John Barry Ryan

The interrogation game

While there is widespread debate about techniques for obtaining information from non-cooperative sources, there is little research concerning the efficacy of different methods. We introduce the ‘Interrogation Game’ as a simple model of the information a source will provide when faced with either (1) an interrogator using coercive techniques or (2) an interrogator offering rewards. The model demonstrates that coercive interrogation results in a very slight increase in accurate information from knowledgeable sources, but much more inaccurate information from ignorant sources. In short, when ignorant group members refuse to provide information, this increases the inequality of payoffs among group members under coercion while the same behavior – truthfully revealing ignorance – decreases the inequality of payoffs under reward. If ignorant detainees have concern for the payoffs of their other group members, they will admit their ignorance in reward, but not coercion. We test the model with a group-based experiment. As the model predicts, coercion leads subjects to provide more inaccurate information. Contrary to the model’s expectations, however, accurate information is almost equally likely in the coercion and reward treatments.

Social Desirability, Hidden Biases, and Support for Hillary Clinton

An emerging consensus suggests that women are underrepresented in government because of biases in the recruitment process instead of biases at the ballot box. These results, however, are largely for legislative offices, and research suggests that “male” characteristics are generally associated with executive positions like the presidency. At the same time, some research demonstrates social desirability masks gender biases against women who seek the highest office in the land. We use the historic candidacy of Hillary Clinton to examine if she faces hidden biases in either the primaries or the general election. Two different methods for uncovering hidden biases embedded in national surveys demonstrate small hidden biases that are likely electorally inconsequential.

The overvaluing of expertise in discussion partner choice

Since the introduction of economic theory to political science, theorists have argued that discussion could serve as an effective information shortcut if individuals communicate with experts who have similar preferences. Previous experimental and survey studies have found mixed results for the efficacy of social communication, but they have not observed the process of discussion partner selection which is so central to the previous models. This paper presents the results of a group-based experiment that allows for discussion partner selection. We fail to find aggregate enlightenment through social communication: lesser informed subjects are helped by social communication, but better informed subjects are harmed. This result is caused in part because subjects are too willing to seek out more expert discussion partners who have different ex ante preferences.

Choice vs. Action: Candidate Ambiguity and Voter Decision Making

A rich literature argues that electoral incentives lead candidates to take ambiguous positions on issues. Furthermore, empirical research suggests that ambiguity does not repel — and may actually attract — voters. This work, however, equates choosing a candidate with paying the costs of voting for that candidate. We reconsider the relationship between candidate ambiguity and candidate preference moving beyond candidate choice and considering turnout as well. Integrating political science with research on consumer decision-making and psychology, we argue that many who select an ambiguous candidate do not translate that choice into an actual vote for that candidate. We test this argument using three experiments which incorporate costly voting and other electoral conditions heretofore absent from research on ambiguity.

Battleground States and Local Coverage of American Presidential Campaigns

Analyses of television news and major newspapers have led to the critique that “the media” ignore the issues in campaigns, which could explain studies that show limited effects for media coverage on knowledge. These studies overlook great variation in the quantity and quality of news coverage in local information environments. Using data collected from local newspaper websites during the 2012 American presidential election, we show the quality and quantity of local news campaign coverage differ substantially between battleground and nonbattleground states. In an effort to differentiate themselves from other news outlets, newspapers in battleground states play up the local angle (e.g., candidate visits), resulting in less attention to issues in their stories. These findings suggest the voters most important to the election outcome (i.e., those in battleground states) may have less information on candidate issue positions available within their local media market.