Stephen Mumford

The Ungrounded Argument

There is an argument that has yet to be made wholly explicit though it might be one of the most important in contemporary metaphysics. This paper is an attempt to rectify that omission. The argument is of such high importance because it involves a host of central concepts, concerning actuality, modality, groundedness and powers. If Ellis’s (2001) assessment is correct, the whole debate between Humean and anti-Humean metaphysics might rest on this viability of the argument. The argument, which I call the Ungrounded Argument (abbreviated to UA), has in various implicit forms been discussed or defended by Blackburn (1990), Molnar (1999, 2003, ch. 8) and Ellis (2001, 114 and 2002, 74–75). It concerns the alleged possibility of ungrounded dispositional properties or causal powers. It is an argument against a thesis that might be called universal or global groundedness; namely, that every dispositional property is grounded in some property other than itself. In Section 2 I formulate, for the first time, an explicit version of the Ungrounded Argument and present the evidence and reasons for its premises. Along the way, I will clarify some of the key concepts and issues. In Section 3 I consider the likely responses to UA and identify the main basis on which it might be challenged. In Section 4, I try to distil the issue down to its central core and show what must be overcome, and what must be acknowledged, if the argument is to be accepted. The main aim of this paper is the explicit articulation of the argument. Sections 3 and 4 are briefer, therefore, and give only an indication of the lines that may have to be developed for the argument’s ultimate acceptance.

At the borders of medical reasoning: aetiological and ontological challenges of medically unexplained symptoms

Medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) remain recalcitrant to the medical profession, proving less suitable for homogenic treatment with respect to their aetiology, taxonomy and diagnosis. While the majority of existing medical research methods are designed for large scale population data and sufficiently homogenous groups, MUS are characterised by their heterogenic and complex nature. As a result, MUS seem to resist medical scrutiny in a way that other conditions do not. This paper approaches the problem of MUS from a philosophical point of view. The aim is to first consider the epistemological problem of MUS in a wider ontological and phenomenological context, particularly in relation to causation. Second, the paper links current medical practice to certain ontological assumptions. Finally, the outlines of an alternative ontology of causation are offered which place characteristic features of MUS, such as genuine complexity, context-sensitivity, holism and medical uniqueness at the centre of any causal set-up, and not only for MUS. This alternative ontology provides a framework in which to better understand complex medical conditions in relation to both their nature and their associated research activity.

Causation and evidence-based practice: an ontological review.

This paper explores the nature of causation within the framework of evidence-based practice (EBP) for health care. The aims of the paper were first to define and evaluate how causation is presently accounted for in EBP; second, to present an alternative causal account by which health care can develop in both its clinical application and its scientific research activity. The paper was premised on the idea that causation underlies medical and health care practices and impacts on the way we understand health science research and daily clinical practice. The question of what causation is should therefore be of utmost relevance for all concerned with the science, philosophy and progress of EBP. We propose that the way causation is thought of in contemporaneous health care is exposed by evidential frameworks, which categorize research methods on their epistemological strengths. It is then suggested that the current account of causation is limited in respect of both the functionality of EBP, and its inherent scientific processes. An alternative ontology of causation is provided, which has its roots in dispositionalism. Here, causes are not seen as regular events necessitating an effect, but rather phenomena that are highly complex, context-sensitive and that tend towards an effect. We see this as a better account of causation for evidence-based health care.

INTENTIONALITY AND THE PHYSICAL: A NEW THEORY OF DISPOSITION ASCRIPTION

This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.

The Genius in Art and in Sport: A Contribution to the Investigation of Aesthetics of Sport

This paper contains a consideration of the notion of genius and its significance to the discussion of the aesthetics of sport. We argue that genius can make a positive aesthetic contribution in both art and sport, just as some have argued that the moral content of a work of art can affect its aesthetic value. A genius is an exceptional innovator of successful strategies, where such originality adds aesthetic value. We argue that an original painting can have greater aesthetic value than an exact replica, merely because it is the original. By parity of reasoning, a successful innovation in sport has additional aesthetic value just because it is a new creation. The genius is one who can provide this extra aesthetic pleasure and on that basis is rightly valued. The genius need not be conscious of how they achieve such innovations and thus find their own genius to be something they cannot explain but only demonstrate. In sport, innovations that offer new ways of playing or solving problems can produce competitive success which demands instant recognition and rewards.

Moderate Partisanship as Oscillation

In Watching Sport, Stephen Mumford distinguishes two ways in which sport can be seen. A purist sees it aesthetically while a partisan sees it competitively. But this overlooks the obvious point that most sports fans are neither entirely purist nor entirely partisan. The norm will be some moderate position in between with the purist and partisan as ideal limits. What is then the point of considering these pure aesthetic and pure competitive ways of seeing? In this discussion note, I consider possible accounts of the way in which the moderate spectator watches. After rejecting what I call a pure perception theory and a mixed view, I defend an oscillation theory. This means that the moderate sports fan is one who switches, sometimes rapidly, between the aesthetic and competitive perceptions of sport. A pay-off of this account is that we do not need a further, third way of perceiving sport in order to account for the moderate. It has been explained in terms of our original two forms of perception. This fills a lacuna in Mumfords account.

Philosophy of science and physiotherapy: An insight into practice

This article presents an overview of the philosophy of science and applies such philosophical theory to clinical practice within physiotherapy. A brief history of science is followed by the theories of the four most commonly acknowledged philosophers, introduced in the context of examples from clinical practice. By providing direct links to practical examples, it demonstrates the possibilities of relating the logical basis of this field of study to the clinical setting. The relevance to physiotherapy is that, by relating this theory, clinicians can better understand and analyse the fundamental logic behind their practice. The insight this provides can benefit professional development in several ways. For the clinician, it permits more comprehensive and coherent reasoning and helps to relate evidence with respect to individual patients. On a larger scale, it encourages reflective discussion between peers around the virtues of alternative treatment approaches. Thus, this topic has the potential to guide clinical practice toward being more scientific and may help raise the credibility of the profession as a whole.

Laws and Lawlessness

I develop a metaphysical position that is both lawless and anti-Humean. The position is called realist lawlessness and contrasts with both Humean lawlessness and nomological realism – the claim that there are laws in nature. While the Humean view also allows no laws, realist lawlessness is not Humean because it accepts some necessary connections in nature between distinct properties. Realism about laws, on the other hand, faces a central dilemma. Either laws govern the behaviour of properties from the outside or from the inside. If the former, an unacceptable quidditist view of properties follows. But no plausible account of laws within properties can be developed that permits a governing role specifically for laws. I conclude in favour of eliminativism about laws. At the conceptual core, the notion of a law in nature is misleading. It is suggestive of an otherwise static world in need of animation.

Effects of context

Complexity should be at the heart of any viable theory of causation. Without it, we cannot give a sensible account of the importance of context. With many causal factors in play, jointly producing an effect, we come to understand the context-sensitive nature of causation. Cases of hypersensitivity, unintended consequences and antipathetic reactions will be outlined together with some considerations for our interventions.

Miracles: metaphysics and modality

It is argued that miracles are best understood as natural events with supernatural causes and that such causal interaction is logically possible. Such miracles may, or may not, involve violations of natural laws. If violations of laws are possible, Humean supervenience views of laws are best avoided. Where miracles violate laws, it shows that what is naturally impossible may be actual and what Is naturally necessary may not be actual. Whether or not miracles actually occur, this demonstrates that the nomic modalities differ from the logical. The theory contrasts favourably with competitors and allows, contrary to an interpretation of Aquinas, that Creation would have been a miracle.