Ted A. Warfield

The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta

Incompatibilism about freedom and causal determinism is commonly supported by appeal to versions of the well known Consequence argument. Critics of the Consequence argument have presented counterexamples to the Consequence arguments central inference principle. The thesis of this article is that proponents of the Consequence argument can easily bypass even the best of these counterexamples. I. The most influential defenses of Incompatibilism, the thesis that freedom and determinism are incompatible, have employed some version or other of the Consequence argument. Recently, however, the Consequence argument has fallen on hard times as counterexamples to the arguments central inference principle have emerged. In this paper we will show how proponents of the Consequence argument can sidestep the best and most influential of these counterexamples. II. The most important presentation of the Consequence argument appears in Peter van Inwagens An Essay on Free Will. Here is van Inwagens informal statement of the argument:

The allure of connectionism reexamined

There is currently a debate over whether cognitive architecture is classical or connectionist in nature. One finds the following three comparisons between classical architecture and connectionist architecture made in the pro-connectionist literature in this debate: (1) connectionist architecture is neurally plausible and classical architecture is not; (2) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model pattern recognition capacities than is classical architecture; and (3) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model the acquisition of pattern recognition capacities by learning than is classical architecture. If true, (1)–(3) would yield a compelling case against the view that cognitive architecture is classical, and would offer some reason to think that cognitive architecture may be connectionist. We first present the case for (1)–(3) in the very words of connectionist enthusiasts. We then argue that the currently available evidence fails to support any of (1)–(3).

ALFRED MELE'S METAPHYSICAL FREEDOM?

In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Meles fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Meles combination of ‘luck’ and ‘Frankfurt-style’ objections to libertarianism, (ii) Meles stipulations about ‘compatibilism’ and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Meles treatment of the Consequence Argument.

Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa

In a recent article in this journal (Adams and Aizawa 1992), Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa argued that Jerry Fodors proposed naturalistic sufficient condition for meaning is unsatisfactory. In this paper, I respond to Adams and Aizawa, noting that (1) they have overestimated the importance of their “pathologies” objection, perhaps as a consequence of misunderstanding Fodors asymmetric dependency condition, (2) they have misunderstood Fodors asymmetric dependency condition in formulating their Twin Earth objection, and (3) they have, in addition to under describing their “clear counterexample” to Fodors proposal, in fact identified a satisfactory Fodorian rejoiner to their objection. I conclude that Fodors proposal is, for all Adams and Aizawa have shown, adequate as a naturalistic theory of content.

Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky, eds., Readings in Language and Mind

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