Steven L Cleveland

Multiagency Urban Search Experiment Detector and Algorithm Test Bed

In order to provide benchmark data sets for radiation detector and algorithm development, a particle transport test bed has been created using experimental data as model input and validation. A detailed radiation measurement campaign at the Combined Arms Collective Training Facility in Fort Indiantown Gap, PA (FTIG), USA, provides sample background radiation levels for a variety of materials present at the site (including cinder block, gravel, asphalt, and soil) using long dwell high-purity germanium (HPGe) measurements. In addition, detailed light detection and ranging data and ground-truth measurements inform model geometry. This paper describes the collected data and the application of these data to create background and injected source synthetic data for an arbitrary gamma-ray detection system using particle transport model detector response calculations and statistical sampling. In the methodology presented here, HPGe measurements inform model source terms while detector response calculations are validated via long dwell measurements using 2”

Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

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Validation of gamma-ray detection techniques for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

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Modeling Urban Scenarios & Experiments: Fort Indiantown Gap Data Collections Summary and Analysis

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Preliminary Performance Results for a Direct Multiplication Measurement for Use in Neutron Multiplicity Analysis

” NaI(Tl) detectors at a variety of measurement points. A collection of responses, along with sampling methods and interpolation, can be used to create data sets to gauge radiation detector and algorithm (including detection, identification, and localization) performance under a variety of scenarios. Data collected at the FTIG site are available for query, filtering, visualization, and download at muse.lbl.gov.

Uranium-233 Signatures

Abstract By around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.