Suchan Chae

Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power

We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium-sized firms.

A group bargaining solution

Abstract We propose a solution for bargaining models where groups of individuals bargain with each other. The solution constitutes a Nash solution within as well as across groups. An individual may be worse off bargaining as a member of a group than bargaining alone (the joint-bargaining paradox) in a pure-bargaining situation. It can be, however, profitable to bargain as a group in a non-pure bargaining situation.

The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game

Abstract We analyze an n -person bargaining game, and show that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium outcome.

Broadcasting versus narrowcasting

Abstract In this paper, we identify the characteristics of TV programs which make the programs more likely to be broadcast than to be shown on pay channels. One characteristic we focus on is the degree of extensiveness of the market. An extensive (intensive, respectively) market is a broad but shallow (narrow but deep, respectively) one. We find that a program is more likely to be broadcast as the market is more extensive. We also investigate which one between broadcasting and pay TV is the more desirable outlet for programs of different characteristics from the welfare point of view.

Existence of competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets

Abstract The existence of competitive equilibrium is proved for a model with incomplete futures markets. The security returns in this model are denominated in terms of units which represent certain composite commodities specific to events.

The n-person Nash bargaining solution with time preference

Abstract The paper introduces an n-person Nash bargaining solution in the time-preference framework. The solution is one which equalizes ‘marginal impatience’ among all players.

Short run core equivalence in an overlapping generations model

Abstract This essay establishes the equality between the set of competitive equilibrium allocations and the set of allocations which belong to the cores of a sequence of short run economies for an overlapping generations model. A short run economy is a finite period economy obtained by truncating the original economy so that the truncated economy is irreducible.

A bargaining model of retransmission consent and must-carry rule

Abstract In this paper, I analyze the effects of the retransmission consent and must-carry rule in the Cable Act of 1992 of the United States using a bargaining model, and interpret the actual outcomes of the negotiations between cable system operators and broadcasters in the light of the model. Regarding a broadcasters choice between invoking the must-carry rule and negotiating for retransmission fees, the model predicts that broadcasters who receive higher additional benefits from the carriage of their signals on cable systems are more likely to opt for the retransmission-consent option. The prediction is shown to be consistent with a statistical data.

Tax incidence with bargaining

Abstract The paper investigates tax incidence in a two-person bargaining model where one party is taxed. The condition under which the non-taxed party shares the burden of taxes (or benefit of subsidies) is characterized. Sufficient conditions for the tax burden to fall entirely on the taxed party are given. Also, a sufficient condition for the non-taxed party actually to benefit from taxation is given.

Can time preference be an instrument for price discrimination

Abstract It is shown that, contrary to some claims in the literature, a monopolist cannot use heterogeneous time preferences as an instrument for price discrimination.