Stephen M. Garcia

Crowded minds: The implicit bystander effect

Five studies merged the priming methodology with the bystander apathy literature and demonstrate how merely priming a social context at Time 1 leads to less helping behavior on a subsequent, completely unrelated task at Time 2. In Study 1, participants who imagined being with a group at Time 1 pledged significantly fewer dollars on a charity-giving measure at Time 2 than did those who imagined being alone with one other person. Studies 2-5 build converging evidence with hypothetical and real helping behavior measures and demonstrate that participants who imagine the presence of others show facilitation to words associated with unaccountable on a lexical decision task. Implications for social group research and the priming methodology are discussed.

Ranks and Rivals: A Theory of Competition:

Social comparison theories typically imply a comparable degree of competition between commensurate rivals who are competing on a mutually important dimension. However, the present analysis reveals that the degree of competition between such rivals depends on their proximity to a meaningful standard. Studies 1 to 3 test the prediction that individuals become more competitive and less willing to maximize profitable joint gains when they and their commensurate rivals are highly ranked (e.g., #2 vs. #3) than when they are not (e.g., #202 vs. #203). Studies 4 to 6 then generalize these findings, showing that the degree of competition also increases in the proximity of other meaningful standards, such as the bottom of a ranking scale or a qualitative threshold in the middle of a scale. Studies 7 and 8 further examine the psychological processes underlying this phenomenon and reveal that proximity to a standard exerts a direct impact on the basic unidirectional drive upward, beyond the established effects of commensurability and dimension relevance.

The Psychology of Competition: A Social Comparison Perspective

Social comparison—the tendency to self-evaluate by comparing ourselves to others—is an important source of competitive behavior. We propose a new model that distinguishes between individual and situational factors that increase social comparison and thus lead to a range of competitive attitudes and behavior. Individual factors are those that vary from person to person: the relevance of the performance dimension, the similarity of rivals, and their relationship closeness to the individual, as well as the various individual differences variables relating to social comparison more generally. Situational factors, conversely, are those factors on the social comparison landscape that affect similarly situated individuals: proximity to a standard (i.e., near the number 1 ranking vs. far away), the number of competitors (i.e., few vs. many), social category fault lines (i.e., disputes across vs. within social categories), and more. The distinction between individual and situational factors also helps chart future directions for social comparison research and generates new vistas across psychology and related disciplines.

The N-Effect: More Competitors, Less Competition

This article introduces the N-effect—the discovery that increasing the number of competitors (N) can decrease competitive motivation. Studies 1a and 1b found evidence that average test scores (e.g., SAT scores) fall as the average number of test takers at test-taking venues increases. Study 2 found that individuals trying to finish an easy quiz among the top 20% in terms of speed finished significantly faster if they believed they were competing in a pool of 10 rather than 100 other people. Study 3 showed that the N-effect is strong among individuals high in social-comparison orientation and weak among those low in social-comparison orientation. Study 4 directly linked the N-effect to social comparison, ruling out ratio bias as an explanation of our results and finding that social comparison becomes less important as N increases. Finally, Study 5 found that the N-effect is mediated by social comparison. Limitations, future directions, and implications are discussed.

Inferring the popularity of an opinion from its familiarity: a repetitive voice can sound like a chorus.

Despite the importance of doing so, people do not always correctly estimate the distribution of opinions within their group. One important mechanism underlying such misjudgments is peoples tendency to infer that a familiar opinion is a prevalent one, even when its familiarity derives solely from the repeated expression of 1 group member. Six experiments demonstrate this effect and show that it holds even when perceivers are consciously aware that the opinions come from 1 speaker. The results also indicate that the effect is due to opinion accessibility rather than a conscious inference about the meaning of opinion repetition in a group. Implications for social consensus estimation and social influence are discussed.

Poor Expression: Concealing Social Class Stigma

Three studies found that people from lower-class backgrounds are less expressive toward interaction partners from upper-class backgrounds except in contexts where they share minority status on another dimension. In Study 1, White lower-class dyad members behaved less expressively than their upper-class interaction partners, while in African American and Latino dyads, upper- and lower-class individuals were similarly expressive. In Study 2, lower-class White participants reported feeling generally less comfortable about interacting with an upper-class partner but not when they shared numerical minority status of being residents of the same state traveling away from home. Finally, Study 3 revealed that lower-class individuals intentionally act differently with upper-class individuals but not with lower-class ones. Upper-class individuals act the same with lower- and upper-class partners alike.

Morally Questionable Tactics: Negotiations between District Attorneys and Public Defenders

A questionnaire study about bargaining tactics was conducted among 163 public defenders (PDs) and district attorneys (DAs) in the criminal justice system. The authors hypothesized that PDs (defensive roles) would perceive questionable tactics to be more appropriate than would DAs (offensive roles), that PDs and DAs would elevate their approval of questionable tactics for counteraggression purposes, and that PDs would elevate their approval for counteraggression to a greater extent than would DAs. Results supported these hypotheses. The authors also examined the basis of the status quo bias, because previous status quo bias studies always confounded power with defensive role. After testing four status quo bias hypotheses, results suggested that, contrary to previous explanations, a defender-challenger framework sometimes provides a better account of the status quo bias than does a power framework.

The N-Effect Beyond Probability Judgments

This article introduces the N-effect—the discovery that increasing the number of competitors (N) can decrease competitive motivation. Studies 1a and 1b found evidence that average test scores (e.g., SAT scores) fall as the average number of test takers at test-taking venues increases. Study 2 found that individuals trying to finish an easy quiz among the top 20% in terms of speed finished significantly faster if they believed they were competing in a pool of 10 rather than 100 other people. Study 3 showed that the N-effect is strong among individuals high in social-comparison orientation and weak among those low in social-comparison orientation. Study 4 directly linked the N-effect to social comparison, ruling out ratio bias as an explanation of our results and finding that social comparison becomes less important as N increases. Finally, Study 5 found that the N-effect is mediated by social comparison. Limitations, future directions, and implications are discussed.

Frogs, Ponds, and Culture: Variations in Entry Decisions

Would you rather be the big frog in a small pond or the small frog in a big pond? In three studies, we demonstrate that the entry preference depends on culture. Study 1 found a higher big pond preference for East Asian, versus European American, students. Studies 2A and 2B replicated this big pond preference in behavioral intent across educational and organizational settings for Chinese, as compared to United States, working adults. Study 3 demonstrated cultural variation in frog–pond decisions was not explained by comparison processes that characterize postentry self-regard but rather by concerns for prestige. Together, findings highlight how a cultural lens informs psychological processes that shape entry decision-making.

Gender and competitive preferences: The role of competition size

In a series of 8 studies, we examine whether gender differences in competition entry preferences are moderated by the size of the competition. Drawing on theories of gender roles and stereotypes, we show that women, relative to men, prefer to enter smaller compared with larger competitions. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate this effect in observational data on preferences for working in differently sized firms and applying to differently sized colleges. Studies 2a and 2b replicate the effect with real behavioral decisions in different domains. We also find empirical evidence that prescriptive gender norms and stereotypes underlie this effect. In Study 3, we find experimental evidence that women and men differ in their preferences for differently sized groups under competition, but not in noncompetitive settings. Three additional experimental studies (Studies 4, 5a, and 5b) show that perceptions of comfort in small versus larger competitions underlie womens preferences. These findings suggest that womens preferences for smaller competitions may be driven by an adherence to prescriptive gender norms. We discuss the implications of the current findings for gender inequalities in organizations. (PsycINFO Database Record