Steven L. Willborn

Civil juries and civil justice : psychological and legal perspectives

Crisis, What Crisis? Perception and Reality in Civil Justice.- Crisis, What Crisis? Perception and Reality in Civil Justice.- Approaches To Studying Civil Juries.- Whats the Story?.- Civil Juries in Ecological Context: Methodological Implications for Research.- What is the Study of Jury Decision Making About and What Should it be About?.- The Relationship between Compensatory and Punitive Damages.- Crossing the Punitive-Compensatory Divide.- The Relation between Punitive and Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the Mass of Awards.- Damages as Metaphor: A Commentary.- Medical Injuries And Medical Evidence.- Faking It? Citizen Perceptions of Whiplash Injuries.- Reflections on Juryphobia and Medical Malpractice Reform.- How Juryphobia and Fears of Fraudulent Claims Disserve Medical Malpractice Reform Efforts.- Apologies And Restorative Justice.- Apologies and Civil Justice.- Can We Talk?.- Constructs of Justice: Beyond Civil Litigation.- Signs for the Future of Civil Justice Research.

Social consciousness in legal decision making: Psychological perspectives.

Introduction Chapter 1: Law and Everyday Decision-Making: Rational, Descriptive, and Normative Models Richard L. Wiener, University of Nebraska at Lincoln Unit I. Investigative Profiling: Legal Developments and Empirical Research Chapter 2: The Rhetoric of Racial Profiling Sam R. Gross, University of Michigan Chapter 3: Racial Profiling, Attributions of Motive, and the Acceptance of Social Authority Tom R. Tyler, New York University Chapter 4: Analysis Racial Profiling as a Minority Issue Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Unit II. Affirmative Action: Legal Developments and Empirical Research Chapter 5: Affirmative Action and the Courts: From Plessy to Brown to Grutter, And Back? Mark R. Killenbeck, University of Arkansas Chapter 6: The University of Michigan Cases: Social Scientific Studies of Diversity and Fairness Faye J. Crosby, University of California, Santa Cruz Amy E. Smith, San Francisco State University Chapter 7: Social Science in the Courts: The View from Michigan Steven L. Willborn, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Unit III. Workplace Discrimination: Legal Developments and Empirical Research in Sexual Harassment Chapter 8: How can we make our research on sexual harassment more useful in legal decision- making? Barbara A. Guteks, University of Arizona Chapter 9: Totality of Circumstances in Sexual Harassment Decisions: A Decision Making Model Richard L. Wiener, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Ryan J. Winter, Florida International University Chapter 10: What Can Researchers Tell the Courts, and What Can the Courts Tell Researchers about Sexual Harassment? Brian H. Bornstein, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Meera Adya, Syracuse University Unit IV. Hate Speech and Hate Crimes: Legal Developments and Empirical Research Chapter 11: The Hate Crime Project and its Limitations: Evaluating the Societal Gains and Risk in Bias Crime Law Enforcement Frederick M. Lawrence, George Washington University Chapter 12: Implications of automatic and controlled processes in stereotyping for hate crime perpetration and litigation Margaret Bull Kovera, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Chapter 13: Implicit Bias and Hate Crimes: A Psychological Framework and Critical Race Theory Analysis Jennifer S. Hunt, University of Nebraska at Lincoln Chapter 14: Psychology and Legal Decision Making: Where Should We Go From Here?Erin M. Richter, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Richard L. Wiener, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Mental disorder and criminal law : responsibility, punishment and competence

Mental Disorder and the Criminal Process.- Depression and the Criminal Law: Integrating Doctrinal Empirical, and Justificatory Analysis.- Determining When Severe Mental Illness Should Disqualify a Defendant from Capital Punishment.- Accommodating Child Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System: Implications for Death Penalty Cases.- Protecting Well-Being While Pursuing Justice.- Judgments of Dangerousness and the Criminal Process.- Capital Punishment and Dangerousness.- Limited Expertise and Experts: Problems with the Continued Use of Future Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing.- Psychopathy, Culpability, and Commitment.- Quagmire Ahead!: The Sticky Role of Behavioral Science in Capital Sentencing.- Competence to Face Execution and the Roles of the Psychological Professions.- Meaningful Consideration of Competence to be Executed.- Psychological Expertise and Amicus Briefs in the Context of Competence to Face Execution.- Constitutional Health Care and Incompetency to Face Execution.

Models of Labour Enforcement: Necessary Indeterminacy

Labour laws are enforced in many different ways. Sometimes public agencies enforce the laws and sometimes workers are authorized to do so. Sometimes employer/violators pay for litigation costs and sometimes not. Sometimes the sanctions for violations are set by the harm caused (such as loss of back pay) and sometimes the sanctions are fines and penalties. Sometimes agencies are the primary forums for hearing disputes and sometimes courts (Summers 1992). The consequences of these types of differences in labour enforcement are under-studied empirically. Labour enforcement theory, if anything, is even less well-studied. This is unfortunate, in part, because only a well-developed theory can help policy-makers sort through the many choices available when they are deciding how to enforce a labour statute. Moreover, a well-developed theory is necessary to guide researchers in their efforts. A theoretical model is needed to simplify the world sufficiently to permit testable hypotheses.

Labor Enforcement Theory: The Case of Public vs. Private Enforcement

Labor laws are enforced in many different ways. Sometimes public agencies enforce the laws and sometimes workers are authorized to do so. Sometimes employer/violators pay for litigation costs and sometimes not. Sometimes the sanctions for violations are set by the harm caused (such as loss of backpay) and sometimes the sanctions are fines and penalties. Sometimes agencies are the primary fora for hearing disputes and sometimes courts. The consequences of these types of differences in labor enforcement are under-studied empirically. Labor enforcement theory, if anything, is even less well-studied. This book chapter examines labor enforcement theory with a focus on the choice between public or private enforcement. The article begins by presenting a standard economic model of enforcement. The chapter then applies the model to private and public enforcement and argues, among other things, that private enforcement adjusts better than public enforcement to economic downturns, but is less effective at enforcing violations that affect current employees. The chapter concludes with a critique and call for re-evaluation of the standard economic model of enforcement.

Procedural Justice and the Structure of the Age and Disability Laws

We are all members of many groups at the same time. We are man or woman, black or white, citizen or non-citizen, young or old, Nebraska football fan or not, and on and on. In large part, our lives are shaped and influenced, and made rich and rewarding through these many and diverse group memberships. For better or worse, the discrimination laws increase our awareness of some of these groupings, and the salience of them.

Social Science in the Courts: The View from Michigan

The University of Michigan cases1 are interesting and provocative case studies on the role of social science in the law, but I think they cut in quite a different direction than suggested by Professors Killenbeck and Crosby in their chapters. Professors Killenbeck and Crosby both argue that social science was quite central to the decisions. I think that social science was relegated to a very minor role. Moreover, on balance, I think this minor role is probably good both for the law and for social science. The most important contribution to affirmative action jurisprudence made by the University of Michigan cases is the holding in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) that diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in making university admissions decisions.2 Justice Powell had said as much in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) decades earlier, but in an opinion that only he joined and that was controlling only because the Court was so fractured.3 Before Grutter, the lower courts had split on how much weight to place on his decision.4 The Court in Grutter decided not to rely on Justice Powell’s decision as a major justification for its decision. The Court said it would not be “useful” to analyze Bakke closely to try to determine the precedential value of Powell’s decision. Instead, the Court decided to endorse his position, not because of precedent, but instead based on a new and fresh analysis.5 The Court was very clear about the principal reason for its decision that diversity was a compelling interest: deference to the judgment of the university.