Stijn van Kessel

Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support

Studies on populist parties – or ‘supply-side populism’ more generally – are numerous. Nevertheless, the connection with demand-side dynamics, and particularly the populist characteristics or tendencies of the electorate, requires more scholarly attention. This article examines in more detail the conditions underlying the support for populist parties, and in particular the role of populist attitudes amongst citizens. It asks two core questions: (1) are populist party supporters characterised by stronger populist attitudes than other party supporters, and (2) to what extent do populist (and other) attitudes contribute to their party preference? The analysis uses fixed effect models and relies on a cross-sectional research design that uses unique survey data from 2015 and includes nine European countries. The results are threefold. First, in line with single-country studies, populist attitudes are prominent among supporters of left- and right-wing populist parties in particular. Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party support in addition to left-wing socioeconomic issue positions for left-wing populist parties, and authoritarian and anti-immigration issue positions for right-wing populist parties. Third, populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support for populist parties, particularly for individuals whose positions are further removed from the extreme ends of the economic or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that strong populist attitudes may encourage some voters to support a populist party whose issue positions are incongruous with their own policy-related preferences.

The populist cat-dog: applying the concept of populism to contemporary European party systems

Populism is a frequently used yet problematic concept; the term is often ill-defined and randomly applied. While these problems have been widely acknowledged, this article argues that there are still issues with the way populism tends to be used, even if a sound definition is provided. This relates to the fact that it is often not clear whether populism is used to refer to an ideological feature of an exclusive category of political parties or whether populism is seen as a type of discourse which can be expressed by any political actor. In order to illustrate the difficulties with regard to the application of the term populism, several ‘hard’ cases of populism across Europe are discussed. The article argues that in order to stimulate a more accurate use of the term, observers should be explicit not only about the meaning of populism, but also about the form in which it manifests itself.Populism is a frequently used yet problematic concept; the term is often ill-defined and randomly applied. While these problems have been widely acknowledged, this article argues that there are still issues with the way populism tends to be used, even if a sound definition is provided. This relates to the fact that it is often not clear whether populism is used to refer to an ideological feature of an exclusive category of political parties or whether populism is seen as a type of discourse which can be expressed by any political actor. In order to illustrate the difficulties with regard to the application of the term populism, several ‘hard’ cases of populism across Europe are discussed. The article argues that in order to stimulate a more accurate use of the term, observers should be explicit not only about the meaning of populism, but also about the form in which it manifests itself.

United in opposition? The populist radical right’s EU-pessimism in times of crisis

Abstract Populist radical right (PRR) parties are typically critical of European integration. They deem the EU an elitist project and consider European integration a threat to national sovereignty. In practice, however, PRR parties’ positions on the EU have varied across countries and periods. Our article assesses whether, and how, PRR parties have changed their ‘EU-pessimist’ discourse following the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis. The crisis has ostensibly provided scope for PRR parties across Europe to bolster their EU-pessimism and place more emphasis on socioeconomic frames. We analyse the evolution of the PRR’s discourse in five countries. The article shows that, although PRR parties have generally brought the crisis into their discourses, they have responded to it in different ways, displaying varying degrees of EU-pessimism. These responses were partly informed by the opportunities provided by their contexts, but ostensibly more so by the strategic considerations of PRR party leaderships.

The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: Comparative conclusions:

This article offers comparative findings of the nature of populist Euroscepticism in political parties in contemporary Europe in the face of the Great Recession, migrant crisis, and Brexit. Drawing on case studies included in the Special Issue on France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the article presents summary cross-national data on the positions of parties, the relative importance of the crisis, the framing of Euroscepticism, and the impact of Euroscepticism in different country cases. We use this data to conclude that there are important differences between left- and right-wing variants of populist Euroscepticism, and that although there is diversity across the cases, there is an overall picture of resilience against populist Euroscepticism.

Populist Eurosceptic trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands during the European crises

Multiple crises shook the European Union (EU) during the past decade. First, the economic and financial crises that unfolded since 2008 shook the foundations of the European project and its monetary union. Then, the inflow of migrants and asylum seekers into Europe in 2015 questioned the EU’s ability to jointly respond to common political issues. More recently, Brexit came across as the corollary of a prolonged legitimacy crisis. These crises have not only affected the course of European integration but also provided novel issues for political competition within the EU member states. At the party-political level, populist anti-establishment parties have traditionally listed among the principal interpreters and drivers of criticism towards ‘Europe’. In this article, we empirically address the changing Eurosceptic frames adopted by populist parties during these crises and speculate on the reverberation of these frames in respective party systems. For this purpose, we focus on two cases: Italy and the Netherlands. Both countries present instances of populist parties of different ideological persuasions within traditionally Europhile contexts. At the same time, both countries have been affected to very different extents by the recent crises, allowing us to examine how populist parties have responded to different political opportunities.

European Parliament elections in times of crisis

The financial crisis has forced member states such as Greece to turn to the EU, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund for financial support, which was coupled with reform programmes. Meanwhile, in order to enforce EU budget rules, the European Commission has been given the power to advise national governments on their budgets. During the 2009 European Parliament election campaign, however, the enforcement of reform programmes in Greece and the granting of budgetary oversight powers to the Commission were not part of any partys campaign promises. It is therefore an open question how these events have affected the positions of the political parties running for the EP in 2014. This question is not just interesting for political scientists but is also of substantive interest for citizens in general, because it concerns the solutions European political parties offer for the crisis.

Populist Parties in the United Kingdom

Whereas the previous two chapters dealt with countries in which some populist parties could rely on considerable levels of support in parliamentary elections, this chapter provides a study of a country where, at least up until 2010, populist parties have failed to make a great impact at the national level: the United Kingdom.1 By means of this case study I aim to discover whether the conditions underlying the electoral success of populist parties are also essential in explaining their failure. The main focus will be on two parties that can (in their present form) be considered populist parties: the British National Party (BNP) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

Populist Parties in Poland

The previous chapter dealt with populist parties in a long-established Western European democracy. This chapter, which is structured in a similar way, moves beyond this part of the continent, and provides an analysis of populist parties in Poland. Similarly to the Netherlands, early 21st-century Poland has witnessed the rise and fall of populist parties, and in Poland populist parties have also taken part in a coalition government. The country thus lends itself equally well to the purpose of comparing successful and unsuccessful electoral performances of populist parties. As became clear in Chapter 2, post-communist Central and Eastern European countries often pose a challenge when the aim is to determine which parties are populist, and which are not. This is also the case in Poland. I will nevertheless argue that, in the period from 2001 onwards, two parties emerged that can be identified as populist parties: Self Defence (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SO) and, since 2005, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwośc, PiS). For the latter party, nevertheless, populism seemingly remained a relatively loose supplement to its national-conservative core ideology. The League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), often considered to be populist as well, is not classified as a genuine populist party in this book.

Populist Parties in the Netherlands

The first case study presented in this book covers the Netherlands. This chapter seeks to identify the populist parties that have appeared in contemporary Dutch politics, to describe their ideological characteristics and to explain their electoral performance on the basis of the explanatory model outlined in Chapter 1. I will thus discuss the role of the electoral system, the responsiveness of established parties with regard to the issues central to the appeal of the populist challengers, and the electoral credibility of the populist parties themselves. The four themes central to the appeal of many populist parties (culture and ethnicity; economic hardship; European integration; and corruption) are discussed insofar as they have been relevant to the electoral competition between the populist parties and their mainstream competitors.

Introduction: Studying Populism in European Party Systems

It may be clear that populism, a term used in the gloomy prognosis of former European Commission President Barroso, is often associated with developments which are deemed adverse, or even dangerous. Particularly since the dawn of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, various European political actors have expressed their concern about the rise of populism, more often than not associating the concept with political extremism and xenophobia. Yet what precisely constitutes this ‘populism’, and which political actors embody it, is often left unsaid. This book aims to clarify the manifestation of populism in European politics between 2000 and 2013. The focus is on political parties, which are still the key actors in contemporary European politics in terms of democratic representation. I first aim to apply the concept of populism to party systems across the continent and to identify parties that stand out from the others in terms of their consistent expression of a populist discourse. Second, I seek to explain the electoral performance of those ‘populist parties’ in national elections. Does the success of these parties in Europe denote a reactionary and destructive mood, as certain commentators and representatives of the political elites would like us to believe, or is this interpretation incomplete, or even flawed?