Gaspare M. Genna

From War to Integration: Generalizing Power Transition Theory

Generalizing the dynamics implied by power transition theory, we characterize the structural conditions that lead nations to initiate conflict or choose to integrate. The relationship between changes in relative power, hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction are used to identify the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. Empirical tests for the last two centuries confirm the strength and robustness of this characterization. In addition, long term assessments of Pax Britannica, the Cold War, and Chinas potential challenge to the United States in this century are used to illustrate the precision of these findings. The fundamental implication is that structural conditions provide the preconditions for conflict and cooperation, but decision makers have leeway in advancing policies that eventually lead to either war or peace.

Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration

This paper proposes a theory for regional integration based on structural conditions. By applying power transition theory, we are able to account for and anticipate not only the tendency for pairs of countries to participate in integration, but the likely intensity of such integration as well. We find that integration is most likely when there is an asymmetric distribution of power between countries and when they are jointly satisfied after a power transition has occurred. These results hold even after controlling for level of development and trade flows. We test this theory on all politically relevant dyads between 1950 and 1996 using a novel method to measure the level of regional integration. We illustrate the empirical findings through simulations that track the developments leading to Europes Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

POWER PREPONDERANCE AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: EXPLAINING REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1960-1997

This article addresses the domestic and international conditions that influence regional integration. The national political elite is assumed to be opportunistic and will opt for regional integration when the domestic and international conditions provide economic gains for their constituencies through greater economic integration. The hypotheses state that increases in regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean (ANCOM, CACM/SICA, CARICOM, and MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) occur during periods of relative power asymmetries among pairs of countries, when mutual trade interests are high, and when alliance portfolios are similar. We test the hypotheses using aggregate data of country dyads from 1960 to 1997. To measure regional integration, we use an index referred to as the Integration Achievement Score. OLS and Cox proportional hazards regression estimates largely support our claims.

The Small N Methodological Challenges of Analyzing Regional Integration

Abstract As the number of regional integration organizations increases, the attention to case selection in small‐N qualitative analysis becomes more necessary in order to avoid selection biases that could produce results with doubtful generalizations. This paper addresses the problem of selecting cases and offers solutions to potential pitfalls in research. First we examine various research designs in qualitative methods and discuss the problems of selecting observations on the dependent variable. We next discuss the operational definition of regions. In order to select from a population of observations, it is important to understand what is and what is not included. Finally, a few implications are presented for the EU studies community.

Brazilian Regional Power in the Development of Mercosul

President Fernando Henrique Cardosos government presided over three critical junctures in the development of the Common Market of the South (Mercosul): the attempted military coup in Paraguay in 1996, the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999, and the Argentine economic crisis in 2002. Its responses to these events were critical to the development of Mercosul because of Brazils unique position as the largest country in the bloc. Many theories of free trade and regional integration hold that economic integration requires a regionally preponderant power that acts as a core provider of collective goods for member states. When such a power provides benefits, satisfaction among the member states increases and the likelihood of integration is increased. An examination of the Cardoso governments policies during the three critical junctures suggests that regional integration declined when Argentina incurred costs during the Brazilian currency crisis and increased when Cardosos government provided aid during the Argentine economic crisis and helped defeat the attempted coup in Paraguay.

Regional integration and democratic conditionality : how democracy clauses help democratic consolidation and deepening

Selected Contents: Introduction Chapter 1. Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality Chapter 2. The Mechanisms of Formal Democratic Conditionality Chapter 3. Origins of Formal Democratic Conditionality Chapter 4. Do Democracy Clauses Matter? The Effects of Formal Democratic Conditionality on Coups, Backsliding, and Democratic Progress Chapter 5. The European Union Chapter 6. The Common Market of the South Chapter 7. The Economic Community of West African States Conclusion. References. Index

The effects of unequal size: Costs and benefits of unilateral action in the development of MERCOSUR

We argue that successful economic integration requires a regionally preponderant country that acts as a provider of goods. However, when a large member acts in a costly unilateral manner, regional integration suffers because of the asymmetric effects on smaller members. In contrast, when smaller members act in a costly unilateral manner, the preponderant power is likely to absorb costs. We propose to test these hypotheses by using the case of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) during three crises: the attempted military coup in Paraguay in 1996, the 1999 devaluation of the Brazilian real, and the 2002 devaluation of the Argentine peso. Evidence shows that economic integration declined with costly Brazilian unilateral actions but improved when Brazil provided goods.

What will it take to build a North American Community

1. Introduction Gaspare M. Genna and David A. Mayer-Foulkes Part I: Determinants of Integration 2. What Will it Take to Build a North American Community? Gaspare M. Genna 3. The Mess They Made: How Conservatism Wrecked North America Julian Castro-Rea 4. Immigration and Institutional Voids: North American Citizenship and Human Rights in Conflict Emma R. Norman 5. Mexico Labor Cooperation and the NAALC Institutions Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia 7. Citizenship at the Margins: The Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program and Civil Society Advocacy Christina Gabriel and Laura MacDonald 8. Organizing the Mexican Diaspora: Can it Strengthen North American Integration? Jane Bayes and Laura Gonzales 9. What Does the 2010 Affordable Care Act Mean for Securing Immigrant Health in North America? Nielan Barnes Part III: Economic and Security Issues in Integration 10. Obstacles to Security Cooperation in North America Rafael Velazquez and Roberto Dominguez 11. Secure Borders & Uncertain Trade Coral Snodgrass and Guy Gessner 12. Drug-Related Violence and Forced Migration from Mexico to the United States Eva Olimpia Arceo-Gomez 13. Wage Differentials, Public Policies, and Mexico-US Migration Ernesto Aguayo-Tellez, Arun K. Acharya and Crhistian I. Rivera-Mendoza 14. Conclusion Gaspare M. Genna and David A. Mayer-Foulkes

Hi, I Want to Talk to You About Your Progress: A Large Course Intervention for At-Risk College Students

Performance during the first year of college and in introductory courses has been widely identified as critical to college students’ retention and success. Accordingly, interventions to assist begi...

Measuring Integration Achievement in the Americas

In this chapter an updated version is presented of the Integration Achievement Score (IAS) that was initially designed by Hufbauer and Schott (Western hemisphere economic integration. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 1994). The author expanded the scope of the original IAS in both time and space, and has systematically applied it to regional integration schemes in the Americas with data from the 2000s. Because of its systematic nature of coding integration achievements, it allows for comparisons between the regional schemes; it is also well suited for further econometric analysis. It contains six categories with six levels each. The categories are: trade in goods and services, free movement of capital, labor mobility, decision-making of supranational institutions, monetary coordination, and fiscal coordination. Moreover; the levels for each regional scheme are calculated with a set of values that range from 0 to 5. Results are presented for five schemes in the Americas (CAN, CACM, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, NAFTA) which allow for a comparison of economic integration levels.