Thomas Waldman

The Use of Statebuilding Research in Fragile Contexts: Evidence from British Policymaking in Afghanistan, Nepal and Sierra Leone

Statebuilding has risen to the forefront of international donor policies toward the security and development of fragile states, with governments now investing millions in statebuilding research every year. However, no serious study has examined the ways in which research influences policy in fragile states. Based on in-depth interviews with officials and researchers, this article begins to shed light on the central dynamics pertaining to research use in such contexts by exploring in some detail the experience of British in-country policymakers in three countries—Afghanistan, Nepal and Sierra Leone. The picture that emerges is a mixed one, with evidence of extensive use of different forms of research combined with worrying practices and lingering deficiencies in some key areas.

British ‘Post-Conflict’ Operations in Iraq: Into the Heart of Strategic Darkness

British forces have long held what may be seen as an enviable, if controversial, record in defeating insurgents around the globe. From Malaya, through Aden to Ireland, British troops have largely been seen as ‘successful’. Iraq however threatens to compromise this reputation. The insurgency remains intense, civil war threatens to engulf the country, British troops are dying in numbers and some troops have been accused of war crimes. How are we to explain the failures in Iraq? In this article I offer a version of events based on a Clausewitzian framework. I demonstrate that British troops in Iraq are deployed in a ‘strategic void’ as a result of political failures in both the UK and US, which means troops are compromised, vulnerable and strategically aimless. Their actions are crucially detached from higher political objectives. Failure to heed Clausewitzs admonitions has led to a situation in which British ‘strategy’ amounts to hope, wait and see, while British troops fight, do and die.

‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz's Timeless Analysis of Chance in War

The concept of chance has often been approached by military thinkers in either an unreasonably fatalistic or complacently dismissive manner. However, Carl von Clausewitz (1780‐1831) developed a more accurate and realistic conception. For him, chance in war is an inescapable yet ambiguous phenomenon: it can create opportunities to be exploited or equally dash the best laid plans. Frequently disregarded in theory, Clausewitz maintained that chance, uncertainty, and friction are central to the nature of war, along with the human qualities required to overcome them such as courage, determination, and adaptability. Modern developments have not rendered these insights obsolete and, if anything, they hold even greater relevance to contemporary warfare. Western militaries fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have been continually challenged by chance events and unforeseeable setbacks. Overconfidence bred by technological superiority has contributed to militaries inadequately capable of confronting unexpected developments in all of war’s dimensions. Understanding Clausewitz’s ideas can help prepare military leaders for the unpredictable in war.

Reconciliation and research in Afghanistan: an analytical narrative

This article examines the evolution of western policy towards the idea of pursuing negotiations with the Taliban, or �reconciliation�, in Afghanistan and the role that research and expert opinion played in that process. The official western position has evolved iteratively from initial rejection to near complete embrace of exploring the potential for talks. It is widely assumed that the deteriorating security situation was the sole determinant of this major policy reversal, persuading decision-makers to rethink what had once been deemed unthinkable. Moreover, given the politicized and sensitive nature of the subject, we might expect the potential for outside opinion to influence decision-makers to be low. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that it would be a mistake to underestimate the role that research and expert knowledge played�the story is more nuanced and complex. Research coalesced, sometimes prominently, with other key drivers to spur and shape policy change. Importantly, it often took experts to make sense of events on the ground, especially where the failure of the military approach was not recognized, understood or palatable to those in official circles. Research interacted with changing events, policy windows, the emergence of new personalities and the actions of various intermediaries to shape emerging positions. More broadly, the case of reconciliation in Afghanistan reveals the difficulties and challenges, but also the variety of opportunities and techniques, for achieving research influence in conflict-affected environments.

War, Clausewitz and the Trinity

Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies, military history, and defence literature, sometimes at length, at others only in passing. Certain of his central insights have suffered distorting representations in recent years. This study is an attempt to analyse Clausewitz’s central theoretical device for understanding war – the ‘remarkable trinity’ of politics, chance, and passion. It aims to present a more accurate conception and one which is truer to Clausewitz’s intentions. It seeks to achieve this through an in-depth analysis and reinterpretation of the text of On War and Clausewitz’s other writings, conducted through the prism of the trinity and in the light of contemporary research on war. It draws on and synthesises many excellent existing studies, but argues that there is room for further clarification. It presents fresh perspectives into certain aspects of Clausewitz’s thought and emphasises elements of his theory that have been neglected. The interpretation is founded on three central approaches which place Clausewitz in historical context, considers critiques of his ideas, and recognises that the trinity cannot be understood in isolation, but rests upon ideas found in Clausewitz’s wider work. The trinity is a uniquely powerful framework for understanding the phenomenon of war. It cannot hope to answer all the strategic problems we face today – that was simply not what Clausewitz intended – but rather constitutes a mental guide for anyone interested in the subject, from commanders to university students. It focuses attention on the central underlying forces of war in their endlessly complex interaction. Once allowances are made for abstruse terminology and irregularities given the unfinished nature of On War, it is hoped that this thesis will underscore the timelessness of the trinity.

Conflict analysis for the twenty-first century

Approaches to conflict assessment remain stuck in the late 1990s. Methodological tools are overwhelmingly geared toward development actors. Significant policy evolution—driven by experiences in practice—over the last decade, along with progress in research on conflict and instability, powerfully suggests the need for analytical tools that are both truly joint—involving all relevant departments—and capable of embracing all major aspects of conflict causation and drivers of state fragility. Based on a review conducted for DFID and taking the UK as a case in point, this article outlines the key issues, challenges and requirements involved in operationalising genuinely joint analysis. There are positive signs that the UK government is serious about its commitment to integrated approaches in conflict-affected and fragile states, as demonstrated by development of the new Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS). Crucially, this must be backed up by a shared understanding of the context that is theoretically informed, process savvy, empirically grounded and geared toward addressing the key issues identified in domestic and international policy.

Vicarious warfare: The counterproductive consequences of modern American military practice

ABSTRACT This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.

Clausewitz and the Study of War

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) is generally considered to be the greatest theorist of the nature of war. Given his towering status in the field it is useful to explore how he arrived at such a rob...

Cumulative influence : the case of political settlements research in British policy

ABSTRACT The concept of the political settlement has risen to occupy a central place in British policy toward conflict-affected and fragile states. Yet, at around the turn of the millennium, the term was barely mentioned in official circles and the so-called ‘good governance’ approach held sway as the dominant operational mode. So, how had this transformation in policy approach come about and what was the role of research? In this article, we demonstrate that research played a central role in influencing the rhetoric of policymakers through a process we term ‘cumulative influence’. Indeed, the subject of political settlements represents an excellent case study for understanding the dynamics of research utilisation. It allows us to build on existing models and suggest useful ways forward in this important area of public policy analysis.