Thorsten Chmura

Experiments and Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour

The paper reports laboratory experiments with a two route choice scenario. In each session 18 subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity of M was larger. Feedback was given in treatment I only on the subjects’ own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for M and S. The main results are as follows: • Mean numbers on M and S are near to pure equilibrium. • Fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions. • The total number of changes is significantly greater in treatment I. • Subjects’ road changes and payoffs are negatively correlated. • A direct response mode results in more changes for bad payoffs whereas a contrary response mode shows opposite reactions. • Simulations of an extended payoff sum learning model fits the main results of the statistical evaluation of the data.

Loyalty programs in emerging and developed markets: the impact of cultural values on loyalty program choice

Loyalty programs increase customers’ repeat purchase behavior and reward their continued patronage by enhancing the firms value proposition. Yet little is known about how cultural values affect loyalty program choice as firms expand abroad. This understanding is important because multinational corporations must decide whether to standardize or adapt their loyalty programs when internationalizing. The authors develop and test theory proposing that cultural values influence loyalty program choice. The results indicate that cultural differences matter. Consumers from countries high in power-distance values and low in individualism values prefer loyalty programs that offer related rewards, whereas consumers from countries low in masculinity values and low in uncertainty avoidance values prefer unrelated rewards. The analysis also indicates that consumers from countries high in masculinity values and high in uncertainty avoidance values shun loyalty programs altogether and prefer immediate promotional offers. This finding suggests that loyalty programs do not work equally well in all countries and that multinational corporations may need to adapt reward programs as they internationalize to ensure that their loyalty-building efforts are successful.

Experimental Investigation of Day-to-Day Route Choice Behaviour

The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6 on S. Two treatments with 6 sessions each were run at the computerized Laboratory of Experimental Economics at Bonn University using RatImage [1]. Feedback was given in treatment I only about own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for M and S. Money payoffs increase with decreasing time. The main results are as follows: Though mean numbers on M and S are very near to the equilibrium, fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions in both treatments. The Fluctuations are smaller under treatment II. The effect is small but significant. The total number of changes is significantly greater in treatment I. Two response modes can be observed: A direct response mode reacts with more changes for bad payoffs whereas a contrary response mode shows opposite reactions. Subjects’ road changes and payoffs are negatively correlated in all sessions.

At the Mercy of the Prisoner Next Door: Using an Experimental Measure of Selfishness as a Criminological Tool

Do criminals maximise money? Are criminals more or less selfish than the average subject? Can prisons apply measures that reduce the degree of selfishness of their inmates? Using a tried and tested tool from experimental economics, we cast new light on these old criminological questions. In a standard dictator game, prisoners give a substantial amount, which calls for more refined versions of utility in rational choice theories of crime. Prisoners do not give less than average subjects, not even than subjects from other closely knit communities. This speaks against the idea that people commit crimes because they are excessively selfish. Finally those who receive better marks at prison school give more, as do those who improve their marks over time. This suggests that this correctional intervention also reduces selfishness.

The Tobin Tax - A Game-Theoretical and an Experimental Approach

In the nineteenseventies, James Tobin suggested the introduction of a transaction tax on the currency market to cope with exchange rate volatility. We investigate the consequences of the introduction of such a tax on an asset market model from a game-theoretic and an experimental point of view. Our main results include in respect to our model that contrary to the situation in game-theoretic equilibrium, the Tobin tax i) reduces trade volume, ii) reduces volatility, iii) increases market efficiency, and iv) decreases earnings inequality.

Experiments on Route Choice Behaviour

The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6 on S.

Generalized Impulse Balance: An Experimental Test for a Class of 3 × 3 Games

In this paper, we introduce a generalized version of impulse balance equilibrium. The stationary concept is applied to 3 × 3 games based on the Bailiff and Poacher Game (Selten, 1991) and its predictive success is experimentally tested against the one of Nash equilibrium. Experiments with 26 different games were conducted; 12 games with completely mixed Nash equilibria and 14 games with partially mixed Nash equilibria. In all the games, generalized impulse balance yields predictions that are closer to the data than the ones of Nash equilibrium. Overall, generalized impulse balance has a significantly higher predictive success than Nash equilibrium.

Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment

For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics, inequity aversion, to offer an explanation. This theory could also explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming others. To test this theory, we exploit that it posits inequity aversion to be a personality trait. We can therefore test it in a very simple standard game. Inequity averse individuals give a fraction of their endowment to another anonymous, unendowed participant. We have prisoners play this game, and compare results to findings from a meta-study of more than 100 dictator games with non-prisoners. Surprisingly, results do not differ, not even if we only compare with other dictator games among close-knit groups. To exclude social proximity as an explanation, we retest prisoners on a second dictator game where the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less.

At the mercy of a prisoner three dictator experiments

ABSTRACT We test male juvenile prisoners on a dictator game with another anonymous co-prisoner as recipient. Prisoners give more than students, but less than nonstudents of their age. They give more to a charity than to another prisoner. In one of two experiments, those convicted for violent crime give more than those convicted for property crime.

Minority Game - Experiments and Simulations

The paper reports laboratory experiments on a minority game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a road A and a road B. Nine subjects participated in each session. Subjects played 100 rounds and had to choose between one of both roads. The road which the minority of players chose got positive payoffs. Two treatments with 6 sessions each were run at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at Bonn University. Feedback was given in treatment I only about own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for road A and road B.