Thomas Pitz

Experiments and Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour

The paper reports laboratory experiments with a two route choice scenario. In each session 18 subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity of M was larger. Feedback was given in treatment I only on the subjects’ own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for M and S. The main results are as follows: • Mean numbers on M and S are near to pure equilibrium. • Fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions. • The total number of changes is significantly greater in treatment I. • Subjects’ road changes and payoffs are negatively correlated. • A direct response mode results in more changes for bad payoffs whereas a contrary response mode shows opposite reactions. • Simulations of an extended payoff sum learning model fits the main results of the statistical evaluation of the data.

Experimental Investigation of Day-to-Day Route Choice Behaviour

The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6 on S. Two treatments with 6 sessions each were run at the computerized Laboratory of Experimental Economics at Bonn University using RatImage [1]. Feedback was given in treatment I only about own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for M and S. Money payoffs increase with decreasing time. The main results are as follows: Though mean numbers on M and S are very near to the equilibrium, fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions in both treatments. The Fluctuations are smaller under treatment II. The effect is small but significant. The total number of changes is significantly greater in treatment I. Two response modes can be observed: A direct response mode reacts with more changes for bad payoffs whereas a contrary response mode shows opposite reactions. Subjects’ road changes and payoffs are negatively correlated in all sessions.

At the Mercy of the Prisoner Next Door: Using an Experimental Measure of Selfishness as a Criminological Tool

Do criminals maximise money? Are criminals more or less selfish than the average subject? Can prisons apply measures that reduce the degree of selfishness of their inmates? Using a tried and tested tool from experimental economics, we cast new light on these old criminological questions. In a standard dictator game, prisoners give a substantial amount, which calls for more refined versions of utility in rational choice theories of crime. Prisoners do not give less than average subjects, not even than subjects from other closely knit communities. This speaks against the idea that people commit crimes because they are excessively selfish. Finally those who receive better marks at prison school give more, as do those who improve their marks over time. This suggests that this correctional intervention also reduces selfishness.

The Tobin Tax - A Game-Theoretical and an Experimental Approach

In the nineteenseventies, James Tobin suggested the introduction of a transaction tax on the currency market to cope with exchange rate volatility. We investigate the consequences of the introduction of such a tax on an asset market model from a game-theoretic and an experimental point of view. Our main results include in respect to our model that contrary to the situation in game-theoretic equilibrium, the Tobin tax i) reduces trade volume, ii) reduces volatility, iii) increases market efficiency, and iv) decreases earnings inequality.

Experiments on Route Choice Behaviour

The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6 on S.

Minority Game - Experiments and Simulations

The paper reports laboratory experiments on a minority game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a road A and a road B. Nine subjects participated in each session. Subjects played 100 rounds and had to choose between one of both roads. The road which the minority of players chose got positive payoffs. Two treatments with 6 sessions each were run at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at Bonn University. Feedback was given in treatment I only about own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for road A and road B.

Experimental Investigation of a Two Route Scenario with Construction Areas

The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes and alternating construction areas on both routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was in every period greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In periods without construction areas the equilibrium is 12 players on M and 6 players on S. In periods with construction areas on M the equilibrium is 10 players on M and 8 players on S. In periods with construction areas on S the equilibrium is 15 players on M and 3 players on S. Two treatments with 6 sessions each were run at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at Bonn University. Feedback was given in treatment I only about own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for M and S. Money payoffs increase with decreasing time. Subjects are told that in each of 200 periods they have to make a choice between the two routes.

Laboratory Experiments with Nagel-Schreckenberg Algorithm

A new software environment (NETSIM) is presented that can be used for interactive experimental studies concerning the route-choice behaviour of human actors in different scenarios. It is also possible to create scenarios in which human actors interact with software agents. Since the treatments in laboratory experiments are well controlled, the behaviour of subjects in situations of economically relevant decision-making can be analysed more thoroughly. We describe an experimental setup in which the Nagel Schreckenberg Algorithm for vehicle dynamics is used.

Survey and Forecasts on Public Transportation in NRW & Stirring up Interfaces and Demarcations of Traffic Models

This paper deals with traffic models designed for the calculation of traffic demand: traffic frequency, traffic distribution and the allocation of traffic to different means of transportation. It engrosses the traffic participation of persons in work traffic. Human behaviour and traffic participation represent a system, which offer a wide area to support planning power. The today’s status of nearest neighbourhood to the “Traffic”-system shall be replaced by making that system an integrated component of it, creating the “Time-Use — Traffic” — System. This paper deals with this aspect. Subjects of detailed presentation are results of mobility research in greater German cities (Dusseldorf 1998, Duisburg 2000 and Essen 2001), the data transfer to the Traffic-Demand-Model and the need to prepare the model according to the new title.