Taeko Hiroi

The dynamics of lawmaking in a bicameral legislature: The case of Brazil

This article analyzes legislative performance in a nascent presidential bicameral democracy, taking Brazil as a case. The author argues that the timing and outcomes of legislative production are functions of bicameral incongruence, types of bicameralism, sequence of examination, and legislative bargaining. These hypotheses are tested using a new legislative data set from Brazil that covers over 3,000 bills submitted to the National Congress since 1988. Event history analyses of these bills show that presidential bicameral (coalitional) majorities, presidential elections, initiation by the lower house, and bills proposing provisional changes raise the chances of a bills approval. The results also indicate that the effects of many of these variables are time dependent. In contrast, bicameral incongruence, symmetric bicameralism, and legislative elections either raise the risks of a bills rejection or delay the timing of its approval. Economic crises increase legislative activities in general in both approving and rejecting bills.

Brazilian Regional Power in the Development of Mercosul

President Fernando Henrique Cardosos government presided over three critical junctures in the development of the Common Market of the South (Mercosul): the attempted military coup in Paraguay in 1996, the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999, and the Argentine economic crisis in 2002. Its responses to these events were critical to the development of Mercosul because of Brazils unique position as the largest country in the bloc. Many theories of free trade and regional integration hold that economic integration requires a regionally preponderant power that acts as a core provider of collective goods for member states. When such a power provides benefits, satisfaction among the member states increases and the likelihood of integration is increased. An examination of the Cardoso governments policies during the three critical junctures suggests that regional integration declined when Argentina incurred costs during the Brazilian currency crisis and increased when Cardosos government provided aid during the Argentine economic crisis and helped defeat the attempted coup in Paraguay.

Regional integration and democratic conditionality : how democracy clauses help democratic consolidation and deepening

Selected Contents: Introduction Chapter 1. Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality Chapter 2. The Mechanisms of Formal Democratic Conditionality Chapter 3. Origins of Formal Democratic Conditionality Chapter 4. Do Democracy Clauses Matter? The Effects of Formal Democratic Conditionality on Coups, Backsliding, and Democratic Progress Chapter 5. The European Union Chapter 6. The Common Market of the South Chapter 7. The Economic Community of West African States Conclusion. References. Index

The effects of unequal size: Costs and benefits of unilateral action in the development of MERCOSUR

We argue that successful economic integration requires a regionally preponderant country that acts as a provider of goods. However, when a large member acts in a costly unilateral manner, regional integration suffers because of the asymmetric effects on smaller members. In contrast, when smaller members act in a costly unilateral manner, the preponderant power is likely to absorb costs. We propose to test these hypotheses by using the case of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) during three crises: the attempted military coup in Paraguay in 1996, the 1999 devaluation of the Brazilian real, and the 2002 devaluation of the Argentine peso. Evidence shows that economic integration declined with costly Brazilian unilateral actions but improved when Brazil provided goods.

Policy change and coups: The role of income inequality and asset specificity

Building on the models developed by Boix, Acemoglu, and Robinson on the relationship between economic structures and regime change, we develop a theory that emphasises structural characteristics of societies and the effects of policy change in such circumstances. We posit that significant policy change in an unequal or asset-specific society induces coups against the incumbent political leader by the losing faction of the elites seeking to prevent or cut losses associated with the policy shifts. Our empirical analysis indicates that the risk of a coup rises considerably during a period of a significant policy change in a society with a skewed distribution of income and one dominated by asset-specific production, such as oil, mining, and agriculture.

Do Democracy Clauses Matter? The Effects of Regional Integration Associations on Political Stability and Democratic Consolidation

This paper examines the mechanisms by which democracy clauses promote democracy and domestic political stability. It begins by noting that political instability in one country can have a negative spillover and impede the economic success of regional integration. Domestic political instability may also hinder cooperation among member states. Thus, domestic political stability is a collective good for regional integration organization (RIO) member states. Legalizing democratic conditionality helps member states to overcome collective action problems and equips RIOs with the necessary credibility, justification, and tools for intervention in member states’ domestic political affairs. In addition, RIOs deepen economic integration among member states, which in turn raises the stakes for the member states to collectively defend democratic institutions and inflates the costs of sanctions for countries under threat. We test the main arguments using data gathered for 40 RIOs in the world. The econometric analyses of RIO coup rates and democratic backsliding rates demonstrate that democracy clauses are indeed effective in preventing coups and backsliding within countries that are members of RIOs with such clauses. Moreover, an analysis of democratic gains indicates that democracy clauses are also effective in the promotion of democracy within RIO member states.