Terence Armstrong

The circumpolar north : a political and economic geography of the Arctic and sub-arctic

A sub-title describes this book as a political and economic geography of the Arctic and sub-Arctic, and it was designed to be more of a text and reference book than as something to be read right through for interest and pleasure. No single reviewer could hope to judge of its accuracy when, for example, the first named author has spent more of his life than, probably, any other English speaker studying the available Russian literature on the subject. After an introductory chapter describing how the area is defined and its physical and biological characteristics (including the interesting observation that species are few but numbers in each species large), individual chapters then describe in detail, following a common pattern, the northern USSR, Canada, Alaska, Greenland, and the northern old world including the sub-Arctic islands. The final chapters then describe the circumpolar oceans with special reference to conflict and cooperation between the major powers and the place of the circumpolar north in world affairs. Each of the main regional chapters describes the geographical background, the history of exploration and development, the mineral and other resources, the population, social conditions, administration, and transport. Space does not allow of a detailed review of these, but one aspect is worth mentioning. To many readers the most interesting parts of the book may well be the accounts of the conflicts caused in different areas by the development of the norths resources and military installations and the effect on the local population of an invasion of sophisticated newcomers. The differing circumstances of Greenland, a protectorate where the native population has remained the majority under an administration dedicated for 200 years to their emergence rather than to colonization and profits; Canada and Alaska, where a social conscience about what was happening to the local minority population as a result of development, is a recent phenomenon; and the northern USSR, where the much larger numbers and smaller differences between the existing and incoming populations created a different situation, are well brought out and make fascinating reading. As the authors say, it is a pity that we are not able to get some account from those areas where a minority local population has created the same problems for the Russians; their experience could have helped others. There are a number of useful tables and some text maps in one colour, but no illustrations. The book would be more attractive, and not necessarily much more expensive, with a multi-coloured end map. If, as seems likely in such an authoritative work of reference, there is a second edition, it is to be hoped that the authors will, in planning this, look around for (or design themselves) a suitable map of the north polar region, and share the cost with the publisher of an atlas in which it could also appear. John Wright

Ethical problems of northern development

It may be taken as axiomatic that the northern lands and seas—Alaska, the Canadian north, Greenland, Svalbard, the ‘northern cap’ of Scandinavia, the Soviet north, and the seas adjoining these areas, including the Arctic Ocean which lies between them—will not escape the process of ‘development’, whatever that may be taken to mean. The pressure of population alone, considered globally, is certain to ensure that the resources of these areas, if not, at least initially, their living space, will be explored and exploited. The fact that each of the land areas is, as it happens, the sovereign territory of an industrialized country, will facilitate this process. The option, if it is thought to exist at all, of total preservation of the Arctic and sub-Arctic as some kind of world nature reserve may have attraction to some but must be seen to be wholly unrealistic. Development will occur. But it is sensible, as well as possible, to try to influence the type and course of that development. The objection may be made that such an exercise is pointless, because we cannot see far enough or clearly enough into the future, when new considerations, unguessed at now, may revolutionize our priorities. This ground for objection is of course true; but it is not a reason for giving no thought at all to the question, for all decisions about the future have to be taken on a basis of imperfect knowledge.

Bellingshausen and the discovery of Antarctica

For the last twenty years there has been considerable Soviet interest in the circumnavigation of Antarctica by the Russian naval expedition of 1819–21, led by Captain T. T. Bellingshausen, with Lieut M. P. Lazarev as his second in command, in the sloops Vostok and Mirnyy . It is now reasonably certain that Bellingshausen sighted the Antarctic continent several times, notably on 27 January 1820 (New Style) at a point about lat 69°21′S, long 2°14′W, and was thus the first to see it (Edward Bransfield sighted the north-west coast of the Antarctic Peninsula at about lat 63°50′S, long 60°30′W on 30 January 1820, three days later). Bellingshausen did not claim to have done so however, but his descriptions of what he saw tally very well with what the edge of the continent here is now known to look like. There is one relatively new point. Bellingshausens first sighting has been moved forward one day, from the 28th to the 27th, because it has been shown that he was keeping ships time, from mid-day to mid-day, and therefore that what his log called the 28th (his sighting being in the second half of the day) was what the civil calendar would call the 27th (Belov, 1963, p 19–29). All this much is well documented and unlikely to be disputed. The question is, how much importance did he, and his contemporaries, attach to this discovery? And did he realize that he had seen the edge of a continent? Recent Soviet studies have sought to show that he had a very good idea of the importance of what he had seen, and that this idea did get through to his contemporaries. It is here that there is room for argument with the Soviet scholars.

Recent Soviet Interest in Bellingshausen's Antarctic Voyage of 1819–21

475 * no positive sample has been traced in the walrus material examined up to date. As was already predicted by Parnell in 1934 and by Leiper in 1938, trichinosis is to be considered as a major problem in the Arctic, and has. a direct bearing on the health of the tribes inhabiting those regions as well as on that of explorers and sealers; the infection is moreover a danger by incapacitating the sledge dog, so indispensable to man in polar countries. Infected with Examined T. spiralis 66 dogs (Cants familiaris) 46 19 polar bears (Thalardos maritimus) 6 101 arctic foxes (Alopex lagopus) 3 4 Greenland hares (Lepus arcticus groenlandicus) 0 18 rats (Rattus norvegicus) 0 133 walruses (Odobcenus rosmarus) 0 28 bearded seals (Erignaihus barbatus) 1 2 bladder-nosed seals (Cystophora cristata) 0 17 other seals 0 27 white whales (Delphinapterus leucas) 0 1 narwhal (Monodon monoceros) 0

Yermak's campaign in Siberia : a selection of documents

Contents: Preface Introduction The Stroganov Chronicle The Yesipov Chronicle The Remezov Chronicle The New Chronicle Royal charters and letters relating to the advance across the Urals References Index.

Place-names in the Soviet Arctic

There are places in the Soviet Arctic which on English maps and in English literature are called by three or four quite different names. The confusion to which this state of affairs leads is obvious. Yet it is not too difficult to establish a set of principles which might be generally used as a guide in putting Russian Arctic place-names on English maps.

The voyage of the Komet along the Northern Sea Route, 1940

Early in 1940 the German naval high command, acting through the German naval attache in Moscow, opened negotiations with the Soviet Navy for the passage of two ships along the Northern Sea Route in the summer of that year. Agreement with the Soviet naval authorities was reached, possibly without the knowledge of the Soviet Government. The operation was to be carried out in the strictest secrecy, and a sum of 850,000 roubles (calculated on the expenses of the icebreakers involved) was to be paid by the Germans. Preparations accordingly went forward. One of the two ships was obliged for some reason to drop out, leaving only the other, the raider Komet , to make the voyage. The Komet was a converted merchant ship of 3300 gross registered tons driven by Diesel motors. She had a top speed of 14 knots. Special preparations for running in ice included strengthening the hull and screw and testing the steering gear more severely than usual: the special type of screw with removable blades, as used by Russian ships for ice passages, was not available. Her commander was Kapitan, later Konteradmiral, Robert Eyssen. He had worked in the 1930sfor Hydrografisches Amt des OKK (Hydrographic Office of the German naval high command), and while first officer and later commander of the survey vessel Meteor had had experience in ice navigation off East Greenland. The crew numbered 270, but included no meteorologists or hydrographers. From the commanders point of view, one of the most useful members of the crew was his interpreter, a man referred to in reports as Agent Kroepsch, a person of unknown allegiance. Krbepschs knowledge of Russian enabled the commander to get a clearer picture of the changeable and, to him, most suspicious attitude of the Russians towards the voyage, and to act accordingly. The voyage itself was remarkable because it showed that with the assistance of icebreakers and good ice and weather conditions very fast time can be made—in fact the voyage was the fastest ever made up to that date.

International transport routes in the Arctic

Most of the highly populated regions of the world are in the middle latitudes of the northern hemisphere. The shortest routes between some of them (and they happen to be the most advanced technologically) lie across the Arctic regions. The possibility of using these routes on a commercial scale has become real only comparatively recently, as technology has found ways of dealing with the distances and the natural obstacles. The transport systems with significant international applications are by sea and air. Land transport, whether by road or rail, crosses few frontiers (north of the Arctic Circle, only into and within Scandinavia) and raises no problems of special interest.

Oil and gas in the Soviet Arctic

Oil has been known in one locality of the Soviet Arctic since the second half of the seventeenth century (Probst, 1957). This is the deposit in the Ukhta region of Komi ASSR, known now as the Timano-Pechorskaya petroliferous province. Occasional attempts were made to obtain it, but intensive exploration started only in 1929, and significant exploitation in 1935. The oil is Devonian, aiid some of it is highly viscous. This led to development of a special mining technique for obtaining the oil, the extra cost being justified on the grounds that heavy oil of this type is particularly suitable for certain uses in the north. The refinery is at Ukhta itself, on the Pechora railway (Shishkin, 1959). Output figures have not been released, but are believed to have reached 1200 000 metric tons a year during World War II, but to have dropped in 1950 to 800 000 and in 1955 to 553 000 (Hassmann, 1953; Hodgkins, 1961). In the post-war period natural gas production was encouraged and it reached in 1960 about 1100 million m. per year (Rochev, 1961).

The northern sea route today

Abstract 1. 1. Outline of typical recent seasons operations; freighting pattern, equipment employed, length of season. 2. 2. Current uses for the route: routine resupply, including to some inland areas; bringing out raw materials (minerals, timber); bringing in fuel and manufactured goods, including river craft; absence of significant through traffic. 3. 3. Future prospects: greater use for resupply, including to inland areas where routes from the south cannot be expanded; enlarging through traffic; possibility of year-round navigation; prospects in the central polar basin opened by Arktika voyage to North Pole in 1977; importance for offshore oil recovery in Kara Sea; possible effect of change in ice conditions, arising either naturally or through change in river run-of.