Svante Cornell

Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective

The granting of autonomous status to minority populations has gained support among academics and practitioners alike as a way to solve, manage, and even preempt ethnic conflict. In spite of the enthusiasm for ethnofederalism, however, the provision of autonomy to minorities may actually increase rather than decrease the likelihood of conflict. Under certain political conditions, autonomy promotes the separate identity of the minority and increases its motivation and capacity to seek separation from the central state. This article presents a rudimentary theoretical framework identifying which qualities of autonomy solutions increase the likelihood of conflict. It discusses how autonomy relates to other factors conducive to conflict by studying minorities in the South Caucasus and examines the case of Georgia. In Georgia, there were five ethnic minority populations, two of whom--the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians--enjoyed autonomous status and were the only minorities to engage in armed conflict with the Georgian government. This article shows how autonomy, by empowering ethnic elites with control of statelike institutions and by enhancing factors such as leadership, economic viability, and external support, played a crucial role in the escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Conversely, the absence of autonomy mitigated separatist and secessionist sentiments among two of Georgias other minority groups--Javakhetis Armenian and Kvemo Kartlis Azeri populations.

The Kurdish question in Turkish politics

In November 1998, Turkey’s Kurdish question returned to the top of the international agenda with the seizure in Italy of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the rebellious Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan— PKK). Demonstrations in support of Ocalan’s release wreaked havoc throughout Europe and served as a reminder of the war between the PKK and the Turkish state that has claimed over 30,000 lives since 1984. A month before his seizure, Ocalan had been expelled from Damascus, his base for the last nineteen years, after Turkey had threatened Syria with war unless it ceased to provide a safe haven for the PKK. Having failed to find asylum in Russia, Belgium, or the Netherlands, Ocalan—apparently acting on an invitation from Italian leftists—believed he could find refuge in Italy. After heavy Turkish and American pressure, Ocalan was nevertheless forced to leave Italy and seek asylum elsewhere, but was eventually apprehended by Turkish security forces on February 16, 1999, in Nairobi, Kenya. The Kurdish question is arguably the most serious internal problem in the Turkish republic’s seventy-seven-year history and certainly the main obstacle to its aspirations to full integration with European institutions. Most Westerners define the problem simply as a matter of oppression and denial of rights by a majority group (the Turks) of an ethnic minority (the Kurds). The civil war in southeastern Turkey that raged between 1984 and 1999 is accordingly viewed as a national liberation movement and enjoys widespread sympathy both in the West and in the Third World. The Turkish political elite, for its part, promotes an entirely different view of the problem, which is often misunderstood and ridiculed in the West. In official Turkish discourse, there is no Kurdish problem, but rather a socioeconomic problem in the southeastern region and a problem of terrorism that is dependent on

The Eurasian Drug Trade A Challenge to Regional Security

The security of Eurasia can no longer be understood in separation from the drug trade. Given the importance of the region to the United States, the adverse effect of the drug trade is also bound to affect U.S. interests in Central Asia.

The Critical but Perilous Caucasus

Kenneth Yalowitz served as U.S. ambassador to Georgia from 1998–2001 and to Belarus from 1994–97. He is presently the Director of the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, and also teaches the Caucasus at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. Svante E. Cornell (svante@cornellcaspian.com) is deputy director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, editor of the Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, and Research Director of the Silk Road Studies Program at Uppsala University.

Georgian Politics since the August 2008 War

Georgian politics since late 2007 has attracted interest mainly because of its highly polarized political climate. The leadership of Mikheil Saakashvili, widely heralded as a beacon of democracy in ...

Uzbekistan: A regional player in Eurasian geopolitics?

Recently there has been a trend towards the development of two rival sets of alliances in Eurasia: in effect, one Western‐oriented alignment led by the United States and Turkey, including Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a group of states resisting American and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is developing, led by Russia and Iran, including Syria and Armenia. One of the most important questions for the development of these alignments is their expansion into Central Asia; in this context Uzbekistans role is crucial. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both its neighbors and great powers. Tashkent has developed close military and security relations with NATO and for a time seemed to hedge its bets on US support, but has lately shown signs of turning back toward increasing security cooperation with Russia and China. Given the strategic value of Uzbekistan and its role as a regional player in its own right, the future course of the countrys policies is of great importance to the security of Eurasia.

The devaluation of the concept of autonomy: national minorities in the former Soviet Union

Ever since the 1960s and in most parts of the world, ethnopolitical con ict has grown as a source of concern in the international arena. In Africa and South Asia, in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, as well as in Western Europe, old grievances have been revived, and new con icts have erupted between ethnically de® ned social groups. As a result of this, research on ethnic con ict and its resolution has mushroomed in recent years. One of the principal and most effective solutions for the resolution of ethnic con ict is that of regional autonomy. Thus Ted R. Gurr has argued that `negotiated regional autonomy has proved to be an effective antidote for ethnopolitical wars of secession in Western and Third World States’ . However, if one tries to apply this model to the con icts of the former Soviet Union, in particular in the Caucasus, the prospects for autonomy become less clear. In many other cases, it seems, the state power at ® rst pursues an assimilation policy, which gives rise to increased con ict. Meanwhile the minority group advocates autonomy or secession; in the end the issue is settled as the state accepts the minority’ s bid for autonomy. However, this model does not ® t to the former Soviet Union. What we see there is that, quite to the contrary, it is the state that advocates autonomy for the minority, which in turn refuses to accept any solution short of independence. This circumstance does not necessarily mean that the secessionist movements in the area are in essence more radical and less ready for compromise than movements such as those of the Miskitos in Nicaragua, the Nagas and Tripuras in India, or the Basques in Spain, all parties to con icts that have been solved by regional autonomy. Rather, it has to do with the way the entire concept of autonomy is viewed by peoples that have experienced the Soviet form of federalism. Before moving to analysing the reasons for the difference in perception, and the possible solutions to this problem, it is necessary to recapitulate the forms of self-determination that exist.

Religion as a factor in Caucasian conflicts

The many conflicts that have raged in the Caucasus since the end of the 1980s have often been depicted in the media and academia as basically religious in character. The religious differences between parties to conflicts are emphasized and often exaggerated. In particular, the Caucasus has been taken as an example of the ‘clash of civilizations’ supposedly under way. This article seeks to challenge this perception of the Caucasian conflicts, arguing that religion has played a limited role in conflicts that are in essence ethnopolitical and territorial in character. The article argues that seldom are religious bodies or institutions used to legitimize conflict behaviour in this region ‐ there has been no Jihad in the Caucasus, for example ‐ nor has the polarization of the parties to a conflict been underpinned primarily by religious identity or theological perspectives. As such, religious conflict can not be spoken of. Furthermore there has occurred no rallying of outside powers along religious lines; in f...