Timothy W. Guinnane

Sample-Selection Biases and the Industrialization Puzzle

Understanding long-term changes in human well-being is central to understanding the consequences of economic development. An extensive anthropometric literature purports to show that heights in the United States declined between the 1830s and the 1890s, which is when the US economy industrialized and urbanized. Most research argues that declining heights reflects the impact of the industrialization process. This interpretation, however, relies on sources subject to selection bias. Changes in that selection mechanism may account for the declining heights. We show that the evidentiary basis of the puzzle is not as robust as previously believed. Our meta-analysis of more than 150 studies shows that declining-heights finding emerges primarily in selected samples. Finally, we offer a parsimonious diagnostic test for revealing (but not necessarily correcting for) selection bias. The diagnostic applied to four samples that underlay the industrialization puzzle shows compelling evidence of selection.

Bringing 'Honest Capital' to Poor Borrowers: The Passage of the Uniform Small Loan Law, 1907-1930

The Uniform Small Loan Law (usll)—the primary tool of the Russell Sage Foundation (rsf) intended to improve credit conditions for poor people in the United States during first decades of the twentieth century—created a new class of lenders who could legally make small loans at interest rates exceeding those allowed for banks. By the 1930s, about two-thirds of the states had passed the usll. Econometric models show that urbanization, state-level economic characteristics, and the nature of a states banking system all affected the chance of passage. That party-political affiliations had no effect is consistent with the uslls “progressive” character. The passage of the usll in one state, however, made passage less likely in neighboring or similar states. The evidence suggests that the rsf only imperfectly understood the political economy of the usll, and that a different overall approach might have produced a result closer to its real aims.

The poor law and pensions in Ireland.

Drawing on several types of evidence created by the pensions enactment and administration this note studies generational relations and the impact of the Old Age Pension in the years just after its creation [in Ireland in 1908]....The evidence shows that before the old-age pension many aged people received support from children and others often by co-residing with younger people. The pension altered some aspects of household structure both by reinforcing a preexisting tendency to form complex households and by increasing household headship rates for aged women. The pension also redefined the responsibilities of the Irish poor relief system by removing the majority of aged paupers from its care. (EXCERPT)

Making Do with Imperfect Law: Small Firms in France and Germany 1890-1935

This paper uses a tight comparison of similar firms operating at the same time under ostensibly similar laws in two countries to study the implementation of new legal forms. The new forms are intermediate between limited partnerships and corporations. A French law of 1925 created the SARL, a new enterprise form modeled on the German GmbH of 1892. The new form was very popular in each country, partly because of the subtle balance it built in the relationships between managers and shareholders. Using samples of the articles of association for GmbHs and SARLs in the period 1892-1935, we show how German and French firms used these new frameworks, and how apparently minor differences in the provisions of each law can have significant implications for economic actors.

Reputational Externality and Self-Regulation

Professional associations and other producer groups often complain that their reputation is damaged by other groups providing a similar but lower-quality service and that the latter should be regulated. We examine the conditions under which a common regulatory regime can induce Pareto-improvements by creating a common reputation for quality among heterogeneous producers, when the regulator cannot commit to a given quality. A common reputation can be created only if the groups are not too different and if marginal cost is declining. High cost groups and small groups benefit most from forming a common regime.