Thomas A. Marks

Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?

Scholars disagree on the prevailing focus on insurgent ideology. Some claim that the dominant Marxist ideology of the Cold War era has been supplanted by a new focus on ethnic and national identity. Others claim that many insurgencies were always focused on identity, but the Cold War and superpower antipathies distorted perceptions of insurgencies as politically-economically focused. Yet the heart of the matter is that analysts are not faced with an ‘either/or’ proposition.

Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics: Comparing Peru and Nepal1

Terrorism is not insurgency, though the latter invariably incorporates the former in its campaign to form a counter-state. Maoist ‘peoples war’ has proved such a challenge to state response precisely because it incorporates terror as a tactic within the larger voluntarist effort ‘to make a revolution’. Examining this dynamic in two cases of Maoist insurgency, Peru and Nepal, produces two conclusions of particular relevance for states and policymakers: in anticipating internal violence, voluntarism is as critical a component as objective circumstances, with deliberate action actually able to shape those circumstances in a weak state setting. Further, inappropriate state response is itself a key factor in contributing to this dynamic. The implications are sobering in an era when states worldwide are attempting the difficult transition to democracy even as they are challenged by development demands exacerbated by heightened popular expectations. In such settings, terror is able to tip the scales in situations which otherwise would hang in the balance, thus allowing voluntarist actors to engage in activity not unlike that envisaged in foco theory, where Ché Guevara posited that guerrilla action itself could produce the conditions for the revolution.

Making Revolution with Shining Path

Many gaps remain in our understanding of insurgency.1 Perhaps the most vexing is that we continue to comprehend only imperfectly the manner in which would-be revolutionaries are able to garner support. This is particularly true of movements such as Shining Path (SL or Sendero) that engage in practices which would seemingly alienate potential followers. It remains virtually an article of faith that to achieve success, an insurgent movement must win the “hearts and minds” of the people. The clandestine mechanisms of rebellion, continues the argument, are so dependent on popular assistance that they cannot possibly survive in an environment where the populace is controlled through repression.

Colombian army counterinsurgency

In the virtual absence ofsocietal involvement and governmentleadership, the Army of Colombia (COLAR)responded to the insurgency of theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) during the Pasrana presidency with a combination of organizationaland operational innovation that hasreversed the previous unfavorablesituation. COLAR has assessed FARCs weakpoint as its relatively underdevelopedpolitical structure. This allowedconcentration upon the key insurgentgenerators of power, the base complexes andmobility corridors. This strategy wassuccessful in forcing FARC mobilewarfare back to the guerrilla stage but wasunable to advance further due tosignificant shortcomings in operationalfunding and equipment – notably air assetsin a country the size of California,Nevada, Utah, and Idaho. Ironically, FARCremained extraordinarily vulnerable even asBogot´ refused to engage in asystematic counterinsurgency campaign,instead leaving the task of besting theguerrillas to the security forces.

Taliban and Anti-Taliban

Few topics have aroused as much recent controversy as the precise standing of Pakistan with respect to the various insurgent and terrorist groups of South Asia. Farhat Taj, a Pakistani journalist who has worked recently in Europe, falls emphatically into the camp which finds Pakistan implicated – specifically, InterServices Intelligence (ISI) – in much that is both deplorable and decidedly nasty. What makes the book worth perusing is that rather than ISI’s alleged actions in India or Afghanistan, Taj discusses ISI-sponsored violence against fellow Pakistanis in tribal areas of contention, FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) and Waziristan. Taj is from the former, and she uses her linguistic and regional competence to journey deep into the conflicts she assesses in order to make a number of startling assertions. Among these are: (1) Some of theWest’s most cited accounts involving FATA and Waziristan, authored by well known academics, suffer from an embarrassing lack of first-hand experience, as well as an unwarranted privileging of Pakistani (as opposed to tribal) sources. (2) The result is a consistent line which claims the tribal peoples have welcomed and provided sanctuary for violent radical extremists, when in reality it is these same tribals who are overwhelmingly victims of and have endeavored to resist the extremists. (3) Time and again, tribal efforts to mount self-defense have been betrayed by the Pakistani military and ISI. (4) The result is entire areas where traditional leaders and structures have been eliminated, allowing terrorist and insurgent groups to dominate economic, social, and political facets of tribal life. The indictment is damning. Taj ‘names names’, cites dates, establishes localities, and is withering in her highlighting of the sheer improbability that ‘chance’ is at work as her subjects are often killed during the very process of her interacting with them. The common denominator is that they have endeavored to collaborate with the authorities in resisting the intrusion of armed radicals into their midst. There can be no doubt the process she details is at work. The challenge lies in bringing the circle round. For the numerous facts and incidents are overwhelmingly a chronicle of brutalization and victimization. And the survivors indeed finger ISI as involved. Yet there is very little which actually ties ISI (or Pakistani regulars) to the incidents in any manner that would hold up before skeptical interrogation. This is unfortunate, since there is nodoubt as to thepressingnatureof the subject under consideration. Media attention has certainly fanned the condemnatory fires

Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security’

Building upon a far-reaching reform movement carried out during the administration of Andres Pastrana (1998–2002), the Colombian military emerged in the Alvaro Uribe first term (2002–06) as a powerful, flexible organization capable of implementing a national strategy for successful counterinsurgency. Sweeping organizational change was accompanied by advances in operational art and tactics, as well as the promotion of new leadership tested in combat. A growing maturity in civil–military relations enabled national advances in democratic politics, economic progress and state integration, the latter to a degree unprecedented in Colombian history.

Counterinsurgency and Operational Art

Addressing insurgency requires the same application of operational art as utilized in conventional warfare planning. Counterinsurgency strategy will be driven by the nature of the insurgent movement, with campaigns constructed to use tactics appropriately so that key facets of the insurgent campaign are neutralized. It is especially important to determine whether terror is used as a tactic (a method of action) by an insurgency or as a stand-alone strategy (a logic of action) by a challenger divorced from a mass base. Insurgencies, in turn, will normally emphasize strategically either winning allegiance of the target population or using violence as a substitute for other methods. Each of these approaches requires the weighting of the appropriate campaign elements of the counterinsurgency strategy. Sri Lanka, having faced both approaches, is an especially useful case study.

Evaluating insurgent/counterinsurgent performance

Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance ‘starts on the streets’, so to speak. Specifically, the five rules of assessment are common sense: (1) become familiar with the area in question; (2) slice up the analytical target into manageable slices; (3) carry out longitudinal studies; (4) look at the role played by ideas in this political warfare; and (5) assess the relationship between structural and purposive elements. Though various efforts have been made to quantify outcome, these have not been particularly successful and encourage emphasis upon process at the expense of analysis. The most common flaw in assessments is to view insurgency in static perspective. Societal causes are a necessary but not sufficient factor in upheaval. Once the insurgency becomes a going concern, organizational dynamics become important. Similar factors obtain on the counter‐insurgent side. In the end, both compete for domination of human terrain.

Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016

Abstract During the period 1996–2006, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged overt people’s war to seize state power and institute a new order that realized the party’s understanding of ‘New Democracy’ as posited by Mao Tse-tung. Contextual shifts led to a crucial strategic turning point in September 2005, when the Maoists agreed to a united front with estranged legal parties to oust the monarchy and establish a republic. Though touted as acceptance of political reintegration, the move was tactical rather than strategic. The party had no intention of supporting a parliamentary version of democracy and thus, 2006–2016, engaged in a covert effort to seize power. Central to this effort was the paramilitary Young Communist League (YCL), the members of which responded to inflammatory party verbiage and exhortations with attacks upon rival political actors. These attacks, academically and legally, were terrorism and offered a salient illustration of intra-state unrestricted warfare. Ultimately, organizational, national, and regional circumstances caused the main Maoist movement to move decisively away from its covert approach. By that time, however, radical splinters had embraced the use of terrorism against rival political actors, creating a situation whereby local politics is yet a dangerous endeavor in certain areas and at certain times.

Colombia: Changing strategy amidst the struggle

From 1965 to the present, Colombia has been confronted by the insurgency of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The threat reached a new level in 1996 with the advent of mobile warfare, whereby large units sought to neutralize the military in an effort to seize power and institute a Marxist-Leninist regime. Unlike Vietnam, what followed was a regaining of the strategic initiative by the government and a decimation of the insurgent threat. This was accomplished with US assistance but from first to last was driven by Colombian leadership and strategy. The strategy which led to this signal change, ‘Democratic Security’, unfolded under the leadership of President Álvaro Uribe. It was a civil–military partnership, which sought to expand the writ of Colombian democracy to all elements of society. Securing the population provided the shield behind which economic, social, and political life could occur as driven by the will of the people. It was the agreement upon legitimacy as the strategic goal and reform as the route to that goal which allowed the Colombians and the Americans to work so well together.