Timothy M. Peterson

Sanctioning Violence The Effect of Third-Party Economic Coercion on Militarized Conflict

While economic sanctions are commonly regarded as nonviolent coercive diplomacy, scholars show that senders—particularly democratic senders—are actually more likely to use military force against the targets of their sanctions. In this article, the authors extend this connection between sanctions and military action by arguing that countries targeted with third-party economic coercion are more likely to be targets of dyadic militarized violence from states not involved in the sanctions. The act of sanctioning, the authors argue, lowers the prohibitions to use violence against the sanctioned state by others. Empirical analysis of dyadic data from 1914 to 2000 shows that, within directed dyads, militarized interstate dispute (MID) initiation is more likely when the potential target of conflict is sanctioned by third-party states, particularly when the sanctioning state is a large democracy.

Third-party trade, political similarity, and dyadic conflict

A growing literature maintains that trade is pacifying to interstate relations, and recent work on trade networks suggests that this pacifying effect extends to indirect trade ties. In this article, it is argued that third-party trade can also have an aggravating effect within dyads, by threatening to alter the dyadic balance of capabilities. For the state trading outside the dyad, trade gains from third parties provide incentives to demand change in the dyadic status quo and finance violent conflict when dyadic disputes arise. For the state whose dyadic partner trades with third parties, potential for the trading state to grow increasingly more powerful encourages action to prevent erosion of the non-trading state’s relative power. These aggravating effects are conditional, however, on dyadic political similarity, as concerns for relative capability shifts decrease when states do not view their dyadic partners as threats. Hypotheses derived from this argument are tested on data spanning 1885 to 2000. Results support these hypotheses, suggesting important implications for the literature on trade and conflict. When extending the relative gains arguments associated with realism beyond the dyad, a clear, yet conditional, aggravating effect of third-party trade emerges.

Insiders versus Outsiders

A growing literature examines the link between preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and peace among member states. However, despite the potentially competitive nature of these agreements, there has been little research examining whether and how PTAs could induce hostilities between members and nonmembers. In this article, I argue that dyadic conflict is more likely when one dyad member’s exclusive PTA with a third party results in lower exports for the dyad member that is excluded from the agreement. Importantly, I contend that trade creating as well as trade diverting PTAs can have this effect. I use a triadic extension of the gravity model of trade to estimate how an exclusive PTA influences the exports of nonmembers relative to PTA members. Using these estimates in statistical tests of dyadic militarized interstate dispute onset spanning 1961 to 2000, I find that PTA-induced trade distortions are associated with a higher likelihood of conflict between members and nonmembers.

Taking the cue: The response to US human rights sanctions against third parties

Although scholars have suggested that sanctions could have an international symbolic effect in which they inform third parties of sender preferences and resolve, studies have not examined whether and when sanctions against one state lead other states to change similar proscribed behavior. In this paper, I examine whether abusive regimes change their respect for physical integrity rights when they witness US human rights sanctions against third parties. Synthesizing contributions from the literatures on sanction effectiveness, reputation and human rights promotion, I develop a new theory asserting that human rights sanctions can motivate leaders in non-sanctioned states to improve their human rights practices proactively—or at least to prevent worsened abuse—when they perceive themselves as sufficiently similar to the sanction target. I find support for my expectations in stratified Cox proportional hazards models using data spanning 1976–2000.

Dyadic Trade, Exit Costs, and Conflict:

Most studies of the link between dyadic trade and militarized conflict examine the extent of trade interaction. However, interaction measures do not account for the impact of cutting off trade (i.e., exit costs). In this article, I highlight the link between exit costs, the cost of conflict, and “the spoils of conquest,” arguing that one state’s exit costs are associated with higher incidence of dyadic conflict when its trade partner’s exit costs are low. However, its exit costs become less aggravating—and eventually pacifying—as its trade partner’s exit costs increase. I test this argument by estimating import demand and export supply elasticities, developing yearly exit cost measures for directed dyads, 1984–2000. Statistical tests confirm that unilaterally high exit costs are aggravating, but that jointly high exit costs are pacifying, a pattern most prominent for trade in strategic commodities.

Beyond Ricardo: The Link between Intra-Industry Trade and Peace

In this article, it is argued that horizontal intra-industry trade is associated with reduced conflict propensity within dyads. Horizontal intra-industry trade is characterized by participation in international markets for similar – in many cases, branded – commodities, resulting from economies of scale and consumer tastes for variety. Conversely, inter-industry trade in accordance with the Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin models, while providing valuable trade gains, in some instances provokes vulnerability to trade partners, such that its overall impact on dyadic conflict is ambiguous. Support for this expectation is found in empirical tests spanning from 1963 to 2001. Additionally, there is evidence that development is insufficient to preclude conflict when jointly developed dyads engage in no intra-industry trade.

Sanctions and Alternate Markets How Trade and Alliances Affect the Onset of Economic Coercion

Although much research has examined how third parties might affect the success of economic sanctions, scant research has considered the extent to which potential—rather than realized—alternate markets affect strategic behavior between sanctioning (sender) and target states prior to sanction use. We argue that the sender is more likely to threaten or impose sanctions against a potential target with higher trade dependence on the sender, but only under the condition that the target’s ability to redirect lost trade to third parties is low. As the target’s ability to redirect lost trade increases, the sender is less likely to use sanctions because it expects that the target could mitigate the intended costs of the coercion more easily. We capture potential alternate markets using a measure of the total economic capabilities held by the target’s allies, finding support for our expectations in statistical tests using data on U.S. sanctions spanning 1950 to 2005. Our results affirm the importance of accounting for third parties and alternate markets as factors influencing the strategic behavior associated with the use of economic coercion.

Human Rights, NGO Shaming and the Exports of Abusive States

Does the attention of human rights organizations limit exports from rights-abusing states? This article examines how naming and shaming by human rights organizations (HROs) conditions the influence of human rights abuse on exports, and argues that human rights abuse alone is insufficient to damage a state’s exports. However, as attention to abuse via HRO shaming increases, abuse has an increasingly negative impact on exports. Importantly, this relationship is also conditional on the respect for human rights among importing states; human rights abuse, even if it is shamed, has no effect when importers are similarly abusive. Empirical tests utilizing gravity models of trade incorporating data on physical integrity rights abuse and HRO shaming in 1990–2008 yield strong support for our expectations.

The Demand for Protectionism: Democracy, Import Elasticity, and Trade Barriers

Numerous studies suggest that democracies employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. In this article, we examine the conditioning role that the elasticity of import demand at the commodity level plays on the relationship between democracy and import barriers. Beginning with the assumption that democracies are more responsive than nondemocracies to the preferences of mass publics, we demonstrate that the value of free trade as a public good depends on the elasticity of import demand. When import demand for a given commodity is inelastic, trade barriers are more harmful to consumers; as such, democracies will employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. However, as import demand becomes more elastic, publics find it easier to adjust to higher prices; as a result, the difference in imposed trade barriers by regime type decreases. We find support for this argument in statistical analyses of crosssectional data covering 4,656 commodities imported by 73 countries Furthermore, we find that democracies raise higher trade barriers than nondemocracies on commodities for which import demand is very elastic.

Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Expectations Theory

Studies find that members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are less likely to be involved in militarized conflict. An expectation of continuing amicable trade relations is among the factors linking PTAs to peace. However, this role of PTAs is difficult to test due to the problem of observational equivalence; PTAs correlate with trade levels and liberalization, factors also linked to peace. In this article, we isolate the impact of PTAs on trade expectations by distinguishing between signed agreements and those in force. A focus on signed but not-yet-in-force PTAs allows us to assess the correlation between agreements and peace before other pacifying, and therefore potentially confounding, elements emerge. Statistical tests spanning 1957 to 2000 demonstrate that signed PTAs are pacifying, while in-force agreements have no statistically significant impact when controlling for other factors linked to peace.