Thomas C. Walker

The Perils of Paradigm Mentalities: Revisiting Kuhn, Lakatos, and Popper

A common theme in the Centennial Issue of the American Political Science Review was how subfields have grown more specialized and insulated from one another. In this essay I argue that this trend has been hastened by the inappropriate incorporation of paradigm mentalities, first presented by Thomas Kuhn and later developed by Imre Lakatos. I show how paradigm mentalities help justifyrigidoppositiontotheoreticalalternativesandlimitcriticalinsight.Whileparadigmmentalitiesmaybefittingfordisciplines that demonstrate Kuhn’s concrete scientific achievements, they constrain the study of political science and international relations in particular. I begin with a primer that compares Kuhn and Lakatos to Karl Popper. Next, I point to harmful consequences resulting from applying paradigm mentalities to the study of international relations. Among these is the tendency to act as if realism has earned the status of a paradigm and then invoke criteria of incommensurability and “subsumption” to deflect criticism. I conclude by discussing how Popper’s model of science provides a better platform for the study of politics by encouraging theoretical and methodological pluralism.

History and politics

If Hegels famous definition, Weltseele zu Pfer? de, can be applied without fear of hyperbole to a historical figure, it can surely be applied to Alexander the Great. True, the German philoso? pher coined this epithet for Napoleon, whom he had glimpsed on horseback after the battle of Jena, and indeed it also fits the empereur, too, for without his actions, and the reactions they caused, modern Europe is inconceivable. In the same way the Hellenistic oikumene and its offshoots, the universality of the Roman Empire and Christianity, are in the end inconceivable without Alexanders revolutionary impact in many fields. It was a revolution ? as momentous for subsequent life and thought as the discovery of America and the demonstration that our universe is not geocentric... ? (Moses Hadas). The fact is that few exceptional personalities belonging to mankinds past have aroused such enthusiasm in biographers and historians as Alexan? der, the son of another figure of historical stature, Philip of Macedon. Witness the famous Einleitung, having all the character of a fervent hymn, that precedes the Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen by J.G. Droysen (1835), a book which, though superseded in many of its details, still stands out as a memorable historical exposition and above all a work of art, overshadowing many subsequent monographs which appear feeble and often pedantic in comparison. This is true, for instance, if only partially so, of the picture of this age and leader drawn by K.J. Beloch (Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., vols. III and IV, 1922-1927). According to this author, Alexander was neither a great statesman nor a great strategist, for it is argued that the bulk of his political successes are to be attributed to his father, Philip, and that his three decisive victories over the Persians are really due to the strategical genius of Parmenion. Yet despite these evident prejudices, stemming from a rationalistic ? professorial? aversion to that brilliance that transcends all ?normal? human standards, we are indebted to Belochs sober criticism for having clarified many details. Above all, he placed the incisive historical role of Philip, heralding the achievements of his son and heir, in true perspective, and pointed to the essential part the above-mentioned Macedonian general had in the military feats of the young king during the first half of his rule.

Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies

List of Figures and Tables Ch. 2 When Does Conquest Pay? Ch. 3 Nazi-Occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944 Ch. 4 Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918 Ch. 5 The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924 Ch. 6 The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945 Ch. 7 The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989 Ch. 8 The Spoils of Conquest Notes Works Cited Index