Tarik Derrough

Measles outbreak on a cruise ship in the western Mediterranean, February 2014, preliminary report

A measles outbreak occurred in February 2014 on a ship cruising the western Mediterranean Sea. Overall 27 cases were reported: 21 crew members, four passengers.For two cases the status crew or passenger was unknown. Genotype B3 was identified. Because of different nationalities of cases and persons on board,the event qualified as a cross-border health threat. The Italian Ministry of Health coordinated rapid response.Alerts were posted through the Early Warning and Response System.

Methodology of the sensitivity analysis used for modeling an infectious disease

Mathematical models may be used to help clarify dynamics of several infectious diseases. Because of the complexity of some models and the high degree of uncertainty in estimating many parameters, the present study proposes a rigorous framework for sensitivity analyses of mathematical models using as example a model to assess varicella and herpes zoster incidence. Its main steps are to assess the uncertainty of the factors to be studied, to evaluate qualitatively and quantitatively the impacts of these factors on model results, and to conduct an univariate and multivariate sensitivity analysis. The application of this technique may have considerable utility in the analysis of a wide variety of complex biological and epidemiological models.

Author's reply: measles on a cruise ship--links with the outbreak in the Philippines.

To the editor: We thank Mandal et al. for their letter in response to our paper. Firstly we would like to point out that most the concerns raised are due to the fact that our article was a preliminary report, which was also stated in the title. It was intended to rapidly inform about an outbreak of measles affecting European and non-European citizens that was ongoing at the time of publication and to alert public health, clinical and laboratory experts in various countries of the possibility of cases among people who had been on the cruise. In fact, most of those concerns are being addressed in the on-going investigation.

Immunisation Information Systems – useful tools for monitoring vaccination programmes in EU/EEA countries, 2016

Immunisation Information Systems (IIS) are computerised confidential population based-systems containing individual-level information on vaccines received in a given area. They benefit individuals directly by ensuring vaccination according to the schedule and they provide information to vaccine providers and public health authorities responsible for the delivery and monitoring of an immunisation programme. In 2016, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on the level of implementation and functionalities of IIS in 30 European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries. It explored the governance and financial support for the systems, IIS software, system characteristics in terms of population, identification of immunisation recipients, vaccinations received, and integration with other health record systems, the use of the systems for surveillance and programme management as well as the challenges involved with implementation. The survey was answered by 27 of the 30 EU/EEA countries having either a system in production at national or subnational levels (n = 16), or being piloted (n = 5) or with plans for setting up a system in the future (n = 6). The results demonstrate the added-value of IIS in a number of areas of vaccination programme monitoring such as monitoring vaccine coverage at local geographical levels, linking individual immunisation history with health outcome data for safety investigations, monitoring vaccine effectiveness and failures and as an educational tool for both vaccine providers and vaccine recipients. IIS represent a significant way forward for life-long vaccination programme monitoring.

Lessons learnt to keep Europe polio-free: a review of outbreaks in the European Union, European Economic Area, and candidate countries, 1973 to 2013.

Between 1973 and 2013, 12 outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis with a cumulative total of 660 cases were reported in the European Union, European Economic Area and candidate countries. Outbreaks lasted seven to 90 weeks (median: 24 weeks) and were identified through the diagnosis of cases of acute flaccid paralysis, for which infection with wild poliovirus was subsequently identified. In two countries, environmental surveillance was in place before the outbreaks, but did not detect any wild strain before the occurrence of clinical cases. This surveillance nonetheless provided useful information to monitor the outbreaks and their geographical spread. Outbreaks were predominantly caused by poliovirus type 1 and typically involved unvaccinated or inadequately vaccinated groups within highly immunised communities. Oral polio vaccine was primarily used to respond to the outbreaks with catch-up campaigns implemented either nationwide or in restricted geographical areas or age groups. The introduction of supplementary immunisation contained the outbreaks. In 2002, the European region of the World Health Organization was declared polio-free and it has maintained this status since. However, as long as there are non-vaccinated or under-vaccinated groups in European countries and poliomyelitis is not eradicated, countries remain continuously at risk of reintroduction and establishment of the virus. Continued efforts to reach these groups are needed in order to ensure a uniform and high vaccination coverage.

Surveillance of congenital rubella and rubella infections in pregnancy in EU/EEA countries, 2012: Current status and future perspective to monitor elimination

INTRODUCTION Rubella elimination and congenital rubella syndrome (CRS) prevention are targets for achievement by 2015 in the WHO-EURO Region. This paper describes the existing surveillance systems for CRS and rubella in pregnancy in order to critically interpret the findings in relation to the 2012 WHO-EURO surveillance guidelines. METHODS In 2012 we conducted a survey to collect information on surveillance of CRS and rubella in pregnancy in 29 EU/EEA countries. Questionnaires explored the characteristics of the surveillance systems, case definition, epidemiological investigation and follow-up of cases, reference laboratories and types of tests performed. RESULTS Twenty-eight countries had surveillance systems for CRS, mostly nationwide, mandatory, passive and case-based; 23 collected information on the origin of the infection; 11 reported asymptomatic infections; 6 required zero-reporting. Case definitions varied among countries, although 24 used the EU definition. Laboratories reported cases in 18 countries. Twenty countries collected information on pregnancy within the rubella surveillance system and 5 had specific surveillance for rubella in pregnancy. Two countries did not monitor outcomes of suspected infections in pregnancy; infants with CRS were monitored in all the remaining countries; asymptomatic infected infants in 15; stillbirths and fetal deaths in 13; therapeutic and spontaneous abortions in 8 and 7. Twenty-seven countries had a national reference laboratory for CRS and rubella in pregnancy; genotyping was performed in 15. DISCUSSION The current surveillance systems allow adequate CRS monitoring in EU. Further efforts are needed to improve their quality, including uniform case definitions, collection of information on the origin of infection, and promotion of reporting from laboratories. Follow-up of pregnant women with suspected infection should be strengthened because it is an entry point for CRS, including detection of fetal deaths, stillbirths and abortions. Laboratory capacity for confirming congenital rubella infections and infections in pregnancy is good in EU, however the use of genotyping should be encouraged.

Global polio eradication: Where are we in Europe and what next?

The world was never so close to reach the polio eradication: only 37 cases notified in 2016 in only three countries, but the game is not yet at the end. The risk of polio outbreaks in the EU is smaller than it has ever been in the past, but it is not so small that we can ignore it. The EU MS must remain alert and plan and prepare for managing polio events or outbreaks because of the possible dire consequences. The IPV only vaccination schedule universally applied in EU has achieved satisfactory coverage, but constantly leaving small accumulating pockets of susceptible individuals. Moreover the IPV only schedule is not an absolute barrier against poliovirus silent transmission as demonstrated in the recent Israel outbreak. The availability of annually revised S.O.P. from WHO GPEI on the identification and response of a polio event, without local poliovirus transmission or a polio outbreak with sustained transmission, helps and challenge EU countries to update their polio national preparedness plans. The EU/EEA area, in fact, is a peculiar area regarding the polio risk both for its vaccination policy, the large polio vaccines manufactures and the constant immigration from areas at polio high risk, but also EU include cultural and financial potentials crucial to sustain the polio end game strategy and reach the benefit of a world without polio risk. Poliovirus eradication will continue to be challenged as long as there is the worldwide presence of polioviruses in laboratories and vaccine production plants. Most of the worlds OPV vaccines are produced in the EU and many laboratories and research centers store and handle polio viruses. EU Member States are engaged actively in implementing the poliovirus biocontainment plans that are part of the polio eradication strategy and to certify the destruction of poliovirus strains and potentially contaminated biological materials.

Field investigation with real-time virus genetic characterisation support of a cluster of Ebola virus disease cases in Dubréka, Guinea, April to June 2015

On 11 May 2015, the Dubréka prefecture, Guinea, reported nine laboratory-confirmed cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD). None could be epidemiologically linked to cases previously reported in the prefecture. We describe the epidemiological and molecular investigations of this event. We used the Dubréka EVD registers and the Ebola treatment centre’s (ETC) records to characterise chains of transmission. Real-time field Ebola virus sequencing was employed to support epidemiological results. An epidemiological cluster of 32 cases was found, of which 27 were laboratory confirmed, 24 were isolated and 20 died. Real-time viral sequencing on 12 cases demonstrated SL3 lineage viruses with sequences differing by one to three nt inside a single phylogenetic cluster. For isolated cases, the average time between symptom onset and ETC referral was 2.8 days (interquartile range (IQR): 1–4). The average time between sample collection and molecular results’ availability was 3 days (IQR: 2–5). In an area with scarce resources, the genetic characterisation supported the outbreak investigations in real time, linking cases where epidemiological investigation was limited and reassuring that the responsible strain was already circulating in Guinea. We recommend coupling thorough epidemiological and genomic investigations to control EVD clusters.

Preparedness and response against diseases with epidemic potential in the European Union : a qualitative case study of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and poliomyelitis in five member states

BackgroundEU Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border health threats provides a legal basis for collaboration between EU Member States, and between international and European level institutions on preparedness, prevention, and mitigation in the event of a public health emergency. The Decision provides a context for the present study, which aims to identify good practices and lessons learned in preparedness and response to Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) (in UK, Greece, and Spain) and poliomyelitis (in Poland and Cyprus).MethodsBased on a documentary review, followed by five week-long country visits involving a total of 61 interviews and group discussions with experts from both the health and non-health sectors, this qualitative case study has investigated six issues related to preparedness and response to MERS and poliomyelitis: national plans and overall preparedness capacity; training and exercises; risk communication; linking policy and implementation; interoperability between the health and non-health sectors; and cross-border collaboration.ResultsPreparedness and response plans for MERS and poliomyelitis were in place in the participating countries, with a high level of technical expertise available to implement them. Nevertheless, formal evaluation of the responses to previous public health emergencies have sometimes been limited, so lessons learned may not be reflected in updated plans, thereby risking mistakes being repeated in future. The nature and extent of inter-sectoral collaboration varied according to the sectors involved, with those sectors that have traditionally had good collaboration (e.g. animal health and food safety), as well as those that have a financial incentive for controlling infectious diseases (e.g. agriculture, tourism, and air travel) seen as most likely to have integrated public health preparedness and response plans. Although the formal protocols for inter-sectoral collaboration were not always up to date, good personal relations were reported within the relevant professional networks, which could be brought into play in the event of a public health emergency. Cross-border collaboration was greatly facilitated if the neighbouring country was a fellow EU Member State.ConclusionsInfectious disease outbreaks remain as an ongoing threat. Efforts are required to ensure that core public health capacities for the full range of preparedness and response activities are sustained.