T. K. Ahn

Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games

This study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify different types of agents and distributions of parameters. The estimated models suggest that the players of such games take into account the learning of others and are belief learners. Despite these interesting findings, we conclude that a powerful method of model selection of agent-based models on dynamic social dilemma experiments is still lacking.

Dilemma games: game parameters and matching protocols

Abstract This study examines the impact of changes in pecuniary payoffs and the linkages between players in the game environment on strategy choice in repeated PD games. Rates of cooperation are found to be correlated with variations in game parameters related to concepts of Fear, Greed, and Cooperators’ Gain. In addition, rates of cooperation are affected by the information that subjects have regarding the history of play of their counterparts, as well as the protocol used for matching subjects across decision rounds.

Security of Property as a Public Good: Institutions, Socio-Political Environment and Experimental Behavior in Five Countries

We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries— Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly different behaviors that correlate with country-level property security, trust and quality of government. Subjects from countries with higher levels of trust or perceptions of safety are more prone to abstain initially from theft and devote more resources to production, and subjects from countries with higher quality political institutions are more supportive of protecting property through compulsory taxation. This highlights the relevance of socio-political factors in determining countries’ success in addressing collective action problems including safeguarding property rights.

Communication and Co-operation in a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma: A Field Experiment

One tenet of classical, rational choice theory as used in non-cooperative game theory is that all players use the same model of rationality for themselves as well as for all other players. The assumption of homogeneous, self-interested actors helps theorists to model how individuals would make choices. One justification for positing homogeneous, rational, egoistic actors has been evolutionary theory (Dawkins, 1976). That is, even if individuals tried out different ways of behaving, only those who made decisions consistent with rational egoistic decisions would maximize returns. In a highly competitive environment, those who maximize returns are more likely to survive in the long run. Long ago, Armen Alchian (1950) made a cogent theoretical argument that, in a highly competitive market, selection pressure would weed out those market participants who did not maximize profits. Extensive experimental studies of behaviour in competitive market settings have supported the use of the classical, rational choice model as the only model of individual choice needed in this setting to make empirically supported predictions (Smith, 1962; Plott, 1986). Thus, continuing to use the classical model when analysing competitive markets has both strong theoretical and empirical support.

Una perspectiva del capital social desde las ciencias sociales: capital social y acción colectiva (A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action)

The concept of social capital stresses several factors that are not new but have often been ignored during the heyday of neoclassical economics and rational choice theories: trust and norms of reciprocity, net- works and forms of civic engagement, and both formal and informal rules or institu- tions. The contribution of the social capital approach lies in that it brings these seemingly diverse factors into the framework of collective action.

Asymmetric Payoffs in Simultaneous and Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Games

We investigate the role of payoff asymmetry in laboratory prisoner’s dilemma games. Symmetric and asymmetric games are examined in simultaneous and sequential settings. In the asymmetric sequential games, we study the impact of having payoff advantaged players moving either first or second. Asymmetry reduces the rates of cooperation in simultaneous games. In sequential games, asymmetry interacts with order of play such that the rate of cooperation is highest when payoff disadvantaged players move first.

The overvaluing of expertise in discussion partner choice

Since the introduction of economic theory to political science, theorists have argued that discussion could serve as an effective information shortcut if individuals communicate with experts who have similar preferences. Previous experimental and survey studies have found mixed results for the efficacy of social communication, but they have not observed the process of discussion partner selection which is so central to the previous models. This paper presents the results of a group-based experiment that allows for discussion partner selection. We fail to find aggregate enlightenment through social communication: lesser informed subjects are helped by social communication, but better informed subjects are harmed. This result is caused in part because subjects are too willing to seek out more expert discussion partners who have different ex ante preferences.