Susanne Abele

Conflict and Coordination in the Provision of Public Goods: A Conceptual Analysis of Continuous and Step-Level Games:

Conflicts between individual and collective interests are ubiquitous in social life. Experimental studies have investigated the resolution of such conflicts using public goods games with either continuous or step-level payoff functions. Game theory and social interdependence theory identify consequential differences between these two types of games. Continuous function games are prime examples of social dilemmas because they always contain a conflict between individual and collective interests, whereas step-level games can be construed as social coordination games. Step-level games often provide opportunities for coordinated solutions that benefit both the collective and the individuals. For this and other reasons, the authors conclude that one cannot safely generalize results obtained from step-level to continuous-form games (or vice versa). Finally, the authors identify specific characteristics of the payoff function in public goods games that conceptually mark the transition from a pure dilemma to a coordination problem nested within a dilemma.

Information flow and influence in collective choice

If decision-relevant information is distributed among team members, the group is inclined to focus on common information and to neglect unique information. This classical finding is robust in experimental settings, in which the distribution of information is created by experimental design. The current paper examines information sharing when access to information is not restricted. We analyzed archival search and discussion data obtained from business executives completing a personnel selection exercise. Information popularity in the population from which groups were composed predicted both the number of group members accessing items during information searches and whether the group discussed the items. The number of group members who accessed an item predicted whether information was repeated during discussion, and repetition predicted which items were included on an executive summary. Moreover, cognitively central group members were more influential than cognitively peripheral members. One implication is that collective information search and discussion highlights information that is perceived as relevant in the population from which groups are composed.

Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats

The prevalent term “auction fever” visualizes that ascending auctions – inconsistent with theory – are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values (the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value). A control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory. Another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one-shot auction with real endowments. We conclude that, when bidders are uncertain about their valuations, auctions that foster pseudo-endowment may raise bids and revenues.

Tacit coordination in close dyads: The use of social focal points

Tacit coordination is crucial for many social interactions, including those among couples. Two different coordination requirements have been distinguished. Matching problems require interdependent actors to choose the same action; mismatching problems require the choice of different actions. We tested the performance of romantic couples relative to complete strangers in both matching and mismatching coordination. Social focal point theory (SFPT) posits that knowledge of social similarity in a domain pertinent to the coordination task will enhance matching coordination while knowledge of divergence will enhance mismatching coordination. Hence, we predicted that couples are more likely to detect and use social focal points in matching but not mismatching tasks, due to their interpersonal similarity and their wealth of mutual social knowledge. Indeed, couples were significantly better than strangers at matching but not at mismatching. Further analyses suggest that interplay between social knowledge and task demands, as delineated in SFPT, determines coordination success.