Tansev Geylani

The Impact of

AbstractPurpose To investigate whether new classesof glaucoma medication have influencedglaucoma filtration surgery over a 20-yearperiod in the southeast region of Ireland.Methods All patients undergoing glaucomafiltration surgery between January 1986 andDecember 2005 in Waterford RegionalHospital were identified. The following datawere recorded for each patient: age; sex; andtype of filtration procedure.Results Over the 20-year study period twoconsultant ophthalmic surgeons performed atotal of 760 glaucoma filtration procedures onpatients aged over 20 years. The annualaverage number of glaucoma surgeriesdeclined steadily, defined by availability ofdifferent topical anti-glaucoma medications,from an average of 23.75 surgeries per surgeonper year in the subperiod 1986–1995, to 21 in1996, 20 in 1997, and 12.69 surgeries persurgeon per year in 1998–2005, thesedifferences being statistically significant(general linear model, Po0.001). The ageprofile of patients did not change significantlyover the course of the study period.Conclusions The volume of patientsrequiring glaucoma filtration surgery underthe care of two consultant ophthalmicsurgeons decreased over the 20-year studyperiod, an era in which three classes of anti-glaucoma medications were made available.However, an increase in the age profile ofpatients undergoing glaucoma filtrationsurgery during the same period was notobserved. Further study is required to resolvewhether introduction of the new topicalanti-glaucoma medications has led to a realreduction in the demand for glaucomafiltration surgery, or has just led to the deferralof such a demand.Eye (2009) 23, 1675–1680; doi:10.1038/eye.2008.335;published online 31 October 2008Keywords: glaucoma medication; geographic;trabeculectomyIntroductionGlaucoma, one of the most common causes ofblindness worldwide, may be defined as ‘acharacteristic form of optic neuropathy, withsome regard to intraocular pressure.’

Image Reinforcement or Impairment: The Effects of Co-Branding on Attribute Uncertainty

Co-branding is often used by companies to reinforce the image of their brands. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which a brands image is reinforced or impaired as a result of co-branding, and the characteristics of a good partner for a firm considering co-branding for image reinforcement. We address these issues by conceptualizing attribute beliefs as two-dimensional constructs: The first dimension reflects the expected value of the attribute, while the second dimension reflects the degree of certainty about the attribute. We argue that these parameters are updated after consumers are exposed to a co-branding activity, and we develop an analytical model that incorporates these notions. An analysis of the model leads to several propositions, which we test in an experiment. Our findings indicate that it is not necessarily in a brands best interest to choose an alliance partner that is of the highest performance possible. Moreover, we find that, while expected values of the brand attributes may improve as a result of co-branding, under certain conditions the uncertainty associated with the brands increases through the alliance. Implications for co-branding researchers and practitioners are discussed.

Information Sharing in a Channel with Partially Informed Retailers

While retailers have sales data to forecast demand, manufacturers have a broad understanding of the market and the coming trends. It is well known that pooling such demand information within a distribution channel improves supply chain logistics. However, little is known about how information-sharing affects wholesale pricing incentives. In this paper, we investigate a channel structure where a manufacturer and two retailers have private signals of the state of the demand. Our model identifies the presence of a pricing distortion, which we term the inference effect, when a manufacturer sets price to an uninformed retailer. Because of this inference effect, the manufacturer would like to set a low wholesale price to signal to the retailer that the demand is low. On the other hand, the manufacturer would like to set a high wholesale price so that he earns the optimal margin on each unit sold. Vertical information sharing benefits the manufacturer by eliminating the distortion caused by the inference effect, which is more profound in a channel whose retailer has a noisier signal. This result implies that when there is a cost associated with transmitting information, the manufacturer may choose to share information with only the less-informed retailer rather than with both.

The Impact of Advertising on Media Bias

In this study, the authors investigate the role of advertising in affecting the extent of bias in the media. When making advertising choices, advertisers evaluate both the size and the composition of the readership of the different outlets. The profile of the readers matters because advertisers want to target readers who are likely to be receptive to their advertising messages. The authors demonstrate that when advertising supplements subscription fees, it may serve as a polarizing or moderating force, contingent on the extent of heterogeneity among advertisers in appealing to readers having different political preferences. When heterogeneity is large, each advertiser chooses a single outlet for placing advertisements (single-homing), and greater polarization arises in comparison to when the media outlet relies on subscription fees only for revenues. In contrast, when heterogeneity is small, each advertiser chooses to place advertisements in multiple outlets (multihoming) and reduces polarization results.

The End of the Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data

The Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits price setting in distribution channels. To avoid costly penalties under RP, managers take a variety of precautions when pricing to retailers and wholesalers. But how likely is a court to find a defendant guilty of violating the RP? We find that this likelihood has dropped drastically as a result of recent Supreme Court rulings from more than 1 in 3 before 1993 to less than 1 in 20 for the period 2006--2010. The analysis also points to an increased success of the no harm to competition defense, which reflects the view that the courts have raised the hurdle for plaintiffs to establish competitive harm. Finally, our results indicate that smaller plaintiffs over time have fared worse than larger ones, a trend that challenges the notion that RP protects small businesses.

Provision of Optional Versus Standard Product Features in Competition

Competing brands differ in the extent to which they offer a given feature as standard or optional in their product lines. In this article, the authors study the competitive basis for this difference in brands’ product line strategies. Specifically, they analyze the relationship between a brands quality image and its propensity to offer a wider product line, from a relatively stripped-down base model to a more feature-rich model. They develop a conceptual framework and hypotheses by considering an analytical model with two vertically differentiated firms: They show that a low-quality firm would offer a feature as optional—that is, it would offer both a feature-added product and a stripped-down base product—if it chose to add the feature to its product. In contrast, a high-quality firm would offer the feature as a standard component unless the cost of the feature was high. This asymmetry in the propensity of high- and low-quality firms to offer optional and standard features with their products is tested using data from the U.S. passenger car market; the authors find empirical support for their model.

Dominant Retailers and Their Impact on Marketing Channels

This chapter explores the implications of dominant retailers for marketing channels – the system through which manufacturers distribute their products to consumers. The emergence of a few dominant retailers has altered the way in which members of the marketing channel make decisions. The chapter first presents an economic framework to explore the source of retail dominance. It then explores how several key decisions (e.g., product quality and assortment, prices, market data collaboration, advertising) taken within the marketing channel are affected by the dominance of certain retailers. Antitrust implications are also assessed.

Bilateral Information Sharing and Pricing Incentives in a Retail Channel

This chapter evaluates the impact of sharing information on wholesale and retail pricing incentives as well as on the distribution of economic rents. We consider a model in which the manufacturer distributes its product to one or more retailers. Each firm receives a private signal as an estimate of stochastic consumer demand. We show that, in the absence of information sharing, the retailer is able to use the wholesale price to infer the manufacturer’s private signal. This creates a pricing distortion which benefits the retailer. Downward sharing of the manufacturer’s private signal eliminates this distortion. In contrast, when the retailer shares its private signal upstream, the manufacturer is able to set price closer to retailer’s value, thus capturing downstream consumer surplus. In general, the manufacturer benefits from more information sharing at the loss of downstream retailers and consumers. Hence, information sharing arrangements in equilibrium require side payments and/or sufficient cost savings (e.g., reduced inventory costs).