Thomas F. Corbet

Inter-infrastructure modeling — Ports and telecommunications

During the past year, Bell Laboratories and Sandia National Laboratories have been modeling and simulating cross-industry interactions between infrastructures and the cascading of impacts under disruption scenarios. Critical national infrastructures for importing and exporting goods and materials (e.g., seaboard shipping through ports on the U.S. East and West Coasts) require the support of other industries to conduct business. For example, ports rely on the grid of information networks (voice, data, Internet) to communicate; they also rely on the power grid to operate machinery and the transportation grid to distribute the goods and materials. While information networks, power networks, and transportation networks tend to be highly reliable, disruptions can lead to extended outages requiring days/weeks to repair. These outages can cause shutdown of port operations, resulting in severe financial losses for the economy. This paper describes just one of those inter-infrastructure dependencies: by simulating a port and the interactions with the telecommunications infrastructure, it describes the impacts on both the flow of goods and materials through ports and the economic impact on the ports under a telecommunications disruption scenario.

Natural gas network resiliency to a "shakeout scenario" earthquake.

A natural gas network model was used to assess the likely impact of a scenario San Andreas Fault earthquake on the natural gas network. Two disruption scenarios were examined. The more extensive damage scenario assumes the disruption of all three major corridors bringing gas into southern California. If withdrawals from the Aliso Canyon storage facility are limited to keep the amount of stored gas within historical levels, the disruption reduces Los Angeles Basin gas supplies by 50%. If Aliso Canyon withdrawals are only constrained by the physical capacity of the storage system to withdraw gas, the shortfall is reduced to 25%. This result suggests that it is important for stakeholders to put agreements in place facilitating the withdrawal of Aliso Canyon gas in the event of an emergency.

Simulating Impacts of Disruptions to Liquid Fuels Infrastructure

This report presents a methodology for estimating the impacts of events that damage or disrupt liquid fuels infrastructure. The impact of a disruption depends on which components of the infrastructure are damaged, the time required for repairs, and the position of the disrupted components in the fuels supply network. Impacts are estimated for seven stressing events in regions of the United States, which were selected to represent a range of disruption types. For most of these events the analysis is carried out using the National Transportation Fuels Model (NTFM) to simulate the system-level liquid fuels sector response. Results are presented for each event, and a brief cross comparison of event simulation results is provided.

A demand-driven, capacity-constrained, adaptive algorithm for computing steady-state and transient flows in a petroleum transportation network.

We developed an algorithm to perform simulations of a supply network for crude oil and refined products in order to estimate the consequences of disruptions to components of the network. Components include oil fields, import terminals, refineries, transmission pipelines, tank farms, and distribution terminals. The physical system is represented as network connections, capacities, and inventories. The governing equations describe mass balance in a non-linear diffusive system in which flows in the network are along gradients in a potential field. Each node in the network has a defined storage capacity and desired storage amount. The potential at each node is a function of the difference between the actual and desired amount of fluid stored. The potential can be thought of as the balance between the desire to increase inflows to maintain the desired storage level and the willingness to provide fluid for consumption or outflow to downstream nodes.

A model for simulating adaptive, dynamic flows on networks: Application to petroleum infrastructure

Simulation models can improve decisions meant to control the consequences of disruptions to critical infrastructures. We describe a dynamic flow model on networks purposed to inform analyses by those concerned about consequences of disruptions to infrastructures and to help policy makers design robust mitigations. We conceptualize the adaptive responses of infrastructure networks to perturbations as market transactions and business decisions of operators. We approximate commodity flows in these networks by a diffusion equation, with nonlinearities introduced to model capacity limits. To illustrate the behavior and scalability of the model, we show its application first on two simple networks, then on petroleum infrastructure in the United States, where we analyze the effects of a hypothesized earthquake.

Earthquake warning system for infrastructures : a scoping analysis.

This report provides the results of a scoping study evaluating the potential risk reduction value of a hypothetical, earthquake early-warning system. The study was based on an analysis of the actions that could be taken to reduce risks to population and infrastructures, how much time would be required to take each action and the potential consequences of false alarms given the nature of the action. The results of the scoping analysis indicate that risks could be reduced through improving existing event notification systems and individual responses to the notification; and production and utilization of more detailed risk maps for local planning. Detailed maps and training programs, based on existing knowledge of geologic conditions and processes, would reduce uncertainty in the consequence portion of the risk analysis. Uncertainties in the timing, magnitude and location of earthquakes and the potential impacts of false alarms will present major challenges to the value of an early-warning system.

Phoenix : Complex Adaptive System of Systems (CASoS) engineering version 1.0.

Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems, or CASoS, are vastly complex ecological, sociological, economic and/or technical systems which we must understand to design a secure future for the nation and the world. Perturbations/disruptions in CASoS have the potential for far-reaching effects due to pervasive interdependencies and attendant vulnerabilities to cascades in associated systems. Phoenix was initiated to address this high-impact problem space as engineers. Our overarching goals are maximizing security, maximizing health, and minimizing risk. We design interventions, or problem solutions, that influence CASoS to achieve specific aspirations. Through application to real-world problems, Phoenix is evolving the principles and discipline of CASoS Engineering while growing a community of practice and the CASoS engineers to populate it. Both grounded in reality and working to extend our understanding and control of that reality, Phoenix is at the same time a solution within a CASoS and a CASoS itself.