Tapio Lappi-Seppälä

Penal Policy in Scandinavia

Scandinavian imprisonment rates are among the lowest in Western democracies, despite 20–30 percent increases in recent years, and penal policies generally are among the mildest. Reasons for this include the continuing strength and credibility of the welfare state, high levels of social trust and political legitimacy, consensual and corporatist political cultures, and the central roles of career judges and other non–political practictioners. Political and penal cultures differ somewhat between countries. Crime control is more openly a contentious political issue in some than in others. Policies have become harsher concerning drugs, sex, and violence. Punitive changes, however, tend to be narrowly focused, while other changes in sanctions policies tend to be liberalizing and broad‐based. Overall, commitments to liberal values, human rights, and rational policy making remain strong.

Explaining imprisonment in Europe

This paper presents the findings of a comparative study that explores the linkages between the use of imprisonment in 30 countries and a range of potentially explanatory factors for variations in this measure of punitivity, including: crime levels; social indicators, such as those measuring investment in welfare programmes and income inequality; trust in other people and trust in political institutions; public fear of crime and public punitivity; and variations in political structure and forms of democracy. The main conclusions are that moderate penal policies have their roots in a consensual and corporatist political culture, in high levels of social trust and political legitimacy, and in a strong welfare state; and that more punitive policies that make more use of imprisonment are to be found in countries where these characteristics are less in evidence.

Trust, Welfare, and Political Culture: Explaining Differences in National Penal Policies

Countries vary enormously in their punishment policies and practices. A nascent literature has begun to explain these differences. There are no simple explanations. Neither high or rising crime rates nor heightened public anxiety or severity explains why policies become tougher or are tougher in some places than in others. The most powerful predictors of moderation in policy and practices are high levels of confidence in fellow citizens and in government, strong welfare states, and consensus compared with conflict political systems. Other important factors include insulation of the legal system from politics, the way in which justice system personnel are trained, and the nature of the mass media.

Crime, Criminal Justice, and Criminology in the Nordic Countries

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, commonly referred to as the Nordic countries, or Scandinavia, stand out in many respects. Social spending and services, taxation, governmental legitimacy, and levels of trust are high compared with most other countries; income inequality and fears for personal safety are low. Imprisonment rates are among the lowest in developed countries, punishment policies are moderate, and criminal justice policy debates are not heavily politicized. Like all countries, the Nordic countries face social and political challenges. Populations have become more diverse in recent decades as a result of recruitment of guest workers and receptiveness to political refugees; ethnic tensions have become more pronounced. All five countries have been affected by the recent global recession and by globalization generally. Sweden and Finland faced and overcame economic crises in the 1990s, and Iceland has recently been reeling under the weight of a banking disaster. Conservative political parties have gained increased influence and power and social welfare programs have be-

Penal Policies in the Nordic Countries 1960–2010

The article gives an overview of major changes in Nordic penal policies during the last 50 years. Three main threads are distinguished. From the late 1960s onwards the use of imprisonment was curbed by restricting the use of indeterminate sanctions, relaxing prison regimes, expanding the use of alternatives, and by reducing penalties for traditional property offenses and drunken driving. Partly overlapping with the period of ‘rational and humane’ criminal policy, attitudes were stiffening from the 1980s onwards, first towards drug offenses, then from the 1990s in violent and sexual offenses, often initiated by the Swedish models. The third thread underlines the fact that penal policies and law reforms are often ambivalent with both ‘repressive and liberal’ elements, as is the case with prison reforms, juvenile justice, and the expansion of community alternatives. In all, the Nordic countries were able to keep their incarceration rates lower than the rest of Europe, where several nations started in the 1960s from levels below the Nordic ones but ended up with much higher figures. The Nordic countries have not only much lower incarceration rates but also fewer offenders under supervised control, lower levels of fear and punitive demands, less serious violence, and fewer property offenses. Prisons are smaller and prison conditions better. So, even if also Nordic crime policy has become more offensive, more politicized, and more adaptive to the voices of the media, the talk of Nordic exceptionalism remains justified. Explanations go back to socio-economic and political structures and cultural traditions, high social and institutional trust, strong welfare states with smaller welfare differences, and consensual and corporatist political culture.

The development of crime in light of Finnish and Swedish criminal justice statistics, circa 1750–2010:

This paper analyses four historical time series on homicide, assault, robbery and theft from Finnish and Swedish vital and conviction (judicial) statistics. It is suggested that long-term criminal justice statistics – at least in Finland and Sweden – are highly usable and that they add relevant basic knowledge to important current criminological and crime policy issues. It is concluded that law reforms are greatly influential in terms of changes in the sanctioning system (strong evidence of policy impact); but law reforms do not contribute to lasting changes in the development of crime as measured by conviction statistics (no substantiated evidence of crime impact). In the long run, crime seems to persistently evade the manifold legislative efforts to ‘combat’ it.

Cross-Comparative Perspectives on Global Homicide Trends

Data are available on homicide trends and patterns for 235 countries from six continents from 1950 to 2010. Recent rates range from fewer than 0.5 victim per 100,000 population to 80 and regionally from around one in Scandinavia to around 30 in Central America. Countries that share cultural, political, and social traditions usually have similar crime trends. In Western countries, lethal violence increased in the 1960s through the early 1990s, followed by declines. Elsewhere, trends may have been different as a result of local political configurations and social developments. In eastern Europe, the development of crime was affected by political turmoil after the fall of the Soviet Union and in several Latin American and Caribbean countries by unstable political conditions and the drug industry. Homicide is not decreasing in parts of the Americas and the Caribbean. Cross-sectional analyses confirm the interdependency of lethal violence with socioeconomic and political factors. The level of lethal violence is heavily dependent on the rule of law, the quality and integrity of governance, the level of democracy, and social and economic equality. No signs were detected of the effects of sanctions practices. Use of capital punishment, high rates of imprisonment, and long sentences coincide with high and increasing homicide rates—and not the other way around.

Explaining national differences in the use of imprisonment

This article explores explanations for differences in penal severity in industrialized countries, evaluating quantitative data and theoretical perspectives to examine several aspects of penal systems. These include rates of imprisonment in different countries, crime rates in relation to prisoner rates, welfare and social equality, trust and legitimacy, and democracy and political economy. The focus is not restricted to the Anglophonic world, but encompasses the Scandinavian countries, Western and Eastern continental Europe, and the Baltic states. Unprecedented expansions of penal control have occurred in recent decades in different parts of the world. American imprisonment rates have increased nearly fivefold and Dutch rates sixfold since the early 1970s. Substantial changes of differing magnitudes may be observed in many countries. An increase in states’ willingness to use penal power has provoked criminological and sociological explanations, most from writers in North America and English-speaking countries. An unspoken assumption that developments in the United States and England and Wales occurred elsewhere has influenced efforts to formulate general explanations of changes taking place under general conditions of late modern society.However, the author notes that things have not happened the same way everywhere, and to overlook differences between nations may lead to overgeneralised and simplified pictures of the dynamics of penal change. For example, alongside general growth in cultures of control, there are divergent trends and country-specific deviations. The Scandinavian countries with their more restrained penal policies serve as one important counterexample: despite some recent criticisms, Nordic penal policy has been an example of a pragmatic and non-moralistic approach, with a clear social policy orientation. It reflects the values of the Nordic welfare-state ideal and emphasizes that measures against social marginalization and inequality work also as measures against crime. In conclusion, the author argues that the pre-conditions of rational policy-making must be prioritised over populist posturing through the production of more and better information for politicians, practitioners and the public. The normal rules of political accountability should also be applied in penal discourse. However, the author notes that things have not happened the same way everywhere, and to overlook differences between nations may lead to overgeneralised and simplified pictures of the dynamics of penal change. For example, alongside general growth in cultures of control, there are divergent trends and country-specific deviations. The Scandinavian countries with their more restrained penal policies serve as one important counterexample: despite some recent criticisms, Nordic penal policy has been an example of a pragmatic and non-moralistic approach, with a clear social policy orientation. It reflects the values of the Nordic welfare-state ideal and emphasizes that measures against social marginalization and inequality work also as measures against crime. In conclusion, the author argues that the pre-conditions of rational policy-making must be prioritised over populist posturing through the production of more and better information for politicians, practitioners and the public. The normal rules of political accountability should also be applied in penal discourse.

Sentencing Theory, Policy, and Research in the Nordic Countries

Sentencing in the Nordic countries follows the civil law tradition. Sentencing councils and advisory boards have no role, as the guidance for the courts is given mainly in the form of legislative sentencing principles and court precedents. Legislative sentencing guidance has undergone changes both in form and substance. The 1970s decline of the rehabilitative ideal was mirrored in sentencing reforms that emphasized proportionality and predictability in sentencing. This was the case especially in Finland and Sweden. But unlike in many other countries, these ideological changes did not result to increased severity—for Finland the result was the opposite. While the Nordic legislators have shown increased interest in more detailed guidance of sentencing, courts are still left with a wide range of sentencing options and fairly broad penal latitudes. At the same time the sentencing systems place high value in consistency and uniformity in sentencing. To reconcile these aims, further devices are needed for the structuring of the sentencing decision, including legal-theoretical analyses and empirical research. The paper discusses the latter point in more detail with more recent research examples from Finland.

Nordic Youth Justice

Nordic systems for dealing with young offenders constitute a “Nordic model of youth justice” and at the same time differ among themselves in important respects. Similarities include a common statutory presumption against confinement, a high age of criminal responsibility (15 except in Denmark), active collaboration between the justice and child welfare systems, and the absence of specialized juvenile courts. Differences include much higher levels of penal confinement in Denmark and Norway than in Finland and Sweden, and greater differentiation between justice system and child welfare approaches in Finland and Norway than in Denmark and Sweden. Even when institutional placements in both welfare and justice facilities are taken into account in comparative analyses, however, the Nordic countries rely much less heavily on confinement of young offenders than England and Wales.