Steve Koontz

Analysis of ISS Plasma Interaction

To date, the International Space Station (ISS) has been one of the largest objects flown in lower earth orbit (LEO). The ISS utilizes high voltage solar arrays (160V) that are negatively grounded leading to pressurized elements that can float negatively with respect to the plasma. Because laboratory measurements indicate a dielectric breakdown potential difference of 80V, arcing could occur on the ISS structure. To overcome the possibility of arcing and clamp the potential of the structure, two Plasma Contactor Units (PCUs) were designed, built, and flown. Also a limited amount of measurements of the floating potential for the present ISS configuration were made by a Floating Potential Probe (FPP), indicating a minimum potential of 24 Volts at the measurement location. A predictive tool, the ISS Plasma Interaction Model (PIM) has been developed accounting for the solar array electron collection, solar array mast wire and effective conductive area on the structure. The model has been used for predictions of the present ISS configuration. The conductive area has been inferred based on available floating potential measurements. Analysis of FPP and PCU data indicated distribution of the conductive area along the Russian segment of the ISS structure. A significant input to PIM is the plasma environment. The International Reference Ionosphere (IRI 2001) was initially used to obtain plasma temperature and density values. However, IRI provides mean parameters, leading to difficulties in interpretation of on-orbit data, especially at eclipse exit where maximum charging can occur. This limits our predicative capability. Satellite and Incoherent Scatter Radar (ISR) data of plasma parameters have also been collected. Approximately 130,000 electron temperature (Te) and density (Ne) pairs for typical ISS eclipse exit conditions have been extracted from the reduced Langmuir probe data flown aboard the NASA DE-2 satellite. Additionally, another 18,000 Te and Ne pairs of ISR data from several radar locations around the globe were used to assure consistency of the satellite data. PIM predictions for ISS charging made with this data correlated very well with FPP data, indicating that the general physics of spacecraft charging with high voltage solar arrays have been captured. The predictions also provided the probabilities of occurrences for ISS charging. These probabilities give a numerical measure of the number of times when the ISS will approach or exceed the vehicle plasma hazard conditions for each configuration. In this paper we shall present the interaction mechanisms between the ISS and the surrounding plasma and give an overview of the PIM components. PIM predictions are compared with available data followed by a discussion of the variability of plasma parameters and the conductive area on the ISS. The ISS PIM will be further tested and verified as data from the Floating Potential Measurement Unit become available, and construction of the ISS continues.

Impact of Solar Array Position on ISS Vehicle Charging

The International Space Station (ISS), because of its large structure and high voltage solar arrays, has a complex plasma interaction with the ionosphere in low Earth orbit (LEO). This interaction of the ISS US Segment photovoltaic (PV) power system with the LEO ionospheric plasma produces floating potentials on conducting elements of the ISS structure relative to the local plasma environment. To control the ISS floating potentials, two Plasma Contactor Units (PCUs) are installed on the Z1 truss. Each PCU discharges accumulated electrons from the Space Station structure, thus reducing the potential difference between the ISS structure and the surrounding charged plasma environment. Operations of the PCUs were intended to keep the ISS floating potential to 40 Volts (Reference 1). Exposed dielectric surfaces overlying conducting structure on the Space Station will collect an opposite charge from the ionosphere as the ISS charges. In theory, when an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) crewmember is tethered to structure via the crew safety tether or when metallic surfaces of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) come in contact with conducting metallic surfaces of the ISS, the EMU conducting components, including the perspiration-soaked crewmember inside, can become charged to the Space Station floating potential. The concern is the potential dielectric breakdown of anodized aluminum surfaces on the EMU producing an arc from the EMU to the ambient plasma, or nearby ISS structure. If the EMU arcs, an electrical current of an unknown magnitude and duration may conduct through the EVA crewmember, producing an unacceptable condition. This electrical current may be sufficient to startle or fatally shock the EVA crewmember (Reference 2). Hence, as currently defined by the EVA community, the ISS floating potential for all nominal and contingency EVA worksites and translation paths must have a magnitude less than 40 volts relative to the local ionosphere at all times during EVA. Arcing from the EMU is classified as a catastrophic hazard, which requires two-failure tolerant controls, i.e., three hazard controls. Each PCU is capable of maintaining the ISS floating potential below the requirement during EVA. The two PCUs provide a single failure tolerant control of ISS floating potential. In the event of the failure of one or two PCUs, a combination of solar array shunting and turning the solar arrays into their own wakes will be used to supply control of the plasma hazard (Reference 3). The purpose of this paper is to present on-orbit information that shows that ISS solar array placement with respect to the ISS velocity vector can control solar array plasma charging, and hence, provide an operational control for the plasma hazard. Also, this paper will present on-orbit information that shows that shunting of the ISS solar arrays can control solar array plasma charging, and hence, provide an additional operational control for the plasma hazard.

N-Nitrosodimethylamine Release from Fuel Oxidizer Reaction Product Contaminated Extravehicular Activity Suits

Before extravehicular activity (EVA) on the Russian segment (RS) of the International Space Station (ISS), the docking compartment (DC1) must be depressurized, because it is used as an airlock. It is preferred to use the U.S. control moment gyros (CMGs) instead of attitude-control thruster firings to compensate for disturbances and to maintain the ISS vehicle attitude. However, when the DC1 is depressurized, the CMGs’ margin of momentum is insufficient to compensate for the disturbance and the service module (SM) attitude-control thrusters’ need to fire to desaturate the CMGs. The SM roll-control thruster firings induce fuel‐oxidizer reaction products (FORP) contamination on the adjacent SM surfaces around the thrusters. One of the components present in FORP is the potent carcinogen N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA). Because the EVA crewmembers often enter the area surrounding the thrusters for tasks on the aft end of the SM and when translating to other areas of the RS, the presence of FORP contamination is a concern. FORP contamination of the SM surfaces is discussed, along with the potential release of NDMA in a humid environment from crew EVA suits, whether they happen to be contaminated with FORP, the toxicological risk associated with the NDMA release, and the implementation of flight rules to mitigate the hazard.

FUEL OXIDIZER REACTION PRODUCTS (FORP) CONTAMINATION OF SERVICE MODULE AND RELEASE OF N-NITROSODIMETHYLAMINE IN A HUMID ENVIRONMENT FROM CREW EVA SUITS CONTAMINATED WITH FORP

The Service Module (SM) is an element of the Russian Segment of the International Space Station (ISS). One of the functions of the SM is to provide attitude control for the ISS using thrusters when the U.S. Control Moment Gyros (CMGs) must be desaturated. Prior to an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) on the Russian Segment, the Docking Compartment (DC1) is depressurized, as it is used as an airlock. When the DC1 is depressurized, the CMGs margin of momentum is insufficient and the SM attitude control thrusters need to fire to desaturate the CMGs. SM roll thruster firings induce contamination onto adjacent surfaces with Fuel Oxidizer Reaction Products (FORP). FORP is composed of both volatile and non-volatile components. One of the components of FORP is the potent carcinogen N-nitrosdimethylamine (NDMA). Since the EVA crewmembers often enter the area surrounding the thrusters for tasks on the aft end of the SM and when translating to other areas of the Russian Segment, the presence of FORP is a concern. This paper will discuss FORP contamination of the SM surfaces, the release of NDMA in a humid environment from crew EVA suits, if they happen to be contaminated with FORP, and the toxicological risk associated with the NDMA release.

Impact of Plasma-Induced Arcing on ISS Touch Temperature

To date, the International Space Station (ISS) has been one of the largest objects flown in lower earth orbit (LEO). The ISS utilizes high voltage solar arrays (160V) that are negatively grounded leading to pressurized elements that can float negatively with respect to the plasma. Because laboratory measurements indicate a dielectric breakdown potential difference of 80V, arcing could occur on the ISS structure. The paper identifies anodized aluminum surfaces, chromic acid and sulfuric acid anodized, on the ISS, which could arc due to plasma charging. An assessment of the effects of plasma-induced arcing on these ISS anodized surfaces, with and without concurrent micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MM/OD) impacts has been completed. The purpose of this study was to assess the loss of thermal control capability of the anodized surfaces on ISS if the Plasma Contactor Units (PCUs) were not continually operated as ISS is constructed and operated. The study considers six cases for the arcing Chromic Acid Anodized Aluminum (CAA) surfaces or Sulfuric Acid Anodized Aluminum (SAA) with no Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris impacts (MM/OD), with MM/OD impacts that completely penetrated the anodize layer, and with MM/OD impacts that partially penetrated the anodize layer. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) performed analyses to provide the data giving the size and depth of penetration of MM/OD impacts. All six cases documented the thermal control properties of the anodized layers throughout the ISS life without PCU operations.

Simulated Space Environment Effects on the Blocking Force of Silicone Adhesive

The International Space Station (ISS) solar arrays utilize MD-944 diode tape to protect the underlying diodes in the solar array panel circuit and also provide thermal conditioning and mechanical support. The diode tape consists of silicone pressure sensitive adhesive (Dow Coming QC-7725) with a protective Kapton over-layer. On-orbit, the Kapton over-layer will erode under exposure to atomic oxygen (AO) and the underlying exposed silicone adhesive will ultimately convert, under additional AO exposure, to a glass like silicate. The current operational plan is to retract ISS solar array P6 and leave it stored under load for a long duration (6 months or more) during ISS assembly. With the Kapton over-layer eroded away, the exposed silicone adhesive must not cause the solar array to stick to itself or cause the solar array to fail during redeployment. Previous testing by Lockheed-Martin Space Systems (LMSS) characterized silicone blocking following exposure to low energy atomic oxygen (AO) in an asher facility, but this is believed to be conservative. An additional series of tests was performed by the Environmental Effects Group at MSFC under direction from the ISS Program Office Environments Team. This test series included high energy AO (5 eV), near ultraviolet (NUV) radiation and ionizing radiation, singly and in combination. Additional samples were exposed to thermal energy AO (<0.1 ev) for comparison to the LMSS tests. Diode tape samples were exposed to each environment constituent individually, put under preload for seven days and then the resulting blocking force was measured using a tensile machine. Additional samples were exposed to AO, NUV and electrons in series and then put under long term (three to ten months) preload to determine the effect of preload duration on the resulting blocking force of the silicone-to-silicone bond. Test results indicate that high energy AO, ultraviolet radiation and electron ionizing radiation exposure all reduce the blocking force for a silicone-to-silicone bond. AO exposure produces the most significant reduction in blocking force.