Thomas Uebel

Carnap's Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism

Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Reconstructing the Aufbau 2. The problem of objectivity: an overview of Carnaps constitutional project 3. An outline of the constitutional projects for objectivity 4. The background to early Carnap: themes from Kant 5. The fundamentals of neo-Kantian epistemology 6. Carnaps neo-Kantian origins: Der Raum 7. Critical conventionalism 8. Epistemology between logic and science: the essential tension 9. After objectivity: logical empiricism as philosophy of science Bibliography Index.

Confirmation, Probability, and Logical Empiricism

THE HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHOD Confirmation and probability are the objects of much attention on the part of logical empiricists. In the first place, confirmation is connected with the ideal represented by the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method, reflecting the idea that scientific knowledge results from the interplay of laws, advanced by way of hypotheses, and singular statements regarding observational findings. Only well-established scientific laws allow for the application of the H-D method and can provide a sound basis for prediction and explanation. Most logical empiricists regard confirmation as the natural candidate for establishing scientific laws. Another candidate is corroboration, embraced by Popper contra logical empiricism. A lucid description of the interplay between laws and observational statements, which is at the core of the H-D method, is to be found in the following passage by Hans Hahn, anticipating the notion of corroboration: laws of nature are hypotheses which we state tentatively; but in stating such laws of nature we implicitly state many other propositions . . . as long as these implicitly stated propositions . . . are confirmed by observation, the laws of nature are corroborated and we continue to hold on to them; but if these implicitly asserted propositions are not confirmed by observation, the laws of nature are not corroborated and we go on to replace them by others. (Hahn 1933a/1987, 38)

Otto Neurath: Philosophy between Science and Politics.

Introduction Part I. A Life Between Science and Politics: 1. Before Munich 1.1. Early years 1.2. War economics 1.3. During the First World War 2. The socialisation debate 2.1. Setting the problem 2.2. Bauer and Korsch 2.3. The standard of living 2.4. Neurath on the structure of the socialist economy 2.5. The road to socialisation 2.6. Neuraths position in the debate 3. In the Bavarian revolution 3.1. The appointment 3.2. In office 3.3. On trial 4. In Red Vienna 4.1. Peoples education 4.2. The Housing Movement 4.3. The Museum of Economy and Society 4.4. The Vienna Circle 4.5. Exile in The Hague and Oxford Part II. On Neuraths Boat: 1. The Boat: Neuraths image of knowledge 2. In the First Vienna Circle 2.1. Three hypotheses 2.2. Machs legacy 2.3. The 1910 programme 3. From the Duhem Thesis to the Neurath Principle 3.1. Normative antifoundationalism 3.2. Radical descriptive antifoundationalism 3.3. Metatheoretical antifoundationalism 4 Rationality without foundations 4.1 The primacy of practical reason 4.2. Determining the conventions of science 4.3. The second Boat: one world 5. A theory of scientific discourse 5.1. Anti-philosophy, Marxism and radical physicalism 5.2. The forward defense of naturalism 5.3. Science as discourse: the theory of protocols 6. Towards a theory of practice Part III. Unity on the Earthly Plane: 1. Two stories with a common theme 2. Science: the stock of instruments 2.1. From re-represention to action 2.2. Unity without the pyramid 3. The attack on method 3.1. Boats and Ballungen 3.2. Protocols, precision and atomicity 3.3. The two Neurath Principles 4 Where Ballungen come from 4.1. Duhems symbols 4.2. The congestion of events 4.3. The density of concepts 4.4. The separability of planning and politics 4.5. How Marxists think of history 5. Negotiation, not regulation Conclusion.