Timothy M. Flemming

Disconnect in concept learning by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): judgment of relations and relations-between-relations.

The authors investigated the role that entropy measures, discriminative cues, and symbolic knowledge play for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in the acquisition of the concepts of same and different for use in a computerized relational matching-to-sample task. After repeatedly failing to perceive relations between pairs of stimuli in a 2-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys rapidly learned to discriminate between 8-element arrays. Subsequent tests with smaller arrays, however, suggested that, although important for the initial acquisition of the concept, entropy is not a variable on which monkeys are dependent. Not only do monkeys choose a corresponding relational pair in the presence of a cue, but they also choose the cue itself in the presence of the relational pair--in essence, labeling those relations. Subsequent failure in the judgment of relations-between-relations, however, suggests that perhaps a qualitatively different cognitive component exists that prevents monkeys from behaving analogically.

Responses to the Assurance game in monkeys, apes, and humans using equivalent procedures

There is great interest in the evolution of economic behavior. In typical studies, species are asked to play one of a series of economic games, derived from game theory, and their responses are compared. The advantage of this approach is the relative level of consistency and control that emerges from the games themselves; however, in the typical experiment, procedures and conditions differ widely, particularly between humans and other species. Thus, in the current study, we investigated how three primate species, capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans, played the Assurance (or Stag Hunt) game using procedures that were, to the best of our ability, the same across species, particularly with respect to training and pretesting. Our goal was to determine what, if any, differences existed in the ways in which these species made decisions in this game. We hypothesized differences along phylogenetic lines, which we found. However, the species were more similar than might be expected. In particular, humans who played using “nonhuman primate-friendly” rules did not behave as is typical. Thus, we find evidence for similarity in decision-making processes across the order Primates. These results indicate that such comparative studies are possible and, moreover, that in any comparison rating species’ relative abilities, extreme care must be taken in ensuring that one species does not have an advantage over the others due to methodological procedures.

Discrimination reversal learning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).

Learning styles in capuchin monkeys were assessed with a computerized reversal-learning task called the mediational paradigm. First, monkeys were trained to respond with 90% accuracy on a two-choice discrimination (A+B-−). Then the authors examined differences in performance on three different types of reversal trials (A-−B+, A-−C+, B+C-−), each of which offered differing predictions for performance, depending on whether the monkeys were using associative cues or rule-based strategies. Performance indicated that the monkeys mainly learned to avoid the B stimulus during training, as the A-−C+ condition produced the best performance levels. Therefore, negative stimuli showed greater control over responding after reversal and reflected a more associative rather than rule-based form of learning.

What Meaning Means for Same and Different: Analogical Reasoning in Humans (Homo sapiens), Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g., D. Premack, 1976; R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli.

Nonverbal estimation during numerosity judgements by adult humans.

On an automated task, humans selected the larger of two sets of items, each created through the one-by-one addition of items. Participants repeated the alphabet out loud during trials so that they could not count the items. This manipulation disrupted counting without producing major effects on other cognitive capacities such as memory or attention, and performance of this experimental group was poorer than that of participants who counted the items. In Experiment 2, the size of individual items was varied, and performance remained stable when the larger numerical set contained a smaller total amount than the smaller numerical set (i.e., participants used numerical rather than nonnumerical quantity cues in making judgements). In Experiment 3, reports of the number of items in a single set showed scalar variability as accuracy decreased, and variability in responses increased with increases in true set size. These data indicate a mechanism for the approximate representation of numerosity in adult humans that might be shared with nonhuman animals.

Ordinal judgments of symbolic stimuli by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): The effects of differential and nondifferential reward.

Ordinal learning was investigated in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). In Experiment 1, both species were presented with pairings of the Arabic numerals 0 to 9. Some monkeys were given food rewards equal to the value of the numeral selected and some were rewarded with a single pellet only for choosing the higher numeral within the pair. Both species learned to select the larger numeral, but only rhesus monkeys that were differentially rewarded performed above chance levels when presented with novel probe pairings. In Experiment 2, the monkeys were first presented with arrays of 5 familiar numerals (from the range 0 to 9) and then arrays of 5 novel letters (from the range A to J) with the same reward outcomes in place as in Experiment 1. Both species performed better with the numerals, suggesting that an ordinal sequence of all stimuli had been learned during Experiment 1, rather than a matrix of two-choice discriminations.

Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) Do Not Form Expectations Based on Their Partner’s Outcomes

Several primate species form expectations based on others’ outcomes, responding negatively when their outcomes differ from their partners’. The function and evolutionary pathway of this behavior are unknown, in part because all of the species which have been tested thus far share traits related to a gregarious lifestyle, intelligence, and cooperativeness. Our goal was to test whether inequity is a homology among primates or a convergence by comparing one species known to show social comparisons, the chimpanzee, to another great ape which differs on several of these life history characteristics. Using a protocol identical to one used previously with chimpanzees, we tested whether orangutans, an intelligent but predominantly solitary species with few opportunities to cooperate, responded similarly. To allow for a strong comparison with chimpanzees (and other species), we used socially housed adults of both sexes, tested with members of their social group. Orangutans did not respond negatively to inequity, supporting previous findings and indicating that inequity responses in apes are likely a convergence based on either sociality or cooperative tendency. These results in such closely related species highlight the need for additional comparative studies to understand better the function and evolution of social behaviors.

Analogical reasoning and the differential outcome effect: Transitory bridging of the conceptual gap for rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta ).

Monkeys, unlike chimpanzees and humans, have a marked difficulty acquiring relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks that likely reflect the cognitive foundation upon which analogical reasoning rests. In the present study, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed a categorical (identity and nonidentity) RMTS task with differential reward (pellet ratio) and/or punishment (timeout ratio) outcomes for correct and incorrect choices. Monkeys in either differential reward-only or punishment-only conditions performed at chance levels. However, the RMTS performance of monkeys experiencing both differential reward and punishment conditions was significantly better than chance. Subsequently when all animals experienced nondifferential outcomes tests, their RMTS performance levels were at chance. These results indicate that combining differential reward and punishment contingencies provide an effective, albeit transitory, scaffolding for monkeys to judge analogical relations-between-relations.

Conceptual thresholds for same and different in old-(Macaca mulatta) and new-world (Cebus apella) monkeys

Learning of the relational same/different (S/D) concept has been demonstrated to be largely dependent upon stimulus sets containing more than two items for pigeons and old-world monkeys. Stimulus arrays containing several images for use in same/different discrimination procures (e.g. 16 identical images vs. 16 nonidentical images) have been shown to facilitate and even be necessary for learning of relational concepts (Flemming et al., 2007; Wasserman et al., 2001; Young et al., 1997). In the present study, we investigate the threshold at which a new world primate, the capuchin (Cebus apella) may be able to make such a discrimination. Utilizing a method of increasing entropy, rather than conventional procedures of decreasing entropy, we demonstrate unique evidence that capuchin monkeys are readily capable of making 2-item relational S/D conditional discriminations. In another experiment, we examine the supposed level of difficulty in making S/D discriminations by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Whereas pigeons (Columba livia) and baboons (Papio papio) have shown marked difficulty simultaneously discriminating same from different arrays at all when composed of fewer than 8 items each, rhesus monkeys seem to understand that pairs of stimuli connote sameness and difference just the same (Flemming et al., 2007). With sustained accurate performance of 2-item S/D discriminations, both experienced and task-naïve rhesus monkeys appear quite certain in their conceptual knowledge of same and different. We conclude that learning of the same/different relational concept may be less dependent upon high levels of entropy contrast than originally hypothesized for nonhuman primates.