Sultan Barakat

The macro-economic impact of disasters

Despite 30 years of study, international development policy appears to be little closer to generating protection to vulnerable people from the preventable losses of disaster. Part of the reason for a lack of progress has been the sidelining of disaster in development studies. Disaster events have been seen as exceptional and allowed to fall outside the mainstream of development theory. In this paper we set out and use a framework that allows a more holistic accounting for the macro-economic impacts of disaster, and is a step towards a deeper integration of disasters and development.

The failed promise of multi-donor trust funds: aid financing as an impediment to effective state-building in post-conflict contexts

Multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) have quickly become one of the most prominent aid modalities. Viewed as a reliable long-term funding source, they are hailed for facilitating donor coordination and ceding unprecedented control of post-conflict reconstruction and development to recipient governments. The advent of the MDTF also highlighted the growing understanding that aid modalities, the form and manner in which assistance is given to developing nations, are themselves a key intervention in war-torn societies and not a passive administrative arrangement. The implementation of MDTFs has, however, frequently nullified their conceptual benefits, particularly in regard to strengthening and legitimating recipient states. Complicated implementation arrangements, donor-dominated coordination and oversight bodies, short timeframes and high expectations pertaining to disbursement have subsumed trust funds to donors’ pre-existing modes of operating and made them contravene state building objectives and weaken aid effectiveness. Modalities can, like any other intervention, cause harmful effects. These are discussed in the context of Afghanistans largest and highest profile reconstruction intervention, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). This article examines one prominent MDTF, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), and its impact upon the NSP and its governance objectives. This critical case study shows the MDTF concept to be fundamentally and theoretically sound but at odds with donor countries’ primary attachment to the strategic rather than development impact of post-conflict reconstruction assistance. Such priorities limit aid effectiveness, hamper coordination and sideline the recipient state in the post-conflict reconstruction process.

The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery

Abstract Recent history has been marked by the rise of post-conflict intervention as a component of military and foreign policy, as a form of humanitarianism and as a challenge to Westphalian notions of state sovereignty. The terms of debate, the history of the discipline and the evolution of scholarship and practice remain relatively under-examined, particularly in the post-9/11 period in which post-conflict recovery came to be construed as an extension of conflict and as a domain concerned principally with the national security of predominantly Western countries. The subsequent politicisation of post-conflict recovery and entry of post-conflict assistance into the political economy of conflict have fundamentally changed policy making and practice. The authors argue that research into post-conflict recovery, which must become increasingly rigorous and theoretically grounded, should detach itself from the myriad political agendas which have sought to impose themselves upon war-torn countries. The de-politicisation of post-conflict recovery, the authors conclude, may benefit from an increasingly structured ‘architecture of integrated, directed recovery’.

‘A tradition of forgetting’: stabilisation and humanitarian action in historical perspective

While subject to increasing articulation and institutionalisation, stabilisation is a long-standing concept and practice that has consistently engaged with and, at times, conflicted with varied understandings of humanitarianism and humanitarian action. Reviewing selected historical experiences, including the Philippines (1898-1902), Algeria (1956-62), Vietnam (1967-75) and El Salvador (1980-92), this paper argues that contemporary models of stabilisation build on and repeat mistakes of the past, particularly the overt securitisation of aid and the perception that humanitarian and development actors are able to purchase security effectively. Where current stabilisation differs from its earlier incarnations, as in the introduction of the private sector and incorporation of humanitarian action into war-fighting strategies, the implications are shown to be troubling if not outright disastrous. T his examination of historical experience, which includes many failures and few, if any, successes, raises the likelihood that it is not solely the design or implementation of individual stability operations that require modification but perhaps the entire concept of stabilisation itself.

After the Marmara earthquake: Lessons for avoiding short cuts to disasters

This paper aims to explore a number of lessons learned from the disaster management experience in Turkey in response to the Marmara earthquake in August 1999. It discusses the shortcomings of disaster mitigation and preparedness measures in Turkey in the context of a disaster and development relationship, including a number of issues such as legislation and training, public awareness, insurance, urban planning and management, and disaster response strategies. It explains why this earthquake produced such a large impact and suggests why, unlike previous earthquakes, the public reaction to the shortcomings in disaster mitigation and preparedness for the earthquake may promote important changes within Turkish society. Through the investigation of disaster management practice in the light of lessons learned from the Marmara earthquake experience, the paper outlines possible responses to these shortcomings.

Setting the scene for Afghanistan's reconstruction: The challenges and critical dilemmas

The current round of fighting in Afghanistan is only the latest twist in a protracted conflict in which the focus of the international community has tended to fluctuate, depending on prevailing geopolitical agendas. Now in its third decade, the war has resulted in massive population displacement, both internal and external, casualty figures in excess of one million, and a serious deterioration in conditions for the civilian population. This paper takes as its starting point the events of 11 September 2001, which led to the recent dramatic changes in Afghanistan, including the Emergency Loya Jirga and other constitutional developments envisaged in the Bonn Agreement. By way of essential background, the paper then offers a brief introduction to the country; it describes the way in which conflict began and traces the various different phases of the war from the late 1970s to the present day. In so doing, it seeks to outline the global and historical context of the current crisis in Afghanistan. It considers the challenges that need to be addressed in order to achieve effective post-conflict reconstruction and development. Finally, it offers a brief overview of current UN plans for Afghanistans reconstruction and outlines a number of critical dilemmas facing those involved in their implementation.

Post-Saddam Iraq: deconstructing a regime, reconstructing a nation

The reconstruction of Iraq, following its invasion and occupation by the USA and its allies in 2003, presents a challenge to the consensus view of post-war reconstruction that has emerged in the wake of the Cold War, in that in Iraq reconstruction is being seen as integral to a military strategy and external strategic interest. Iraq itself also presents a very different context in terms of its human and economic development, resources and recent history compared with other nations that have been the subject of reconstruction interventions. This paper draws on four key tenets of post-war reconstruction: understanding the context (historical, cultural, regional); developing a shared national vision of the future; developing collaborative governance; and inducing development as a framework for analysing the nature of the reconstruction attempted in Iraq. It traces the difficulties of effecting a peaceful transition to the failure to understand the implications of attempting to impose a pre-determined plan in the fragile conditions of Iraq, post-Saddam. Nevertheless, despite these many mistakes, the paper concludes by suggesting that a way forward can still be found.

The Role of Basic Education in Post-Conflict Recovery.

The last decade has seen a growing recognition amongst international donors, development agencies, non-government organisations and academics of the vital role education can play in bringing about recovery following violent conflict, natural disaster and other crises. This has led to the development of increasingly targeted and sophisticated programme planning and management tools, for use by government ministries, UN agencies and non-governmental organisations in fragile contexts. Drawing on the 2010 independent study of UNICEFs Education in Emergencies and Post-Conflict Transition Programme, this paper explores the transformative role education can play in post-conflict recovery. It argues that while basic education assistance can have a catalytic role in helping states during the early stages of a transition out of violent conflict, there is the need for a better understanding of its role in building peace at the national, sub-national and community levels. The paper also argues for the development of a solid evidence base to inform policy and practice at all national, regional and community levels so as to demonstrate conclusively the important role played by education during and in the aftermath of conflict.

Attributing Value: evaluating success and failure in post-war reconstruction

External analysts are already trying to evaluate the impact of the reconstruction strategies of the occupying powers in Iraq. However, those with long experience in this field caution against a rush to judgement and emphasise that it will be the Iraqis themselves who will eventually make a value judgement on how the occupation has affected their nation. The paper seeks to define a possible approach to facilitating such an evaluation at the appropriate time. Study of current evaluation theory and practice leads to the conclusion that aid evaluation, particularly in post-war contexts, tends to be almost exclusively geared to the purposes of project accountability and performance. Thus it largely fails to question the culturally and ideologically determined assumptions of value which underpin post-war reconstruction interventions. As a result a satisfactory methodology for the evaluation of the long-term impact has not been developed. Concluding that a participatory approach is the key to developing such a methodology, the methodological challenges to participatory evaluation are defined, paying particular attention to approaches, attitudes and indicators. These challenges are then practically demonstrated through case studies of project evaluation in Burundi, sector evaluation in Mozambique and an interim country evaluation in Iraq. This evidence suggests that participatory methods enable understanding of both the visible effects of war and reconstruction and the invisible, emotional and attitudinal changes which are the determining factors in developing a harmonious nation.

Fragile States: A Donor-serving Concept? Issues with Interpretations of Fragile Statehood in Afghanistan

Current conceptions and models of fragile statehood in conflict-affected contexts can serve the purposes of international donor governments over and above reconstruction and statebuilding. First, despite remaining ill-defined, the fragile state concept is widely utilized by donors to oversimplify analysis of complex political environments, such as that of Afghanistan, leading to inadequate bureaucratic responses. Second, current models of fragile statehood are unable to capture contextual or temporal dynamics, and invariably omit the contribution of international intervention to entrenching fragility. This is particularly the case in Afghanistan where the effects of international militarized stabilization responses have not been systematically included in fragility assessments, leading to increased insecurity. This article calls for a more nuanced approach to fragility and greater acknowledgement of the role donor governments can play in its entrenchment.