Susanne Lütz

Contingencies of innovative networks: A case study of successful interfirm R & D collaboration

Abstract Trust among partners is an essential prerequisite in interfirm R & D collaboration. The paper deals with this question analysing the preconditions under which the establishment of trust among companies becomes possible. The case study of a very successful cooperative research project reveals trustbuilding as a modular, cascade-like process. Initially a wider scientific-technical network was established including all industrial and scientific actors who could be potentially interested in solving the technological problem at hand. The process ended with a smaller group of researchers from a few companies and scientific institutes cooperating in a government-sponsored R & D project. At each stage of this highly contingent process the intervention of public officials helped rendering cooperation successful.

The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries

The latest global financial crisis has allowed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a spectacular comeback. But despite its notorious reputation as a staunch advocate of restrictive economic policies, the Fund has displayed less preference for austerity in recent crisis lending. Though widely welcomed as overdue, the IMF’s shift away from what John Williamson coined the ‘Washington Consensus’ was met with resistance from the European Union (EU) where it concerned Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The situation of hard-hit Hungary, Latvia, and Romania propelled unprecedented cooperation between the IMF and the EU, in which the EU has very actively promoted orthodox measures in return for loans. We argue that this represents a European rescue of the Washington Consensus. The case of Latvia is paradigmatic for the profound disagreements between an austerity-demanding EU and a less austere IMF. The IMF’s stance contradicts conventional wisdom about the organization as the guardian of economic orthodoxy. To solve this puzzle, we shed light on three complementary factors of (non)learning that have shaped the EU’s relations vis-à-vis CEE borrowing countries in comparison to the IMF’s: (1) a disadvantageous institutional setting; (2) vociferous creditor coalitions; (3) the precarious eurozone project.

From managed to market capitalism? German finance in transition

Deregulation, technological change, and the integration of markets increase the competitive pressures on forms of national and sectoral governance. The heart of the issue is whether the continental, consensus‐oriented model of capitalism is gravitating towards the Anglo‐Saxon, market‐oriented model. This essay examines the heuristic value of this convergence thesis, using the German financial sector and its relations to industry and government as a case in point. It will be argued that while the institutional restructuring that is taking place within Germany reflects characteristics of Anglo‐Saxon capitalism, institutional hurdles, such as federal structures and the veto power of certain societal lobbies, have thus far prevented such a convergence throughout the entire system.

Governance in der politischen Ökonomie

Der auf die institutionelle Steuerung von Wirtschaft gerichtete Governance-Ansatz geht davon aus, dass nationale Okonomien in ein Bundel nichtmarktformiger Koordinationstypen (wie Firmenhierarchien, Netzwerke, Verbande und Staat) eingebettet sind. Die Governance-Forschung fragt nach der Konfiguration von Governance-Typen in sektoralen, regionalen oder nationalen Produktionszusammenhangen und nach deren komparativen Leistungsvorteilen. Die wachsende Integration von Markten scheint jedoch Spielraume fur kapitalistische Vielfalt zu reduzieren und Lander mit einer eher marktformigen Organisation ihrer Wirtschaft zu begunstigen. Wahrend die international vergleichende Governance-Forschung auch weiterhin von einer Stabilitat nationaler Wirtschaftskontexte ausgeht, sieht eine jungere, vorwiegend auf Deutschland bezogene Debatte nationale Okonomien erheblichen Wandlungsprozessen unterworfen. Der vorliegende Beitrag vermittelt einen Uberblick uber den Verlauf der Governance-Diskussion und setzt sich kritisch mit den Vor- und Nachteilen des Varieties-of-Capitalism-Ansatzes auseinander. Abschliesend wird fur eine starker prozess- und akteurorientierte Forschungsperspektive pladiert, die Antriebskrafte, Mechanismen und Dimensionen des Wandels kapitalistischer Institutionen in den Mittelpunkt stellt.

Internationalization and financial federalism: The United States and Germany at the crossroads?

In this article, the authors examine some effects of economic internationalization on state structures, especially in regard to the distribution of power and authority within federalist systems. Using an institutional rational choice model, they analyze changes in financial regulation and market structures in Germany and the United States. The focus is on the financial realm because of its high degree of internationalization and because, in both countries, financial markets and regulation have historically exhibited federalist traits. The findings indicate that internationalization has led to significant convergence in financial market structures and regulation across the two countries and that in each case this convergence has been accompanied by centralization of financial regulatory authority. Although both the German type of cooperative federalism and the U.S. model of competitive federalism proved to be vulnerable to the growing international pressures, the two countries took different paths of change that reflected differences in domestic institutions. Thus, the authors conclude that convergence is, and will likely remain, of a limited nature.

The finance sector in transition: A motor for economic reform?

Finance used to be the cornerstone of the coordinated model of German capitalism. Restricted competition within the banking sector and stable network relations between industry, banks and also regional governments were seen as preconditions for longer term investment strategies and regional industrial policy. Since the early 1990s, a substantial restructuring has taken place leading to the commodification and re-regulation of financial relations. Despite this overall trend, elements of the stakeholder model are either being sustained or remodelled thus leading to a greater variety of organisational models within the national system of capitalism. It is argued that domestic change is mostly a response to exogenous forces, such as European competition policy, financial globalisation and the re-regulation of finance on different political levels. Exogenous forces are not necessarily constraining domestic actors, but turn into ‘opportunity structures’ for those willing to push reforms through.

Einleitung — Probleme, Institutionen und Relevanz regulativer Politik

Regulative Politik gewinnt in Deutschland und Europa wachsende Bedeutung. In der Wirtschaftspolitik haben die Abkehr vom Keynesianismus zu Gunsten neoliberaler Marktkonzepte und die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates zum Bedeutungszuwachs regulativer Ordnungspolitik im Vergleich zur Verteilungs- und Umverteilungspolitik beigetragen. Insbesondere die Privatisierung „naturlicher Monopole“ im Verkehrs-, Medien- und Kommunikationssektor hielt neue Regulierungsaufgaben bereit (Konig/Benz 1997). Auch die auf europaischer und globaler Ebene verstarkte Integration von Markten wird von politischen Bestrebungen zur Vermehrung und Vereinheitlichung regulativer Standards begleitet (Majone 1994b und 1996, Zurn 1998a). Der zunehmende Stellenwert der Umweltpolitik und Forderungen nach neuen Formen staatlicher Risikovorsorge sind weitere Grunde fur den Bedeutungszuwachs regulativer Politik (Beck 1986, Hiller/Krucken 1997).

Varieties of Change in German Capitalism: Transforming the Rules of Corporate Control

Whether distinct national ‘varieties of capitalism’ will survive in an increasingly globalising economy has become one of the most hotly debated issues in comparative political economy since the early 1990s. The major question in the academic debate is whether the institutional configurations of national political economies are increasingly converging on the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon model, whether the different varieties, in particular the continental European model of coordinated (‘Rhenish’) capitalism, will continue to evolve in path-dependent ways, or whether a growing ‘hybridisation’ of domestic institutional frameworks will occur. The latter term indicates that processes of institutional change may result in a melange of old and new, Anglo-Saxon and continental European elements. Our article seeks to enrich the debate on the ‘hybridisation’ of the German corporate governance system in both an empirical and a theoretical sense. Empirically, we are focusing on the rules which shape the distribution of influence and control over company policy among different groups of stakeholders. We perceive German corporate governance regulation as an institutional element of Germany’s coordinated capitalism. We assume that conflicts over the design of the regulatory regime suggest conclusions about the willingness of important actors to defend or reform existing structures. A national system of corporate governance regulation can be described as comprising three dimensions of corporate control. First, internal corporate governance mechanisms operate within the institutional framework of the firm. Within the corporation, the board of directors constitutes the main device for monitoring management. Second, external control is exercised by market forces and outside actors. The main external control mechanism is the capital market in the form of the market for corporate control. Third, located at the interface between internal and external corporate governance, between supplying information about the financial situation of a company to corporate insiders and to outside investors, is the accounting system. National corporate governance systems differ with New Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 2008

On the Road to Anglo-Saxon Capitalism? German Corporate Governance Regulation between Market and Multilevel Governance

Financial internationalization and European regulatory harmonization put the German corporate governance regime under pressure to move towards a market-oriented, Anglo-Saxon model. While International Political Economy approaches expect Anglo-Saxon standards to spread across national borders, Comparative Political Economy predicts persistent diversity. In our paper, we trace the patterns and driving forces of change in two areas of corporate governance regulation, namely internal governance and accounting. In accounting, processes of multilevel coordination entailed a high degree of convergence towards Anglo-Saxon standards and institutions. A much greater stability of the domestic institutional framework can be seen in the case of internal governance. While political economy approaches offer important insights for analyzing these changes, both fail to account for the different patterns of convergence and divergence in the two cases. Therefore, we argue in favor of a policy analysis perspective to capture the sectorally distinct interplay of forces that shape the processes of regulatory change.

Marktkonstitution als politische Aufgabe: Problemskizze und Theorieüberblick

Fragen der Schaffung und Regulierung von Markten stosen seit geraumer Zeit auf besondere Aufmerksamkeit. In dem Mase, in dem der keynesianische Wohlfahrtskapitalismus in eine Krise geraten war und zunachst Inflation, dann Stagflation und schlieslich Massenarbeitslosigkeit die Wirtschaftspolitik der Industrielander herausforderten, erhob sich der Ruf neoliberaler Okonomen und Politiker nach mehr Markt und weniger Staat. Inzwischen hat die in den USA und Grosbritannien bereits in den fruhen Achtzigerjahren eingeschlagene neoliberale Wende der Wirtschaftspolitik auf alle hoch entwickelten Industriestaaten in der einen oder anderen Weise abgefarbt. Gros angelegte Privatisierungsprogramme fuhrten vielerorts zum Ruckzug des Staates als Eigentumer von Wirtschaftsunternehmen. Zugleich wurden Markte von althergebrachten Reglements befreit, denen Okonomen wachstumshemmende Wirkung attestiert hatten.