Ted W. Bowyer

Detection and analysis of xenon isotopes for the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty international monitoring system.

The use of the xenon isotopes for detection of nuclear explosions is of great interest for monitoring compliance with the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). Recently, the automated radioxenon sampler-analyzer (ARSA) was tested at the Institute for Atmospheric Radioactivity (IAR) in Freiburg, Germany to ascertain its use for the CTBT by comparing its results to laboratory-based analyses, determining its detection sensitivity and analyzing its results in light of historical xenon isotope levels and known reactor operations in the area. Xe-133 was detected nearly every day throughout the test at activity concentrations ranging between approximately 0.1 mBq/m3 to as high as 120 mBq/m3. Xe-133m and 135Xe were also detected occasionally during the test at concentrations of less than 1 to a few mBq/m3.

Xe isotope detection and discrimination using beta spectroscopy with coincident gamma spectroscopy

Abstract Beta spectroscopic techniques show promise of significant improvements for a beta–gamma coincidence counter that is part of a system for analyzing Xe automatically separated from air. The previously developed counting system for 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133g Xe, and 135g Xe can be enhanced to give additional discrimination between these Xe isotopes by using the plastic scintillation sample cell as a beta spectrometer to resolve the conversion electron peaks. The automated system will be a key factor in monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Beta-Gamma Counting System for Xe Fission Products

A beta-gamma coincidence counting system has been developed for automated analysis of Xe gas samples separated from air. The Xe gas samples are contained in a cylindrical plastic scintillator cell located between two NaI(T1) scintillation detectors. The X-ray and gamma spectra gated by coincident events in the plastic scintillator cell are recorded for each NaI(T1) crystal. The characteristic signatures of the131mXe,133gXe,133mXe, and135gXe isotopes of interest for nuclear test-ban verification as well as the procedures and results of absolute efficiency measurements are described. A NaI(T1) crystal with provision for 4 sample cells has been implemented for the system to be deployed in the field. Examples of data on ambient air samples in New York City obtained with the field prototype are presented.

International challenge to predict the impact of radioxenon releases from medical isotope production on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty sampling station.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). At entry-into-force, half of the 80 radionuclide stations will be able to measure concentrations of several radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear explosions, and then the full network may be populated with xenon monitoring afterward. An understanding of natural and man-made radionuclide backgrounds can be used in accordance with the provisions of the treaty (such as event screening criteria in Annex 2 to the Protocol of the Treaty) for the effective implementation of the verification regime. Fission-based production of (99)Mo for medical purposes also generates nuisance radioxenon isotopes that are usually vented to the atmosphere. One of the ways to account for the effect emissions from medical isotope production has on radionuclide samples from the IMS is to use stack monitoring data, if they are available, and atmospheric transport modeling. Recently, individuals from seven nations participated in a challenge exercise that used atmospheric transport modeling to predict the time-history of (133)Xe concentration measurements at the IMS radionuclide station in Germany using stack monitoring data from a medical isotope production facility in Belgium. Participants received only stack monitoring data and used the atmospheric transport model and meteorological data of their choice. Some of the models predicted the highest measured concentrations quite well. A model comparison rank and ensemble analysis suggests that combining multiple models may provide more accurate predicted concentrations than any single model. None of the submissions based only on the stack monitoring data predicted the small measured concentrations very well. Modeling of sources by other nuclear facilities with smaller releases than medical isotope production facilities may be important in understanding how to discriminate those releases from releases from a nuclear explosion.

Worldwide measurements of radioxenon background near isotope production facilities, a nuclear power plant and at remote sites: the “EU/JA-II” Project

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) specifies that radioxenon measurements should be performed at 40 or more stations worldwide within the International Monitoring System (IMS). Measuring radioxenon is one of the principle techniques to detect underground nuclear explosions. Specifically, presence and ratios of different radioxenon isotopes allows determining whether a detection event under consideration originated from a nuclear explosion or a civilian source. However, radioxenon monitoring on a global scale is a novel technology and the global civil background must be characterized sufficiently. This paper lays out a study, based on several unique measurement campaigns, of the worldwide concentrations and sources of verification relevant xenon isotopes. It complements the experience already gathered with radioxenon measurements within the CTBT IMS programme and focuses on locations in Belgium, Germany, Kuwait, Thailand and South Africa where very little information was available on ambient xenon levels or interesting sites offered opportunities to learn more about emissions from known sources. The findings corroborate the hypothesis that a few major radioxenon sources contribute in great part to the global radioxenon background. Additionally, the existence of independent sources of 131mXe (the daughter of 131I) has been demonstrated, which has some potential to bias the isotopic signature of signals from nuclear explosions.

Calculation of Minimum-Detectable-Concentration Levels of Radioxenon Isotopes Using the PNNL ARSA System

Measurement of xenon fission product isotopes is a key element in the global network being established to monitor the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The automated Radio-xenon Analyzer/Sampler (ARSA), built by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, can detect 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe, and 135Xe via a beta-gamma counting system. Due to the variable background and sources of these four radio-xenon isotopes, it is important to have as sensitive a detection system as possible and to quantify the Minimum-Detectable-Concentrations (MDC) that such a system will be able to detect to preclude false negative and false positive results. From data obtained from IAR in Germany MDC values for 133Xe were well below the 1 mBq/SCMA as required by the PTS for the Comprehensive Test BAn Treaty [WGB TL-11,1999].

The science case for 37Ar as a monitor for underground nuclear explosions

A new calculation of the production of 37Ar from nuclear explosion neutron interactions on 40Ca in a suite of common sub-surface materials (rock, etc) is presented. Even in mineral structures that are relatively low in Ca, the resulting 37Ar signature is large enough for detection in cases of venting or gaseous diffusion driven by barometric pumping. Field and laboratory detection strategies and projected sensitivities are presented.

Noble gas migration experiment to support the detection of underground nuclear explosions

A Noble Gas Migration Experiment injected 127Xe, 37Ar, and sulfur hexafluoride into a former underground nuclear explosion shot cavity. These tracer gases were allowed to migrate from the cavity to near-surface and surface sampling locations and were detected in soil gas samples collected using various on-site inspection sampling approaches. Based on this experiment we came to the following conclusions: (1) SF6 was enriched in all of the samples relative to both 37Ar and 127Xe. (2) There were no significant differences in the 127Xe to 37Ar ratio in the samples relative to the ratio injected into the cavity. (3) The migratory behavior of the chemical and radiotracers did not fit typical diffusion modeling scenarios.

Atmospheric plume progression as a function of time and distance from the release point for radioactive isotopes

The radionuclide network of the International Monitoring System comprises up to 80 stations around the world that have aerosol and xenon monitoring systems designed to detect releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere from nuclear explosions. A rule of thumb description of plume concentration and duration versus time and distance from the release point is useful when designing and deploying new sample collection systems. This paper uses plume development from atmospheric transport modeling to provide a power-law rule describing atmospheric dilution factors as a function of distance from the release point. Consider the plume center-line concentration seen by a ground-level sampler as a function of time based on a short-duration ground-level release of a nondepositing radioactive tracer. The concentration C (Bq m(-3)) near the ground varies with distance from the source with the relationship C=R×A(D,C) ×e (-λ(-1.552+0.0405×D)) × 5.37×10(-8) × D(-2.35) where R is the release magnitude (Bq), D is the separation distance (km) from the ground level release to the measurement location, λ is the decay constant (h(-1)) for the radionuclide of interest and AD,C is an attenuation factor that depends on the length of the sample collection period. This relationship is based on the median concentration for 10 release locations with different geographic characteristics and 365 days of releases at each location, and it has an R(2) of 0.99 for 32 distances from 100 to 3000 km. In addition, 90 percent of the modeled plumes fall within approximately one order of magnitude of this curve for all distances.

Alternative treaty monitoring approaches using ultra-low background measurement technology

The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty includes a network of stations and laboratories for collection and analysis of radioactive aerosols. Alternative approaches to IMS operations are considered as a method of enhancing treaty verification. Ultra-low background (ULB) detection promises the possibility of improvements to IMS minimum detectable activities (MDAs) well below the current approach, requiring MDA < or = 30 microBq/m(3) of air for (140)Ba, or about 10(6) fissions per daily sample.