Thomas M. Alexander

Educating the Democratic Heart: Pluralism, Traditions and the Humanities

Though Dewey is frequently recalled primarily as an educational theorist, it would be better to remember him as a philosopher who located every aspect of his thought within the general problematic of the nature and purpose of the democratic life. Dewey’s theory of education is guided by his conception of what a democratic culture must be. Every political and educational theory reflects fundamental commitments about human nature and what constitutes a well-lived or meaningful life. In this essay, I intend to sketch a portrait of Dewey’s ideal of democratic culture in light of recent debates on the role of the humanities and the need for cultural traditions, the place of “pluralistic” education within this debate, and ultimately the character of the cultural imagination which is at the heart of democratic civilization. Contrary to the scientistic interpretations of Dewey, I will argue that the humanistic and aesthetic values are central. We cannot dismiss the importance of traditions in the name of pluralism; nor can we dismiss pluralism for a monolithic tradition. Democracy requires a tradition of pluralism that goes beyond mere toleration of diversity or knowing a smattering of superficial details about various subcultures. Pluralism involves a rigorous, deep and wide exposure to the dimension of human symbolization and the ultimate aim of civilization.

The Technology of Desire: John Dewey, Social Criticism, and The Aesthetics of Human Existence

In an important essay, “Science and Society,” Dewey makes this observation: “The significant outward forms of the civilization of the western world are the product of the machine and technology.” Later on he adds, “We are forced to consider the relation of human ideas and ideals to the social consequences which are produced by science as an instrument. The problem involved is the greatest civilization has had to face.”1 In many ways this stands as a statement of the central theme of Dewey’s own work, which takes a very complex attitude toward the problem stated and weaves an equally complex answer. Indeed, of the major twentiethcentury thinkers, Dewey is the only one to take the question of technology as central — unless one includes Martin Heidegger’s work, which stands, whatever qualifications are made, as a negative reaction to technological civilization.2 One of the advantages of Dewey’s work, in fact, is the complex way Dewey approaches “the greatest problem civilization has had to face,” and offers what may be the only possible response other than fatalism or blind faith in the consequences of industrial civilization. It will be the primary purpose of this essay to indicate how deep Dewey’s vision was of technology’s relation to the end of producing a context in which human life can be lived fully and intelligently. For Dewey, only when the final aesthetic ends of human existence are acknowledged can technology itself become “responsible.”3 In addition to clearing up some misconceptions about Dewey’s instrumentalism, I wish to stress the importance of the ideas of art and social intelligence in Dewey’s understanding of technology.

Thinking in place: Comments on Scott Pratt's Native Pragmatism

Native Pragmatism by Scott Pratt joins a small but significant body of work by philosophers dealing with Native American thought. It is one of the first major works by a professional philosopher to address directly the question of Native American Philosophy since 1953, when The World’s Rim by Hartley Burr Alexander appeared, fourteen years after his death. There have been of course, philosophical works on Native American subjects by people outside professional philosophy itself, including many works by Native writers, like Vine Deloria Jr., or by anthropologists like Dennis Tedlock. But the problems and issues of Native people writing about their own traditions or of anthropologists writing about other peoples’ traditions are different from those of philosophers. First, at the core of Western philosophy’s own “myth” of its origins is that it begins with a rejection of myth and its “tradition” has been to critique tradition. Thus world-views that operate comfortably within the symbolism of myth and exhibit reverence toward tradition are almost excommunicate from the start. Second, Anglo-American philosophy has so over-whelmed other modes of reflective praxis in the English-speaking world with its various scientistic paradigms, that anything dealing with deep issues of embedded cultural thinking, philosophical anthropology, or pluralistic modes of meaning and rationality are not even on the “map” of Philosophy. Finally, there is the subculture of “American Philosophy” which has its own myth and tradition of its origins within European philosophy and which has, in spite of its commitments to pluralism, “lived experience,” and culturally contextualized reflection, resisted the idea of “Native American Philosophy” as part of its own project. Native Pragmatism is a direct challenge to this last set of assumptions, as will be evident as I give a synopsis of the book’s main arguments and appeals to evidence. Before I do so, I want to ask you to reflect a moment on what it means to “do” philosophy here in North America—that is to say upon the ground of a holocaust far more dreadful than any seen since. Is it not “disembodied” in time and place to pretend

Eros and Spirit: Toward a Humanistic Philosophy of Culture

“philosophy and civilization” is one of Dewey’s most important— and most neglected—essays. It is unsettling to anyone who wants to think of Dewey primarily as a “pragmatist.” Dewey says the aim of philosophy should be to deal with the meaning of culture and not “inquiry” or “truth”: “Meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth and philosophy is occupied with meaning rather than with truth” (LW 3:4).1 Truths are one kind of meaning, but they are only an “island” lying in “the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant. We do not inquire whether Greek civilization was true or false, but we are immensely concerned to penetrate its meaning,” he adds, and continues,“In philosophy we are dealing with something comparable to the meaning of Athenian civilization or of a drama or a lyric” (LW 3:5). He concludes by saying: