Markus Englerth

At the Mercy of the Prisoner Next Door: Using an Experimental Measure of Selfishness as a Criminological Tool

Do criminals maximise money? Are criminals more or less selfish than the average subject? Can prisons apply measures that reduce the degree of selfishness of their inmates? Using a tried and tested tool from experimental economics, we cast new light on these old criminological questions. In a standard dictator game, prisoners give a substantial amount, which calls for more refined versions of utility in rational choice theories of crime. Prisoners do not give less than average subjects, not even than subjects from other closely knit communities. This speaks against the idea that people commit crimes because they are excessively selfish. Finally those who receive better marks at prison school give more, as do those who improve their marks over time. This suggests that this correctional intervention also reduces selfishness.

Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment

For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics, inequity aversion, to offer an explanation. This theory could also explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming others. To test this theory, we exploit that it posits inequity aversion to be a personality trait. We can therefore test it in a very simple standard game. Inequity averse individuals give a fraction of their endowment to another anonymous, unendowed participant. We have prisoners play this game, and compare results to findings from a meta-study of more than 100 dictator games with non-prisoners. Surprisingly, results do not differ, not even if we only compare with other dictator games among close-knit groups. To exclude social proximity as an explanation, we retest prisoners on a second dictator game where the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less.

At the mercy of a prisoner three dictator experiments

ABSTRACT We test male juvenile prisoners on a dictator game with another anonymous co-prisoner as recipient. Prisoners give more than students, but less than nonstudents of their age. They give more to a charity than to another prisoner. In one of two experiments, those convicted for violent crime give more than those convicted for property crime.

How Do Prisoners Solve Their Dilemma? An Experiment

How do actual prisoners solve their proverbial dilemma? In a lab experiment, conducted in a German prison for male juvenile offenders, we find that prisoners are no less cooperative than students in a symmetric two-person prisoner’s dilemma. Using data from post-experimental tests, we explain this behavior with efficiency seeking, while our data do not support that choices are caused by inequity aversion.

Die Datenkrake als Nutztier der Strafverfolgung

Einleitung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. 326 Der „Pionier-Beschluss“ des AG Reutlingen .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. 329 Der staatliche Zugriff auf E-MailKommunikation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. 331 Ausgangsproblem .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 331 Die Rechtsprechung von BGH und BVerfG .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 332 Der 1. Strafsenat des BGH .. . . . . . 1. 332 Der 2. Senat des BVerfG . . . . . . . . . 2. 332 Der 3. Strafsenat des BGH .. . . . . . 3. 334 Ein Systematisierungsversuch . . . 4. 334 Kritik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. 336 Die Problematik sozialer Netzwerke . . D. 339 Messages und Chats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 340 Sonstige kommunikative Funktionen bei Facebook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 348 Exkurs: Strafprozessualer Zugriff durch die nachrichtendienstrechtliche Hintertür? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.