Theodore R. Sarbin

A Contribution to the Study of Actuarial and Individual Methods of Prediction

Are predictions of conduct more accurate when made by case-study methods than by actuarial methods? This study is an experimental rather than a polemical attempt to determine the relative accuary of the two modes of prediction. A restricted form of behavior-academic success-was predicted from clinical (case-study) material and from a previously derived regression equation. The correlation coefficients demonstrate that the case-study method which presumably accounts for an innumerable asortment of variables is no more accurate than a simple statistical method which accounts for only two variables. Analysis of the predictions suggests that the case-study method takes behavior segments with known predictive weights and applies other weights which are less efficient. Case-study predictions-at least on the grounds of efficiency-should not be substituted for actuarial predictions. As a complement to the actuarial predictions, the clinical predictions add nothing. The posibility of generelizing to the prediction of other kinds of critera is discussed.

HYPNOSIS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A CONTEXTUALIST

We set out to formulate a theory that makes counterexpectational conduct expectational. Our contextualist position has led us to the dramaturgical perspective. This perspective guided our examination of the hypnotic performance, and we noted that both the hypnotist and the subject are actors, both enmeshed in a dramatic plot, both striving to enhance their credibility. The dramatistic concepts of actor and spectator helped us make sense of the contradictory self-reports in Hilgards analgesia studies. We underscore the proposition (long overlooked) that the counterfactual statements in the hypnotists induction are cues to the subject that a dramatistic plot is in the making. The subject may respond to the cues as an invitation to join in the miniature drama. If he accepts the invitation, he will employ whatever skills he possesses in order to enhance his credibility in enacting the role of hypnotized person. This proposition emphasizes the need for analyzing the implied social communications contained in any interaction.

Nonvolition in Hypnosis: A Semiotic Analysis

Heeding the counsel of the late J. R. Kantor, I conceptualize hypnosis as an interesting conversation and that the interactants are performing social roles. From this perspective, I apply a semiotic analysis to one of the puzzles of hypnosis: the disclaimer of agency by some subjects.I show that the hypnosis monologue is a grand metaphor, the literal and figurative terms of which are tacit and must be construed by the subject. Three kinds of construals are identified, one of which facilitates the disclaimer of agency. The subjects who disclaim agency fit the criteria for self-deception. I put forth two notions to aid our understanding of how one goes about the difficult task of deceiving oneself: (a) the compelling features of the self-narrative, and (b) the adoption of a metaphysical posture such that the disclaimer of agency does not appear irrational to the actor.

Some evidence in support of the role-taking hypothesis in hypnosis.

Abstract A study was designed to test the hypothesis that hypnosis is a form of role-taking behavior. Independent measures of hypnotizability and role-taking ability were found to be significantly related.

The Dimensionality Of The CPI Socialization Scale And An Empirically Derived Typology Among Delinquent And Nondelinquent Boys

The 64 items of the CPI So scale were cluster analyzed in a sample of 318 males into 3 main dimensions: C-1-Stable home and school adjustment versus waywardness and dissatisfaction with family; C-2-Optimism and trust in others versus dysphoria, distrust and alienation; C-3-Observation of convention versus asocial role and attitude. The initial sample was comprised of 84 school disciplinary problems (DP), 75 institutionalized delinquents (D), and 169 nondelinquent (ND) boys. A cross-validational sample included 121 ND versus 121 D boys. Each of the 3 clusters differen- tiated significantly between D and ND subsamples. From an inverse cluster analysis of the initial 318 boys over the 3 cluster dimensions, 11 types were generated. Four of these were diagnostic of delinquency, 6 of nondelinquency, and 1 pertained primarily to the intermediate criterion group of school disciplinary problems.

On the futility of psychiatric diagnostic manuals (DSMs) and the return of personal agency

Abstract This article critiques the most recent version of the American Psychiatric Associations (1994) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV). After pointing to the procedures employed in constructing the Manual, I note that unreliability of diagnosis is still a major problem and, more important, little attention has been paid to validity. Based on the mechanistic Kraepelinian model, the Manual contributes to the increasing medicalization of distress and directs clinicians to search for causes of unwanted behavior in biochemical anomalies. The person as agent is not part of the DSM diagnostic program. As an alternative to the DSM-IV, I propose a contextualist approach to understanding unwanted conduct. The person is treated as an agent who employs strategic actions to maintain a self-narrative. Strategic actions that fail to influence relevant others to supply warrants of social validation become the targets of clinical interventions.

Worldmaking, Self and Identity

Both papers, Chandler (2000) and Shotter (2000), are concerned with ‘worldmaking’. Chandler focuses on the relationship between cultural vitality and the development of robust identities; Shotter, following Vygotsky and Goethe, focuses on the features that enable people to construct acceptable identities. Time conceptions are implicit in Chandler’s contribution; they are more explicit in Shotter’s paper emphasizing how research should be carried out. The latter paper leads to the suggestion that we construe time with metaphors other than those used to describe the spatial world.

On Self‐Deception

T H E P O I N T OF DEPARTURE for this conference is the Clever Hans story. Because the story was written as a scientific treatise, the horse’s trainer, Herr von Osten, appears primarily as a stimulus object. Scientists observed and recorded Herr von Osten’s postural movements and concluded that such movements were signals to the horse to tap his hoof. Although not entirely neglected in the scientific write-up, Herr von Osten’s unshakable belief in the horse’s human-like rationality received only brief notice. Both Stumpfl and Pfungst2 declared that von Osten was not a trickster nor a swindler; rather they settled on a diagnosis of self-deception. Although in its naked form, the term “self-deception” contains a contradiction, it continues to be widely used to denote states of affairs similar to that of Herr von Osten in the Clever Hans story. Herr von Osten held to his anthropomorphic belief in the horse’s rationality in the face of adverse evidence presented by respectable and responsible scientists. Parenthetically, one should note that anthropomorphism is a rather common human belief, and Herr von Osten’s apparent espousal of anthropomorphic doctrine was not taken by his contemporaries as a sign of senile dementia (nor should it have been). My aim in this paper is to illuminate the conduct frequently labeled self-deception. Von Osten is an appropriate example. To show that the phenomenon is not unique, I will identify several additional examples taken from experimental and field studies. These examples, taken together, serve both as a working definition of self-deception and a framework for a sketch of previous attempts to come to grips with the problem. At the end of my paper, I offer a theoretical statement about self-deception based on the narrative as the root-metaphor for knowing.

The Social Psychology of “Hallucinations”

Two experiments are reported. In the first, psychiatric patients “hallucinate” the taste of salt in distilled water significantly less often than college students. In the second, psychiatric patients are compared to medical patients for susceptibility to “auditory hallucinations” and the data (although not significant) follow the same trend. It is argued that these results would be predicted neither by psychophysics nor by psychiatry but can be understood only in terms of the meaning of the social situation in which the actions take place.

On the belief that one body may be host to two or more personalities

The belief in the validity of the multiple personality concept is discussed in this article. Two scaffolding constructions are analyzed: dissociation and repression. As generally employed, these constructions grant no agency to the multiple personality patient. The claim is made that the conduct of interest arises in discourse, usually with the therapist as the discourse partner. In reviewing the history of multiple personality and the writings of current advocates, it becomes clear that contemporary users of the multiple personality disorder diagnosis participate in a subculture with its own set of myths, one of which is the autonomous actions of mental faculties. Of special significance is the readiness to transfigure imaginings into rememberings of child abuse, leading ultimately to the manufacture of persons. The implications for both therapy and theory of regarding the patient as agent in place of the belief that the contranormative conduct is under the control of mentalistic faculties are discussed.