Sydney D. Bailey

Human Rights in Armed Conflict

At its very first session, the UN International Law Commission rejected a proposal that it should attempt to codify the laws of war. The majority of the members of the Commission considered that as war had been outlawed, the regulation of its conduct had ceased to be relevant. The majority of the Commission declared itself opposed to the study of the problem at the present stage [1949]. It was considered that if the Commission, at the very beginning of its work, were to undertake this study, public opinion might interpret its action as showing lack of confidence in the efficiency of the means at the disposal of the United Nations for maintaining peace.1

The Geneva Conference

The Korean part of the Geneva Conference was an exercise in futility, though a necessary exercise.1 It arose from the decision reached at Panmunjom in February 1952, a compromise between the determination of the Unified Command to confine the discussions on stopping the fighting to military matters, and the view of North Korea and China that peace would be precarious if major political tensions were not eased. South Korea was opposed to having any conference and to many other aspects of the Armistice Agreement, and Syngman Rhee delayed the South Korean decision to participate until the last moment.2 Dulles considered that he had inherited the agreement to have a conference from the Democrats: he never believed that it would achieve the purposes defined in the Armistice Agreement, so for him it was a damage-limitation exercise. China and North Korea gave the impression of being in no hurry to have a conference and were not hopeful of making progress, though Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) was glad to use the Geneva meetings to affirm China’s great-power status.3 One of the countries which had supplied combat forces to the Unified Command declined to attend. Some of the other fourteen (which, with the United States and South Korea, were now known as the Allies) went to Geneva with the hope of salvaging a minimal agreement on principles from the farrago of rhetoric, but the most hopeful of them could only express ‘restrained optimism’ (Richard Casey of Australia).4

The Elusive Peace

Every war is a catastrophe, for the victor as well as for the vanquished, and it is tempting for the commentator to look for a culprit or culprits. All the parties to the Arab-Israeli war of 1947–49 made mistakes, before the fighting started, while it was taking place, and after it had stopped; but the main actors were to a large extent victims of past mistakes rather than culprits.

The United Nations : a short political guide

Purposes structure groups and blocs peace-making and peace-keeping disarmament human rights is the UN worth saving? Appendices: extracts from the UN Chapter UN members (1 January 1988) States or territories which are not UN members.

Political Violence and the Rule of Law

The situation of violence and counter-violence in Northern Ireland since 1968 has few parallels in Western Europe. Resort to the bullet rather than the ballot threatens the lives of innocent people, but it does more than that: it erodes the rule of law and impairs the whole fabric of human society. Each incident of sectarian violence tempts the paramilitaries of the other side to undertake acts of retribution. The security forces are always vulnerable to attack, and any indiscriminate or excessive use of force by them is likely to lead to a fresh outbreak of terrorism. There have been times when the security forces have felt threatened by extremist elements from both ends of the spectrum.

The Case-by-Case Approach

For the first four decades, the Security Council dealt with most human rights issues on an ad hoc basis. The single exception to this practice was the issue of self-determination, which preoccupied many UN organs in addition to the Security Council. There were occasional references to human rights instruments in resolutions1 or speeches.2 Occasionally the Council would include in a resolution or statement an appeal in general terms to respect human rights.3 From time to time, the Council received documents regarding human rights from other UN organs.4 The Council also received from UN Members documents alleging violations of human rights by other UN Members, but with no expectation that the Council would debate the matter or take a decision. That was probably the situation regarding a Soviet document in 1950 alleging ‘unremitting terrorism and mass executions in Greece’. Britain stated in the Council that matters dealt with in the Soviet document ‘are clearly within the sphere of Greek domestic jurisdiction, and the United Nations … is therefore precluded from discussing them’. The Council rejected the Soviet proposal to include the item in the agenda.5 Some States that have been criticized for failing to respect the human rights of those for whom they are responsible have turned the tables by criticizing their critics. In 1990, Israel circulated to the Security Council some of the Country Reports on Human Rights prepared by the US State Department, relating to eighteen States that had criticized Israeli policy.6 A recent, and respectable, use of this procedure was a document from Portugal alleging massive violations of human rights in East Timor.7

Diplomacy and Debate

Looks at diplomacy and debate at the UN Security Council, and the role of procedural rules and practice in these activities. The first four sections of the chapter describe the rules for: the order of speakers; interrupting the speaker; the right of reply; and motions, proposals and suggestions — the various types of these are all defined. The next section discusses precedence motions (Rule 33), which are techniques available to the Council by which debate can be suspended or terminated, either to facilitate positive purposes, or to frustrate negative ones (such as filibustering); these include: suspension of the meeting; adjournment of the meeting either sine die or to a certain day or hour; reference of any matter to a committee, the Secretary‐General of the UN, or a rapporteur; postponement of the discussion to a certain day, or indefinitely; and introduction of an amendment; all of these are described separately. The remaining sections of the chapter discuss amendments, and statements before or after the vote.

Has the UN a Future

We have not, in the earlier chapters, dealt with criticisms now voiced about the political role of the United Nations, except incidentally. But the UN has faults, like any human institution. Are these faults those one would expect to find in a large and complex multi-purpose intergovernmental organization at the end of its fifth decade, or are they faults which could have been prevented if only the states of which the UN is composed had been more altruistic or more far-sighted?

Peace and Security

The UN organ with primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security is the Security Council (Article 24 of the Charter).This Council has varying degrees of coercive power. It can place a matter on its agenda, debate the issue, conduct an investigation, recommend procedures or terms of settlement or other provisional measures. The Council may also authorize peace-keeping, for which there is no express provision in the Charter, but Dag Hammarskjold once called it Chapter Six-and-a-half. Peace-keeping operations have been especially appropriate for policing demilitarized zones, disputed frontiers, or for maintaining law and order in areas of tension. A more coercive procedure, for which the Charter expressly provides, requires measures not involving military action, often known in UN circles as sanctions (Art. 41). ‘These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’ If such measures would be or have proved to be inadequate, the Security Council may take such military action as may be necessary (Art. 42).

Groups and Blocs

Some of the more optimistic speeches at San Francisco in 1945 seemed to suggest that the United Nations, simply by existing, would put an end to all international conflict. While it is legitimate to hope for the best, it is only realistic to assume that disputes between nations and between groups of nations will continue to disturb world peace. The leaders of most countries believe that such disputes are inevitable, so they arm accordingly in the hope that military capabilities backed by resolute leadership will deter war. But deterrence alone is never enough.