphor, but evidence for the persuasive power of this language has been hard to come by. We addressed this issue by investigating whether voting intentions were affected by implicit mappings suggested by a metaphorically framed message, drawing on a real-world example of political rhetoric about the federal budget. In the first experiment, the federal budget was framed as similar to or different from a household budget, though the information participants received was identical in both conditions. When the federal budget was described as similar to a households, people considered the personal finances of a presidential candidate more relevant-a finding we replicated in a larger, pre-registered study. In a follow-up experiment, we presented participants with a more explicit rhetorical argument and found a similar effect, moderated by political affiliation. These studies illuminate how metaphorical comparison affects cognition for important real-world issues, sometimes in unintended ways.

An emergent approach to analogical inference

In recent years, a growing number of researchers have proposed that analogy is a core component of human cognition. According to the dominant theoretical viewpoint, analogical reasoning requires a specific suite of cognitive machinery, including explicitly coded symbolic representations and a mapping or binding mechanism that operates over these representations. Here we offer an alternative approach: we find that analogical inference can emerge naturally and spontaneously from a relatively simple, error-driven learning mechanism without the need to posit any additional analogy-specific machinery. The results also parallel findings from the developmental literature on analogy, demonstrating a shift from an initial reliance on surface feature similarity to the use of relational similarity later in training. Variants of the model allow us to consider and rule out alternative accounts of its performance. We conclude by discussing how these findings can potentially refine our understanding of the processes that are required to perform analogical inference.

Environmental Inversion Effects in Face Perception.

Visual processing is highly sensitive to stimulus orientation; for example, face perception is drastically worse when faces are oriented inverted vs. upright. However, stimulus orientation must be established in relation to a particular reference frame, and in most studies, several reference frames are conflated. Which reference frame(s) matter in the perception of faces? Here we describe a simple, novel method for dissociating effects of egocentric and environmental orientation on face processing. Participants performed one of two face-processing tasks (expression classification and recognition memory) as they lay horizontally, which served to disassociate the egocentric and environmental frames. We found large effects of egocentric orientation on performance and smaller but reliable effects of environmental orientation. In a follow-up control experiment, we ruled out the possibility that the latter could be explained by compensatory ocular counterroll. We argue that environmental orientation influences face processing, which is revealed when egocentric orientation is fixed.