Susan Hanna

Ecological economics and sustainable governance of the oceans

Abstract This paper is an introduction and synthesis of the papers that appear in this special issue devoted to the sustainable governance of the oceans. The special issue contains papers on various aspects of the problem, including: the ecological and economic importance of the oceans, the problems facing the oceans from an ecological economics perspective, the links between science and policy, the rationale for sustainable ocean governance, and examples of sustainable institutions and governance structures. We developed the ‘Lisbon principles’ of sustainable governance (responsibility, scale-matching, precaution, adaptive management, full cost allocation, and participation) as a core set of guidelines for sustainable ocean governance. We then describe the major problems facing the oceans in terms of how the principles are violated, and evaluate some suggested institutions in terms of how the principles are incorporated.

INSTITUTIONS FOR MARINE ECOSYSTEMS: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT

The expansion of the scope of fishery management from single species to ecosystems requires more than a set of rules for multiple species. It requires sets of institutions and property rights regimes that reflect the attributes of the ecosystem and its human users, value ecosystem services as well as ecosystem commodities, and coordinate interest groups and managers on a broad ecosystem scale. Institutions that properly coordinate the human use of ecosystems have several functions. They must create management structures that promote the definition of multiple objectives and coordinate organizational tasks in a cost-effective way. They must also create management processes that are legitimate, flexible, and promote socially appropriate time horizons that recognize intergenerational rights to resource use. Each of these functions has economic dimensions that are critical to their successful implementation. This paper identifies some of the important economic dimensions of resource management institutions th...

User participation and fishery management performance within the pacific fishery management council

Fish populations have the potential to contribute to the long-term economic and social benefit of humans, but to do so they must be managed in ways which maintain ecological health. There are many ways that management performance can be assessed, but four measures are particularly pertinent to sustainability: equity, stewardship, regulatory resilience, and efficiency. A key factor in management performance is the process by which management tools are developed and implemented. One approach that has been recommended to improve performance is to structure the management process around user participation. The paper analyzes three case studies of user participation in ad hoc processes of Pacific groundfish management: the development of a license limitation program; an inter-gear sablefish allocation; and the development of a sablefish individual quota (IQ) program. The case studies illustrate the role played by participation in contributing to the equity, stewardship, resilience, and efficiency of the management process. The effect of user participation was mixed in the three cases, depending on the history of participation, the structure and process of participation, on resource conditions and on the characteristics of the program under consideration. Participation can contribute positively to fishery management performance when there is a history of collective decision-making, the time line is slow enough to allow a full consideration of the issues, educational possibilities are pursued and the condition of the resource allows equitable compromises.

Strengthening governance of ocean fishery resources

Abstract Governance of the world’s marine fisheries is ill-adapted to sustainability. Twenty years after the expansion of exclusive economic zones over most of the continental shelves, fisheries worldwide face problems of stock depletion, declining yields and increasing conflict. Other human activities in the ocean compound the effect. What is wrong? This paper is about the internal workings of fishery governance and their links to fishery outcomes. The theme of this paper is that there are fundamental weaknesses in the way fishery governance works that contribute to sustainability problems. Basic requirements for healthy ocean fishery governance are not being met because the scope and structure of governance are weak. Although the particular forms of weakness vary with fisheries and with geopolitical regions, the substance of the weakness is common across all regions. What we ask of fishery governance is that it coordinate institutional rules and individual actions by performing certain functions: incorporate multiple objectives representing different types of conservation and use; bring the time horizons of private individuals into line with those of the public; send signals of resource scarcity and enable effective adaptive responses; promote legitimacy by reflecting accepted norms of equity and by controlling harmful opportunism; contain both the level and distribution of transactions costs. Fishery governance is failing to adequately perform these functions as a result of the attributes of management scope and management structure. At both national and international levels, improvement of governance will rest on the adoption of a stable long-term management scope and the construction of flexible management structures.

The new frontier of American fisheries governance

Abstract Throughout its history, America has viewed its oceans as vast fishery frontiers. These frontiers are suffering depletion as large amounts of fishing power combined with significant oceanographic changes are straining the limits of sustainability. The new ocean frontier is not the promise of undeveloped resources, but rather the challenge of undeveloped sustainable governance systems. This paper discusses the institutional transformation necessary to achieve sustainable governance. The first part provides an historical overview of the American use of resources as frontiers. The second part characterizes the frontier as an extreme form of resource use, contrasting it to its opposite ideal, the commons. The third part outlines behavioral differences between the users of frontiers and commons, the pioneers and shareholders. Building on the attributes of resource management under the two ideals, the fourth part of the discussion focuses on the necessary conditions and major challenges to developing the institutional capital required for sustainable US fishery management. The institutional capital needed for sustainable fisheries governance is comprised of several pieces: (1) A perception of the fishery as an integrated ecosystem; (2) an identification of shareholders; (3) an allocation of decision making power and responsibility which vests all interests and internalizes the source of control; (4) incentive structures to promote long-term management; (5) management skills among fishery interests; (6) management processes that promote adaptability to change. The final section provides conclusions and an assessment of the progress US fishery management has made in institutional capital development. Pressures of scarcity are forcing US fisheries management to evolve away from the frontier ideal, but the development of the institutional capital necessary for sustainable fishery governance is incomplete.

Attitudes of Trawl Vessel Captains about Work, Resource Use, and Fishery Management

Abstract The fisheries literature embodies critical assumptions about fisherman attitudes and motivations. Common assumptions are that populations of fishermen are homogeneous in motivation and decision making and that they behave in a myopic fashion, ignoring the effects of their fishing activities on the fishery resource, The results of a survey of trawl vessel captains challenge these assumptions. We document a heterogeneous population of captains who hold a diverse set of views toward work, risk, and the ocean environment. We discuss the implications of these survey results for the design and implementation of fishery regulations, and for the rationalization of fisheries. We note the potential costs of misrepresenting fishermen in models of fishery resource use.

Managing the Human–Ecological Interface: Marine Resources as Example and Laboratory

The field of resource management integrates human and ecological systems. It is currently undergoing a difficult transition as it broadens to accommodate new values and interests. Some of the problems associated with this transition are evident in marine ecosystems, where the management of the ecological–human interface has been hindered by a lack of basic understanding. Using marine fisheries as examples, this paper describes the proximate and underlying causes of the human–ecological problem. It identifies areas in which basic research is needed on the behavioral dynamics of marine resource use, including incentives, feedbacks, management scale, monitoring and evaluation, alternative management approaches, the role of history, and human capital. It discusses the cost of failing to invest in social science research and identifies barriers to interdisciplinary research. Priorities for interdisciplinary research are listed.

The eighteenth Century English commons: A model for ocean management

Abstract Ocean management institutions have not kept pace with our technical ability to exploit ocean resources. In contrast to the fragmented management procedures currently in practice, long term ocean sustainability requires a comprehensive, coordinated management approach. Common property, while often advanced as the cause of overexploitation of ocean resources, may in fact be the institutional arrangement with the greatest potential to control ocean use. This paper presents the 18th Century English commons as an example of a successful resource management institution which coordinated multiple resource uses, was flexible to changing environmental conditions, and embodied community control. The historical record on the enclosure of the commons suggests parallels with current privatization efforts which raise troubling distributional questions. Issues central to the adaptation of the commons structure to current ocean management needs are discussed.

Resolving allocation conflicts in fishery management

Abstract Fishery management conflicts increase as decisions evolve through three stages: conservation, regulation, and allocation. The major sources of conflict in fishery management are increases in the size and effectiveness of user populations, stabilization or decline in the resource base, cultural differences between users, and different goal orientations of users. We present four case studies of Pacific U.S. fishery conflicts, detailing the processes used to resolve them. From the case study examples, we generalize two approaches to the resolution of conflict: authoritative and participatory. The future direction of fishery conflicts is projected to be the expansion of fishery‐specific conflicts into more general resource system conflicts.

The Economics of Co-Management

Economics is the study of how people allocate scarce resources among competing ends. This allocation addresses the production and distribution of goods and services over time and space. It takes place within the context of both human behaviour and organisational structure. In publicly owned fisheries, economics is further concerned with the allocation of access to the resource and with managing the interaction of people with the resource. Fisheries co-management, as an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between the government and user groups, is one approach to allocating access and to managing the interaction.