Timm Triplett

Azande Logic Versus Western Logic

In Knowledge and Social Imagery, David Bloor suggests that logical reasoning is radically relativistic in the sense that there are incompatible ways of reasoning logically, and no culturally transcendent rules of correct logical inference exist which could allow for adjudication of these different ways of reasoning. Bloor cites an example of reasoning used by the Azande as an illustration of such logical relativism. A close analysis of this reasoning reveals that the Azandes logic is in fact impeccably Aristotelian. I argue that the conclusions Bloor can legitimately draw from his case study are not controversial and do nothing to make plausible the thesis of logical relativism.

Relativism and the Sociology of Mathematics: Remarks on Bloor, Flew, and Frege

Antony Flews ‘A Strong Programme for the Sociology of Belief (Inquiry 25 {1982], 365–78) critically assesses the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge defended in David Bloors Knowledge and Social Imagery. I argue that Flews rejection of the epistemological relativism evident in Bloors work begs the question against the relativist and ignores Bloors focus on the social relativity of mathematical knowledge. Bloor attempts to establish such relativity via a sociological analysis of Freges theory of number. But this analysis only succeeds if the rejection of an explanatory theory entails that there are reasonable grounds for the rejection of the set of propositions which that theory was intended to explain. I argue against such an entailment, and thus against Bloors attempt to relativize mathematical knowledge.

The philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm

This text mixes Chisholm as a disseminator of others ideas, with his own theories of knowledge and perception, his defence of Cartesian dualism, foundationalism, his adverbial theory of sensory experience, and his immanent agent causation as a solution to the problem of personal freedom.

Bernard Gert's Morality and its application to computer ethics

Bernard Gert’s account of the moral system is at once modest and bold, traditional and original. It is modest and traditional because it claims that the moral system is already known and understood, at least implicitly, by everyone. Gert claims merely to be articulating common sense. Yet Gert’s account is bold and original because it works orthogonally to the whole tradition of moral theory in Western philosophy. Gert believes that both Kantian and utilitarian moral theories are based on the fundamental mistake of trying to create an innovative system of morality instead of acknowledging the system we already have. The point of a moral theory should be to describe, explain and if possible justify the common moral system that already exists. Gert sees the moral system as analogous to a natural language and its rules. A natural language is rich and nuanced, structured by complex grammatical rules which native speakers nevertheless implicitly understand and employ with great facility. In an analogous way, the moral system is complex and nuanced, but nevertheless readily understood and used by all moral agents as they make decisions and evaluate their own and others’ actions. An artificially constructed moral system, Gert feels, could never achieve this richness and sensitivity and, in any case, is an excrescence. Another aspect of the originality of Gert’s approach is that it combines 1) a strong insistence that morality is a universal system that applies to all moral agents and all cultures, and 2) a recognition that many significant moral disputes are unresolvable – that there is no single and abidingly true correct answer to every moral question. Gert’s universalism boldly cuts against the grain of our relativism-loving culture. But, with the recognition of unresolvable moral disputes, Gert also challenges the overconfidence characteristic of universalist approaches to morality. I do not know of any other moral philosopher who has developed with such care and insight an account of morality that clearly avoids moral relativism while also avoiding the dogmatic and counterintuitive claims typical of many universalist moral systems. (Whether there is a tension between the traditional and the original in Gert’s approach – between, that is, Gert’s claim to be merely making explicit what is already implicit in common sense and his detailed working out of, for example, the moral rules and the two-tiered method for justifying violations of the moral rules – is an interesting question which will be touched on below, but cannot be fully explored here.) This review article consists of a brief summary of Gert’s account of the moral system,1 some general remarks on that account, and a more detailed consideration of Gert’s procedure for using the moral system to resolve specific ethical debates, focusing on a current debate in computer ethics.

Does observational knowledge require metaknowledge? A dialogue on Sellars

Abstract In the following dialogue between TT – a foundationalist – and WdeV – a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars’s ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’. Sellars writes: ‘For a Konstatierung “This is green” to “express observational knowledge”, not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of “This is green” are symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.’ In the ensuing dialogue, TT argues that it sets the bar too high when knowledge about perceptual conditions is required for ordinary observational knowledge – that young children, for example, are implausibly excluded as knowers given Sellars’s principle. WdeV defends Sellars’s metaknowledge requirement against these charges. Results from developmental psychology are surveyed for what they show about the actual capabilities of young children. The implications of these results for the success of Sellars’s principle are debated.

Rescher's Metaphilosophy

Books reviewed in this article: Nicholas Rescher, Philosophical Standardism Nicholas Rescher, The Strife of Systems Nicholas Rescher, A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. III, Metaphysical Inquiries

Rorty's critique of foundationalism

Summary and conclusionRortys critique concentrates on one aspect of foundationalism: the claim that nonpropositional sensory awareness serves as the basis for propositional justification. This claim is an essential component of classical foundationalism, though not necessarily of the more moderate versions of foundationalism that have been proposed. Thus even if it were a successful critique it would tell against only one type of foundationalism. But nothing in Rortys argument provides any reason to doubt the plausibility of a classical foundationalist explanation of why sensory awareness justifies ordinary nonbasic propositions. Even classical foundationalism, then, remains untouched by Rortys critique.

Is Sellars's Rylean hypothesis plausible? A dialogue

In order to provide an alternative to the Cartesian myth that knowledge of our thoughts and sensations is “given,” Sellars posits a community of “Rylean ancestors” – humans at an early stage of conceptual development who possess a language containing sophisticated concepts about the physical world and about their own language and behavior, but who lack any concepts of thoughts or sensations. Sellars’s presentation of this thought experiment leaves many important details sketchy. In the following dialogue, we offer our differing assessments of how well those details could be filled out. TT questions how the Rylean hypothesis could provide a plausible account of human thought and sensory experience at any stage of human conceptual development. WdeV responds to TT’s challenge by filling out the picture of what the Ryleans’ conceptual world would look like. TT and WdeV debate the merits and the plausibility of the resulting picture.