Thomas H. Deaton

A note on political participation as consumption behavior

ConclusionIn this paper we have isolated the impact that changes in the relative price of voting have on political participation by finding the residual between the gross effect and the pure income effect. The results obtained by this procedure indicate that the substitution effect is negative. In sum, our findings suggest that political participation is a superior good in the sense that total consumption increases with income, even if the price rises proportionately; but that this rate of growth is no where near as fast as it would be with a fixed price, and therefore the substitution effect curves in the usual way. This leaves the basic mystery of why participation rises with income intact, but it at least eliminates one of the subsidiary problems.

Macroeconomic Determinants of the Vote in Presidential Elections

In a 1971 paper Kramer attempted to establish empirically that macroeconomic variables have a significant impact on the vote shares received by Democratic and Republican congressional candidates. He found mixed results, with the growth rate in per capita real income and the inflation rate being important determinants of vote shares, and with the unemployment rate being statistically unimportant. Subsequent studies in this area have also found mixed and some times conflicting results. By using levels of macroeconomic variables rather than rates of change and by examining vote shares in presidential rather than congressional elections, m this paper we were able to detect a consistent and statistically significant relationship between macroeconomic variables and the vote by party in presidential elections.

Rational choice and the taxation of sin

Abstract The traditional literature on sumptuary taxation indicates that these taxes are the results of a majority of individuals imposing their moral code upon consumers of goods that are thought to be undesirable. Undoubtedly, this explanation is not trivial, and accounts for the existence of some of the present sumptuary taxes. This paper has developed a choice model of sumptuary taxes based on a wealth-maximization assumption that illustrates the possibility that an individual could approve of an excise tax on a good that he consumes.

The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy

The size and number of political interest groups is analyzed using the firm-industry framework of standard microeconomic theory. The model allows for the entry and exit of interest groups in the interest-group industry, as well as adjustments in the size of individual interest groups. The structural characteristics of the market for legislation (i.e., the costs of procuring influence) drives these adjustments in political coalitions and interest groups. Empirical evidence on the relationship of coalition adjustments to changes in various characteristics of legislatures is provided using data on U.S. states.