Thomas Schillemans

Does Horizontal Accountability Work? Evaluating Potential Remedies for the Accountability Deficit of Agencies

This article addresses the accountability deficit of executive agencies. It argues that the acclaimed deficit consists of two elements: the inability of democratic principals to hold autonomous agencies accountable and the insufficiency of hierarchical accountability mechanisms on their own. Horizontal mechanisms for accountability have been developed in which agencies account for their behavior toward stakeholders, boards of commissioners, and professional visitations. This article addresses the question whether and to what extent horizontal accountability mechanisms in practice serve as remedies for the deficit. An evaluative grading system is designed with which 15 horizontal accountability mechanisms of Dutch agencies are assessed. The analysis shows that horizontal accountability is a partial solution for the accountability deficit. It scarcely contributes to democratic control but has promising effects for organizational learning.

Innovations in Accountability: Learning Through Interactive, Dynamic, and Citizen-Initiated Forms of Accountability

Governments are experimenting with new forms of accountability that depart from tradition and are less bureaucratic in form, content, and symbolism. This article reports on the learning potential of recent public accountability innovations in Australia, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. All these innovations depart from the set formats of established forms of accountability, using new media and digital technology, not to increase the level of bureaucratic reporting, but to open up the accountability process to interactions with internal and external stakeholders. This enables critical dialogue on organizational conduct and performance that may foster organizational learning processes.

Moving Beyond The Clash of Interests: On stewardship theory and the relationships between central government departments and public agencies

Abstract This paper analyses the relationships between central government departments and agencies through the lens of stewardship theory. Stewardship theory has been developed as an alternative to agency theory and focuses on shared goals and norms. The paper first shows how current regulations are strongly imbedded in agency theory and then proceed to analyse, on the basis of a survey and focus groups, how the problems experienced by public managers generally point to the relevance of stewardship. On this basis and with input from sixty public managers, a stewardship model for the relationships between agencies and central governments is developed.

Managing Public Accountability: How Public Managers Manage Public Accountability

Accountability is of growing importance in contemporary governance. The academic literature on public accountability is fraught with concerned analyses, suggesting that accountability is a problematic issue for public managers. This article investigates how public managers experience accountability and how they cope with accountability. The analysis highlights a number of ways in which public managers do indeed “suffer” from accountability, although, conversely, most of the respondents were able to identify strategic coping mechanisms with which apparently problematic accountability requirements can be converted into practically useful procedures.

Media and public accountability: Typology and exploration

The role of the media in public accountability has often been discussed. This is especially the case for public sector organisations, whose accountability relations have changed in the shift from government to governance. In this paper, we develop a typology of the ways mass media are involved in public accountability processes. Media can stimulate actors to reflect on their behaviour, trigger formal accountability by reporting on the behaviour of actors, amplify formal accountability as they report on it or act as an independent and informal accountability forum. To explore the presence of these roles in practice, we focus on public sector organisations in the Netherlands. Our quantitative and qualitative analysis in the Netherlands suggests that the media primarily serve an indirect role in public accountability, either by invoking pre-emptive self-criticism in public organisations in anticipation of potential media scrutiny or by triggering formal accountability demands from MPs

Calibrating Public Sector Accountability: Translating experimental findings to public sector accountability

Abstract Accountability mechanisms are among the most important means with which governments guard and improve the performance of public sector organizations. However, research documents a plethora of accountability-failures. A key issue is: how can public sector accountability become more effective? This paper seeks to answer this question by connecting two largely separated strands of research: public administration research on real-world organizations and experimental research on the effects of different forms of accountability on decision-making. The paper develops the Calibrated Public Accountability-model (CPA-model) from experimental research findings which can be used to investigate how accountability can be calibrated to task requirements of organizations.

Learning From Accountability?! Whether, What, and When

ABSTRACT Accountability has been described as both an enabler of organizational learning and a barrier to it. This article uses case-studies, interviews, and observations of “workplace learning” in public sector organizations to advance our understanding of the relationship between accountability and organizational learning. It investigates whether public managers learn from their interactions with nongoverning boards, and, if so, what they learn about and under what conditions they learn. The analysis finds that organizational learning may thrive under the condition of multiple accountability and generally requires a combination of control and critical feedback.

Coping with Complexity: Internal Audit and Complex Governance

ABSTRACT Complexity, a key issue in accountability research, is almost coterminous with modern governance. Increased complexity is a key external contingency driving analyses of public administration. Scholars often conclude that “traditional” forms of centralized accountability and control are no longer feasible in the face of complexity, but at the same time, internal audit in government, as a form of centralized accountability and control, is expanding its scope. This apparent paradox is addressed by means of mixed research methods focusing on how internal auditors in government understand and cope with complexity. The article demonstrates that auditors do so by hybridizing values and through professional and relational anchoring of practices. The results suggest that public administration scholars should not write off centralized control in complex systems of governance. The article also suggests that new accountability issues arise, relating to professional autonomy and influence inside government.

From “Major Decisions” to “Everyday Life”: Direct Accountability to Clients

In this chapter we will discuss two models for democracy: the “Major Decisions Model” and the “Everyday Life Model”. In the Everyday Life Model, citizens involved in an accountability process can say whatever bothers them in their dealings with a health care organization. In the Major Decisions Model, citizens involved in an accountability process have to disregard their personal experiences and are rather asked to discuss major strategic plans and decisions on the organizational agenda. In the literature, the Major Decisions Model is generally seen as preferential, because it directly connects citizens to crucial decision-making. However, in some circumstances the Everyday Life Model might be wiser to adopt as it builds directly on the genuine daily experiences of clients in health care settings.

Nudging: een opinieverkenning onder gezondheidsprofessionals

SamenvattingHet zingt steeds meer rond onder beleidsmakers en gezondheidsprofessionals: Nudging, een strategie voor gedragsbeïnvloeding waarbij gebruik wordt gemaakt van de impulsieve, automatische processen die mensen gebruiken om keuzes te maken. Een ‘nudge’ kan mensen een duwtje geven in de richting van verstandige, gezonde keuzes. Hoewel deze aanpak veelbelovend lijkt, stuit nudging ook op weerstand. In dit stuk bespreken we een inventarisatie van de meningen van gezondheidsprofessionals over nudging: hoe effectief, legitiem en haalbaar vinden zij nudges voor het bevorderen van gezond gedrag? Als in algemene termen over nudging wordt gesproken is men overwegend positief; specifieke voorbeelden van nudges blijken echter meer discussie op te leveren.