Steven E. Lobell

Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy: Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy

How do states, or more specifically the decision-makers and institutions that act on their behalf, assess international threats and opportunities? What happens when there is disagreement about the nature of foreign threats? Who ultimately decides the range of acceptable and unacceptable foreign policy alternatives? To what extent, and under what conditions, can domestic actors bargain with state leaders and influence foreign or security policies? How and under what circumstances will domestic factors impede states from pursuing the types of strategies predicted by balance of power theory and balance of threat theory? Finally, how do states go about extracting and mobilizing resources necessary to implement foreign and security policies? These are important questions that cannot be answered by the dominant neorealist or liberal theories of international politics. Consider the following: in 1945, and again in 1990, the United States emerged victorious from a major war or an enduring rivalry. In each postwar period, officials in Washington faced the daunting task of assessing and responding to new and unfamiliar international threats. However, the resulting shifts in grand strategy were not predictable solely based upon an analysis of relative power distributions or the dynamics of American domestic politics at the time. The bipolar distribution of power following the Second World War does not explain why the United States embarked upon a grand strategy of containment, which eventually mixed both realpolitik and liberal internationalist ends and means, over the alternative of competitive cooperation with the Soviet Union through a sphere-of-influence arrangement in Europe.

The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics

Second image reversed plus a second image -- Liberal contenders and Britains grand strategy of cooperation, 1889-1912 -- Imperial contenders and Britains grand strategy of restrained punishment, 1932-1939 -- Imperial contenders and Spains grand strategy of punishment, 1621-1640 -- Great power tenure.

Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy: Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism

Despite important differences between the chapters, most of the contributors to this volume have expressed strong preferences for an approach to international politics that stresses the primacy of the international system, but that also acknowledges the importance of domestic political arrangements and the perceptions of leaders in the selection and implementation of foreign policy responses to the international environment. The question remains, however, how important this enterprise of neoclassical realism is as a research agenda and whether, in practical terms, it truly represents an improvement on existing theoretical approaches. In order to place our discussion in a broader context, therefore, our purpose in this chapter is threefold: (1) to map out the scope of neoclassical realism as understood in this volume; (2) to compare its performance in the cases covered in this volume to other popular approaches to international politics and foreign policy (principally neorealism, liberal theory, and other Innenpolitik approaches); and (3) to identify directions for future research. The scope of neoclassical realism A central theme of this volume has been that neoclassical realism is a more coherent approach to foreign policy than has been previously appreciated. In particular, we have articulated a common conception of the state that underlies disparate neoclassical realist theories, uniting them into a single, coherent body of theory. For neoclassical realists, the state exists as a potentially autonomous actor that is distinct from any societal group.

Second Face of Security Strategies: Anglo-German and Anglo-Japanese Trade Concessions During the 1930s

Great powers can pursue deliberate Trojan horse policies to transform rising and threatening states into followers and supporters rather than challengers by altering their domestic political and economic institutions. I contend that a great power can use trade concessions, rather than punishment, to enable a favorable foreign policy coalition in a target country. The intent is to strengthen the political power of state and societal elites who have a stake in deepening international ties, while opponents of such policies will be weakened politically and economically. The societal winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred outward-oriented grand strategy. I term this process the second face of security since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security. I examine Britains commercial policies toward Germany and Japan during the 1930s to better understand second-face strategies. I argue that the intent of Britains industrial and commercial policy was to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry, and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Berlin and Tokyo away from rearmament, extreme autarky, and war.

Politics and National Security: The Battles for Britain

Between 1889 and 1939 Britain created security for itself through alliances, rearmament, or appeasement (either alone or in some combination). The existing literature emphasizes the role of geopolitics, domestic characteristics, and individual idiosyncrasies to explain Britains choices. I argue that within Britain, two broad and logrolled coalitions (outward-looking internationalist bloc and inward-oriented nationalist faction) battled to advance their factions preferred security strategy and to capture the associated distributive benefits. Supporters and opponents understood that how Britain secured itself would create internal winners and losers. Supporters and opponents also recognized that any changes in the security strategy would have domestic redistributional consequences. I apply this model to Britain and use a longitudinal controlled comparison over three periods: 1889—1914, 1914—1919, and 1919—1939.

War is politics: Offensive realism, domestic politics, and security strategies

NIALL FERGUSON writes that Britain’s greatest foreign policy failure in the decade prior to the Great War was that while London “identified a serious German threat to the continental status quo,” Britain “made no serious attempt to prepare to check that threat by the only viable means: the creation of a comparably large land army.”1 Most national actors and interest groups understood the security challenge posed by Germany (bully or conquer France and overrun the Low Countries) and Britain’s shortcomings in terms of its military and industrial preparedness for war (as demonstrated earlier by the Boer War).2 Yet, before 1914, the accompanying domestic redistributional consequence from the necessary financial, economic, military, and industrial policies made a large standing army politically impossible. According to offensive realism, security in the international system is scarce.3 Driven by the anarchical nature of the international system, such theorists contend that states seek to maximize their security through maximizing their rela-

Second Image Reversed Politics: Britain's Choice of Freer Trade or Imperial Preferences, 1903–1906, 1917–1923, 1930–1932

In 1903-1906, 1917-1923, and 1930-1932 British decision makers debated whether to adopt a system of imperial preferences. Preferences were rejected in 1906 and 1923, but adopted in 1932 at the Ottawa Conference. The existing political economy literature focuses primarily on the hegemons position in the international system, state or society centered arguments, and the role of ideas and beliefs to explain changes in a hegemons foreign commercial policy. Using a second image reversed argument, I contend that changes in the commercial composition of the emerging contenders from a mix of liberal and nonliberal contenders in the first and second periods (1903-1906; 1917-1923) to nonliberal contenders in the third period (1930-1932) strengthened economic nationalists over free traders, contributing to Britains adoption of imperial preferences. Although greatly diminished in strength, free traders were able to moderate the protectionist policies through the Ottawa Agreements and the Sterling Area. Why did Britains foreign commercial policy prior to World War I and the immediate postwar years differ from its commercial policy in the decade prior to World War II when all three periods were characterized by relative British industrial decline, foreign protectionism, unemployment (in the latter two periods), and emerging competitors for regional hegemony?1 In particular, why did Britains leaders reject a foreign commercial policy of imperial preferences in 1906 and 1923, but in 1932, at the Ottawa Conference, adopt a system of imperial preferences? The existing political economy literature focuses primarily on changes in the hegemons position in the international system (hegemonic stability theory), state or society centered arguments, and the role of ideas and beliefs to explain changes in a hegemons foreign commercial policy. For the most part, these explanations emphasize insideout arguments; the underlying forces that shift a hegemons foreign commercial Authors note: The ideas in this article originated during a fellowship from the University of Californias Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and TheJohn D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and I am grateful

The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War

In combining the domestic and international levels, I contend that the international environment can enable a domestic win-set and thereby guide the formation of a states international security strategy. The trigger is the nature of and changes in the extant international setting. Based on findings from framing effects and prospect theory, I contend that periods of external crisis, conflict, and war will shift the publics domain to one of relative losses. In this realm, it will be easier for foreign policy advisors who favor offensive security strategies to frame the national debate. Periods of international peace, tranquility, and prosperity will shift the publics domain to relative gains, which will make it easier for advisors who favor risk averse and defensive strategies to frame the national discussion. The outcome can be a more offensive or defensive strategy than the state would have otherwise pursued. I apply the model to Britain to examine Britains decision to adopt a Limited Liability strategy between 1912 and 1914, and to escalate to a Continental Commitment by 1916. A version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Annual International Studies Association Convention. I would like to thank Jane Cramer, Tom Rice, and Jeffrey Taliaferro for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Britain's paradox: cooperation or punishment prior to World War I

In the three decades prior to World War I, Britains paradox was whether to cooperate with or punish an emerging Germany, Japan, France, Russia, and the United States. Based on the need for economy, successive Chancellors of the Exchequer pressed for cooperating with the contenders. Members of the services and Conservatives pushed to punish these contenders, countering that Britain could afford the rising naval expenditure needed to implement such a programme. The existing literature emphasizes the role of geopolitics, domestic constraints, and individual idiosyncrasies to explain Britains foreign policy adjustment. I argue that the nature of the foreign commercial policy of the contenders guided Britains response. Due to the special affinity among commercially liberal states, Britain cooperated with America and Japan, ceding regional governance to both aspiring regional hegemons. Britain did, however, punish non-liberal France, Germany, and Russia by implementing new naval construction programmes and concentrating freed-up military resources until these countries capitulated in their naval challenge.

Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict

In this book we offer an approach to understanding the internationalization of ethnic conflict in different regional contexts that integrates international relations and comparative analysis. We examine four core explanatory frameworks that contribute to the diffusion and the escalation of ethnic conflicts in divided states and societies. These explanations are at the nexus of comparative and international understandings of conflict. Much of the literature on ethnic conflict focuses on the origins of ethnic identity (instrumentalists versus constructivists; Smith 1986, 1993; Kaplan 1993; Connor 1994; Arfi 1998) or on the sources of ethnic conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1998).1 We focus on the link between ethnic and interstate conflict, and specifically, on the internationalization of ethnic conflicts. We recognize the internationalization of ethnic conflict as requiring an under-standing of “intermestic” structures and processes.2