Stephen L. Quackenbush

Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace

We apply formal models of deterrence developed by Zagare and Kilgour (2000) to examine the impact of dispute settlements on future discord. Our theory of recurrent conflict, based primarily on how levels of satisfaction lead to different types of deterrence, allows us to formulate explicit expectations for the relative stability of militarized conflict settlements. We conceptualize peace periods following dispute settlements as situations of mutual or unilateral deterrence, depending on the method of resolution applied to the preceding dispute. Relations following imposed settlements are modeled as unilateral deterrence situations, while affairs subsequent to negotiated settlements and disputes ending without a settlement are viewed as instances of mutual deterrence. We derive hypotheses regarding durations of peace and test them through survival analyses of the periods of peace following 2,536 dyadic militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1992. Our results strongly support the theorys expectat...

Identifying Opportunity for Conflict: Politically Active Dyads

Since states cannot fight without the opportunity to do so, empirical identification of opportunity is important. Unfortunately, previous measures of opportunity—politically relevant dyads, the politically relevant international environment, and regional dyads—are inadequate. I attempt to measure opportunity by developing the concept of a politically active dyad, using contiguity, power status, and alliances as defining characteristics. I then use Braumoeller and Goertzs (2000) methodology for necessary conditions to compare active dyads with previous measures. This test demonstrates that although previous measures are unable to capture opportunity as a necessary condition for international conflict, the concept of politically active dyads does.

Evaluating the Monadic Democratic Peace

The democratic peace is a well established empirical law in the international relations literature.Two key findings mark the cornerstone of the democratic peace: first, democracies almost never fight other democracies, and second, democracies regularly fight non-democracies. Although most empirical analyses and theoretical explanations have focused on the dyadic nature of the democratic peace, some have argued that democratic norms make democracies more peaceful than other regime types in general, not just in their relations with other democracies. In this article, we evaluate the monadic democratic peace to examine support for the claim that democracies are more peaceful in general than non-democracies. Examining the frequency of conflict and the likelihood of dispute initiation using four different measures of democracy, our results indicate that, while the dyadic democratic peace is strongly supported, there is little, if any, empirical support for the monadic democratic peace.

Settlements, Outcomes, and the Recurrence of Conflict

Despite the hope that the resolution of one militarized dispute will bring peace to a dyad, these conflicts often recur. This recurrence of conflict is particularly important because subsequent disputes within a dyad tend to be more severe than previous ones. However, the factors leading to recurrent conflict remain a matter of debate. While some argue that the settlement of a dispute has a significant impact on post-conflict relations, others argue that the outcome of a dispute is the most important determinant of post-conflict stability. Although evidence has been found to support both views, the relative impact of dispute settlements and outcomes has not been satisfactorily determined. Accordingly, this article simultaneously examines the relationship between settlements, outcomes, and conflict recurrence through survival analyses of the periods of peace following 2,973 dyadic militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001. The authors find that although settlement type is an important predictor of recurrent conflict, with imposed settlements being the most stable, outcome type has no significant effects on post-dispute peace duration. The article concludes with a preliminary analysis of the factors that lead to the varying forms of settlement.

General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory

Since general deterrence necessarily precedes immediate deterrence, the analysis of general deterrence is more fundamental to an understanding of international conflict than is an analysis of immediate deterrence. Nonetheless, despite a few exceptions, the quantitative literature has ignored the subject of general deterrence, focusing almost exclusively on situations of immediate deterrence. My purpose in this essay is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting a recently developed theory of general deterrence—Perfect Deterrence Theory—to a systematic test by examining general deterrence from 1816–2000. The results indicate that the predictions of perfect deterrence theory are strongly supported by the empirical record.

Not Only Whether but Whom

Although in reality, states simultaneously pursue direct and extended deterrence, extant theories of deterrence have considered direct and extended deterrence situations separately. Furthermore, extended deterrence theories have not modeled all three actors in extended deterrence situations. To overcome these limitations in the literature, the author develops the three-party extended deterrence game and analyzes it with both complete and incomplete information, allowing conclusions to be drawn regarding deterrence and the related areas of alliance reliability and war expansion. For example, the findings indicate that deterrence is most likely to succeed when the alliance between Defender and Protégé is reliable. However, neither Defender nor Protégé wishes to be a more reliable ally than the other; if there is an asymmetry in reliability, Challenger will chose the more reliable state to attack in order to avoid a multilateral war. This counterintuitive conclusion was only reached by considering all three actors in extended deterrence.

Deterrence theory: where do we stand?

Although deterrence theory was a central focus in the study of International Relations during the Cold War, attention has shifted away from deterrence since the end of that conflict. Nonetheless, deterrence is a general phenomenon that is not limited to any particular time or space. Moving beyond a simple focus on the US-Soviet relationship, scholars have recently begun further explorations of deterrence, through development of theory, analysis of policy alternatives, and empirical analysis. This article seeks to evaluate where deterrence theory stands today through: (1) a consideration of distinctions between different strands of theory; (2) a discussion of the assumption of rationality in deterrence theory; (3) an examination of three important distinctions in deterrence; (4) an evaluation of the difficult task of testing deterrence theory, and (5) an overview of recent theoretical developments. The primary conclusion is that perfect deterrence theory provides a logically consistent alternative to classical deterrence theory and therefore provides the most appropriate basis for further theoretical development, empirical testing, and application to policy.

National Missile Defense and Deterrence

The current stance of the Bush administration has renewed debate on the implications of national missile defense. While a large part of that debate concerns its technical and economic feasibility, there is also considerable debate concerning the ramifications of national missile defense for international peace and stability. Unfortunately, few studies have analyzed the implications of missile defense through the lens of deterrence theory. Those that have were based on classical deterrence theory, which is plagued by a variety of logical inconsistencies and empirical anomalies. Accordingly, I examine the implications of national missile defense for deterrence from the vantage point of an alternative theory of deterrence, perfect deterrence theory. The results indicate that national missile defense generally enhances the stability of deterrence; the greatest threat missile defense poses is causing dissatisfaction in potential challengers.

Territorial Issues and Recurrent Conflict

It is well established that territorial issues are highly conflict prone. Furthermore, dyads encountering conflicts over territory should be expected to fight more frequently, with shorter durations of peace than other dyads. However, the growing literature examining factors leading to the recurrence of conflict has largely ignored the impact of territorial issues, focusing instead on factors such as the type of dispute settlement. In this article, I seek to examine the relationship between territorial issues, settlements, and conflict recurrence through survival analyses of the periods of peace following 2,974 dyadic militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001.

National missile defense and (dis)satisfaction

Previous research, applying perfect deterrence theory, has demonstrated that national missile defense generally enhances the stability of deterrence, primarily because it makes the defender’s retaliatory threat more credible. However, stability is not ensured, because missile defense has the potential to increase other states’ dissatisfaction with the status quo. Consequently, dissatisfied states have an increased incentive to challenge the status quo, undermining deterrence stability. Although there is a lengthy literature debating this point, no one has conducted a rigorous empirical analysis of the impact of national missile defense on satisfaction. To address this significant gap in the literature, we analyze the impact of US missile defense programs on other states’ status quo evaluations through analyses of events data, 1985–2004, and UN voting data, 1985–2008.