Brian P. McLaughlin

Actions and events : perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson

List of Contributors - Annette Baier, Jonathan Bennett, Michael Bratman, Hector-Neri Castendea, Roderick M. Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Jon Elster, Dagfinn Follesdal, Terence Horgan, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Richard Jeffrey, Mark Johnston, Jerrold J Katz, Caludia Leacock, Ernest LePore, Lawrence Brian Lombard, John McDowell, James D. McCawley, Brian McLaughlin, Terence Parsons, David Pears, W.V. Quine, Alexander Rosenberg, Esa Saarinen, David H. Sandford, Frederick Stoutland, Irving Thalberg, Michael Tye and George M. Wilson.

TYPE EPIPHENOMENALISM, TYPE DUALISM, AND THE CAUSAL PRIORITY OF THE PHYSICAL

Epiphenomenalism may be taken to assert one of two things. (1) That certain events which have physiological characteristics have also mental characteristics...And that an event which has mental characteristics never causes another event in virtue of its mental characteristics, but only in virtue of its physiological characteristics. Or (2) that no event has both mental and physiological characteristics; but that the complete cause of any event which has mental characteristics is an event or set of events which has physiological characteristics. And that no event which has mental characteristics is a cause-factor in the causation of any other event whatever, whether mental or physiological (1925, p. 472).

Dretske and his critics

Perceptual experience, John Heil scepticism, relevance, and relativity, Stewart Cohen proper knowledge, David H.Sanford Dretske on how reasons explain behaviour, Jaegwon Kim actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of content, Terence Horgan the role of mental meaning in psychological explanation, Robert Cummins ways of establishing harmony, Daniel C.Dennett causal contents, Frederick Adams belief individuation and Dretske on naturalizing content, Brian P.McLaughlin Dretskes replies.

The allure of connectionism reexamined

There is currently a debate over whether cognitive architecture is classical or connectionist in nature. One finds the following three comparisons between classical architecture and connectionist architecture made in the pro-connectionist literature in this debate: (1) connectionist architecture is neurally plausible and classical architecture is not; (2) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model pattern recognition capacities than is classical architecture; and (3) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model the acquisition of pattern recognition capacities by learning than is classical architecture. If true, (1)–(3) would yield a compelling case against the view that cognitive architecture is classical, and would offer some reason to think that cognitive architecture may be connectionist. We first present the case for (1)–(3) in the very words of connectionist enthusiasts. We then argue that the currently available evidence fails to support any of (1)–(3).

A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to block's harder problem

Ned Block (2002) claims that there is “an epistemic tension” between two fairly widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that (a) we are phenomenally consciousness, and that (b) there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated (noncircularly) in nonphenomenal terms (p.392). Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject “armchair philosophical reductive analyses” (p.393) of consciousness— such as analytical functionalism—“phenomenal realists have no brief against scientific reduction of consciousness” (p.393). His characterization of naturalism is complex:

Classical Constituents in Smolensky’s ICS Architecture

In a recent paper,1 Paul Smolensky replies to an article that Jerry Fodor and I published in 1990.2 I shall use this opportunity to make a partial reply; partial, because I lack the space here to address all of the issues Smolensky raises in his paper—a paper that spans sixty-seven pages of print. I shall confine myself to making one key observation and to attempting to clarify a few issues, leaving a fuller discussion for another occasion.3

The Representational vs. the Relational View of Visual Experience

In Reference and Consciousness , 1 John Campbell attempts to a make a case that what he calls ‘the Relational View’ of visual experience, a view that he champions, is superior to what he calls ‘the Representational View’. 2 I argue that his attempt fails. In section 1, I spell out the two views. In section 2, I outline Campbells case that the Relational View is superior to the Representational View and offer a diagnosis of where Campbell goes wrong. In section 3, I examine the case in detail and argue that it fails. Finally, in section 4, I mention two very well-known problems for the Relational View that are unresolved in the book.

I–Brian P. McLaughlin

In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the skeptical hypothesis under assessment is true, and that the prospect of a sound strongly a priori argument of this sort seems dim.

Why Perception is not Singular Reference

Charles Chastain has developed a general notion of singular reference based on the reference relation a singular term bears to its referent.1 He holds that perception is, in this broad sense, a kind of reference. Subtleties aside, he holds that one perceives something if and only if one has a sense experience that refers to it.2 This account of perception plays a central role in his framework for a theory of reference: Perceptual reference is, he holds, the primary way that referential chains are initiated.

Physicalism and Alternatives

Physicalism is the doctrine that our world is fundamentally physical in nature. Substance dualism is an alternative doctrine, according to which there are certain fundamental, irreducible substances (objects) that are not physical – immaterial minds, entelechies, souls, or disembodied spirits. Property (or attribute) dualism, another alternative, maintains that there are fundamental properties that are not physical – spiritual properties or mental properties. Physicalism is a controversial doctrine, even among theorists who deny there is any supernatural realm. Various alternative doctrines to physicalism currently receive some currency, but none receives widespread acceptance. Whether our world is fundamentally physical remains a matter of dispute.