Thomas Markussen
University of Copenhagen
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Publication
Featured researches published by Thomas Markussen.
Journal of Development Studies | 2006
Thomas Barnebeck Andersen; Henrik Hansen; Thomas Markussen
Abstract This paper studies the role of US political factors in the allocation of World Bank concessional lending, where US political interests are proxied by voting similarity in the United Nations General Assembly on issues identified as important by the US Department of State. In contrast to previous studies we find that the US exerted a significant influence on IDA lending during the period 1993–2000. We demonstrate that the influence was both statistically as well as economically significant. Finally, we demonstrate that our result is robust with respect to the omission of the IDA Country Performance Rating index.
Journal of Development Studies | 2011
Thomas Markussen
Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.
The Economic Journal | 2014
Thomas Markussen; Ernesto Reuben; Jean-Robert Tyran
The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
Vienna Economics Papers | 2011
Thomas Markussen; Louis Putterman; Jean-Robert Tyran
Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal choice of a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Most groups adopt formal sanctions when they are of deterrent magnitude and cost a small fraction (10%) of the potential surplus. Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction, however, most groups choose informal sanctions when formal sanctions are more costly (40% of the surplus). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions.
Archive | 2009
Thomas Markussen; Finn Tarp; Katleen Van den Broeck
Studies of land property rights usually focus on tenure security and transfer rights. Rights to determine how to use the land are regularly ignored. However, in transition economies such as Vietnam and China, user rights are often limited. Relying on a unique Vietnamese panel data set at both household and plot level, we show that crop choice restrictions are widespread and prevent crop diversification. Restrictions do not decrease household income, but restricted households work harder, and there are indications that they are supplied with higher quality inputs. Our findings are consistent with the view that the Vietnamese government has managed to intervene effectively in agricultural (rice) production to promote output and food security. At the same time, it is now time to carefully consider the potential benefits of a more diversified crop pattern.
European Economic Review | 2016
Thomas Markussen; Louis Putterman; Jean-Robert Tyran
Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I errors, even full contributors to the public good may be punished. With type II errors, free riders may go unpunished. We find that judicial error undermines cooperation and that the effects of type I and II errors are symmetric. To investigate their relative (dis-)like for error, we let subjects choose what type of error to prevent. By use of an incentive-compatible mechanism, we find that subjects prefer type II over type I errors. We find that the strength of this preference is fully in line with a motive to maximize income and does not indicate any additional psychological or fairness bias against type I errors.
Archive | 2010
Thomas Markussen; Jean-Robert Tyran
We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our model because voters cannot easily tell benevolent from egoistic candidates by observing their pre-election behavior. Egoistic types may strategically imitate benevolent types in the pre-election stage to extract rents once in office. We show that strategic imitation is less likely if the political system is likely to produce good governance. That is, if benevolent candidates are common, if the president has little discretionary power, and if the public sector is effective. We analyze the role of institutions like investigative media and re-election and show that they can improve or further hamper political selection, depending on the parameters of the political game.
European Journal of Political Economy | 2011
Thomas Markussen
The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political competition how the private provision of public goods is affected when it is embedded in a system of democracy and redistributive taxation. Results show that the positive effect of inequality on public goods production, which Olson (1965) pointed to, is weakened and might even be reversed in this context. Also, the median voter may choose a negative tax rate, even if he is poorer than the mean, in order to stimulate public goods production. The relevance of the model is illustrated with an application to the finance of higher education.
Archive | 2013
Luu Due Khai; Thomas Markussen; Simon McCoy; Finn Tarp
By applying a unified framework, this book examines the impact of land tenure reforms on poverty reduction and natural resource management in countries in Africa and Asia with highly diverse historical contexts. These land tenure reforms include Land-to-the-tiller policies, Market assisted land redistribution reforms, Tenure security enhancing low-cost reforms, Forest tenure reforms and the Needed future reforms related to the recent sharp increase in demand for agricultural land in Africa. The Land-to-the-tiller reforms did not produce the intended impacts but rather enhanced tenure insecurity, undermined the efficiency of land rental markets and access to land for land-poor households. Market-assisted land redistribution reforms face many design and political challenges and have in many cases not been scaled up in a good way. Low-cost tenure security enhancing reforms have recently been scaled up in a number of countries with positive initial impacts. Individual ownership of forestland is preferred in some contexts while communal tenure manages forest resources effectively in other contexts.
Archive | 2011
Thomas Markussen; Kitavi Mbuvi
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.